altogether too much for Chetqua, who proceeded to invent where he could not guess. The trusting assistant copied it all down with complete confidence. Typical of Chetqua’s pronouncements are the following.

“This Book is difficult to be comprehended by the Chinese themselves and is supposed to contain some abstract Doctrines of their Religion.” (Note inside the book Taihei bukun taizen, a register of the feudal aristocracy giving family crests, lineage, residence, income, etc.)

“This Book is in the old Chinese Character which Chetqua does not sufficiently understand to explain. But it probably is an Account of the different Dresses of the Empire in different Times.” (Ise monogatari shō. Selections from the Ise monogatari with commentary notes, illustrated by Hishikawa Moronobu.)

“A Book of Instruction by a Chinese Priestess.” (Chetqua’s description of the text of Nokiba no oe, a Nō play by Zeami Motokiyo.)

“A Book of Examination for the Office of Mandarin.” (A collection of five Nō plays by Zenchiku, Motokiyo, etc.)

It is pleasing to be able to record, in this anniversary number for Arthur Waley, that it was Dr. Waley himself who saw that all was not well with Chetqua’s account of the last two items, and added in pencil in his distinctive handwriting a correct description of the books. No doubt Dr. Waley has long forgotten this, but his pencilled notes survive (though unsigned) as another small tribute to his astonishingly wide-ranging scholarship.

The British Museum hopes to publish in the near future a catalogue of the books which Kaempfer brought back from Japan. This will bring to light no startling discoveries of Japanese literary works unknown to bibliographers, and few unrecorded editions, but it will at least place on record a full description of this small library of historic interest, in all probability the first Japanese books ever seen in this country.

“BEING” IN WESTERN PHILOSOPHY
COMPARSED WITH SHIH/FEI AND YU/WU
IN CHINESE PHILOSOPHY

by A. C. GRAHAM

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INTRODUCTION

To what extent are differences between Chinese and Western thought affected by grammatical differences between Chinese and the Indo-European languages? Every Western sinologist knows that there is no exact equivalent in his own language for such a word as jen 仁 or shên, and that as long as he thinks of it as synonymous with “benevolence” or “virtue” he will impose Western preconceptions on the thought he is studying. He is bound to suspect that there are also deeper structural differences which mideath him in the same way, and which it is much harder to identify. This question, vital to the study of Chinese philosophy and still hardly touched, is of interest to others besides sinologists. It is now widely recognized that the relation between the thought of a society and its language presents an
important problem. The best known statement of this problem, that of B. L. Whorf in the papers posthumously collected under the title Language, Thought and Reality (1956), is based on the American Indian language Hopi. But almost the first language to be attacked from this point of view was Chinese, in I. A. Richards’ Mencius on the Mind (1932); and for more than one reason Chinese is especially suitable for the purpose. It is the only language outside the Indo-European family with a rich philosophical tradition entirely independent of Europe; and the fact that it is an uninflected language, with rules of word-order largely similar to those of Russian, reduces the difficulty of explaining the structure of a Chinese sentence to those ignorant of the language.

The verb “to be” is one of the most striking peculiarities of the Indo-European group, performing a variety of functions which most languages distinguish sharply. The metaphysical problems which it raises have been important throughout the history of Western philosophy, from the Existentialists to the Physicists. Classical Chinese deals with the various functions of “to be” by means of at least six different sets of words and constructions, several of which have other functions outside the scope of “to be”. Among the Chinese words, shih/fei and yu/wu occasion philosophical problems which overlap our own problem of Being. Until we can decide in what respects these words resemble and differ from “to be”, we cannot avoid projecting our own presuppositions about Being onto Chinese philosophy.  

1 Abbreviations: SPTK, Su-shu ts’ung-h’an; SPPY, Su-shu pei-yen; BSS, Basic Sinological Series.

2 Like many other revolutionary books, this is important less for its conclusions than for the questions it asks. Cf. Language in Culture (American Anthropological Association, Memoir No. 79, 1954), edited by Harry Hoijer, a symposium on the Whorfian hypothesis, including a contribution on Chinese versus English by Charles F. Hoijer.

The relation between “to be” and Chinese words with similar functions is discussed by Waley (cf. Part 2, Introduction below); by Nakamura Hajime 申村英, Tōgō shin sei kōdō 東洋人の思惟方法 (Tokyo 1948–9), 1/353–9, 320–30; by Chang Tung-nan 張東川, Differences between Chinese and Western Philosophy from the Point of View of Linguistic Structure (Tung-fang tzu-shih 東方雜志, 1935, 3/1, not seen).

PART I. THE TREATMENT OF SIX FUNCTIONS OF “TO BE” IN CLASSICAL CHINESE

A. EXISTENCE. “THERE IS A MAN”

Classical Chinese has one word for “have” and “there is”, yu 有, negative wú 無;

我有大樹
“I have a big tree”

朱有富人
“There was a rich man in Sung” (Sung had a rich man)

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穀有肥馬
“There are fat horses in the stables” (The stables have fat horses)

天下無馬
“There are no horses in the world” (The world has no horses)

有人於此
“There is a man here”

When existence is affirmed, yu generally has no subject, as in the last example. But a Chinese sentence does not necessarily have a subject, and even in these cases we need not hesitate to say that yu is a transitive verb followed by its object. There are two words in classical Chinese which always function as object, chih 之 (him, her, it) and to 所 (him or her whom, that which). Both are often found with yu: 有之 (have it, there is this), 所有 (what one has, what there is).

Thus in Chinese one approaches existence from something outside, usually undefined, which has, in which there is, the thing in question. The same is true of ordinary English and French, in which one says “there is X” rather than “X is”,” il y a X” rather than “X est”. But Western philosophy, grounded in Greek and Latin rather than in ordinary modern speech, has generally approached the question from the opposite direction, from the thing which “is” or “exists”. The object of yu is the subject of “is”.

B. GENERAL COPULA LINKING NOUNS. “HE IS A MAN”

In modern Chinese there is a straightforward copulative verb shih 是, negated by pu 不, the ordinary negative preceding verbs. But in classical Chinese the position is more complicated. There is a negative copulative verb fei 非 linking nouns and substantival phrases:

白馬非馬。
“A white horse is not a horse.”

But there is no corresponding verb in the affirmative. Sometimes two nouns are simply juxtaposed without a copula; more often (in philosophical texts nearly always) they are followed by the final particle yeh.

白馬馬也，乘白馬馬也。
“A white horse is a horse. To ride a white horse is to ride a horse.”

Although this is the commonest function of final yeh, it has many others; thus it is frequently used after substantival clauses and after passive verbs following k'o 可 “may”.

In long sentences the division between subject and complement is often marked by shih, “this” (the aforementioned, the thing in question . . . not “this here”, which is ts‘u 此, opposite of pi 彼 “that there”). This pronoun gradually became the modern verb shih, a development which is easy to understand since shih stands in the same position as fei, between subject and complement.

知之為知之，不知為不知，是知也。
“When you know it to recognize that you know it, and to recognize that you don’t when you don’t, this is knowing.”

When there is a judgement between alternatives, yeh and fei can cover a whole sentence: “(The right alternative is that . . .) or “is not that . . .”

爾固為哭吾師?”諾曰, “臣非敢哭爾師, 哭臣之子也。

“Why are you weeping for my army?” They answered, “It is not that we presume to weep for your army; we are weeping for our sons.”

From the opposite direction, whether A is or is not B, whether an assertion or action is right or wrong, is judged by shih and fei. “It is this is B, is the right alternative)” and “It is not:”

輪匠執其規矩, 以度天下之方圓, 曰, ‘中者是也, 不中者非也.’

“Wheelwrights and carpenters take their compasses and squares to measure the world’s squares and circles, and say ‘What coincides, is this; what does not coincide, is not.’”

“前日之不置是, 則今日之受非也。

“If your refusal on a previous day was right, your acceptance today is wrong.”

In this usage shih is genuinely parallel with fei, and ceases to be a pronoun at an early date; in the third century B.C. it is already sometimes negated by pu.

Chinese indicates time by particles which precede verbs (and adjectives, if we choose to classify them separately); since there is no main verb in “A B yeh”, it may be asked how one is to show whether A was, is or will be B. But there is no time reference in sentences of this class. Of the six classes distinguished in this essay, four have the possibility of time reference. A man’s existence (type A) has a beginning and end in time; so does his being a soldier or an artist (D), his being young, tall or happy (E), his being in England or in France (F). But it would clearly be meaningless to ask since when he has been a human being, a mammal and a solid object, or for how long he will continue to be the person I met yesterday or the reason why I visited Bristol last December. Although Socrates is dead, we can all see that to introduce tense into the sylllogism would be a useless complication. Japanese Kambun versions of Chinese texts replace yeh by a verb, nari, but they keep it in the plain form without conjugation. There are many examples of sentences containing yeh in the present essay; is there one in which the tense of “to be” in the translation gives any information which the Chinese text fails to provide?

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1 Kuang-yang chuan, Duke Hsi 33, summer.
2 Mo-tsou, SPTK, 7/3B/6-8.
3 Mencius 2B/3.
4 Cf. Mo-tsou, 10/3A/4, 11/5B/7; Chuang-tsou, SPTK, 1/4B/8; Lü-shih ch’un-ch’i, SPTK, 16/18B/8.
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C. IDENTITY. “HE IS CHARLES”

Yeh can be used for identity (A is B and B is A) as well as for class membership; but there is also a special copula for identity, chi 齋. The pre-Han philosophers make little use of it, but later the Buddhists and the Neo-Confucians use it regularly:

道即性也, 若道外尋性, 性外尋道, 便不相望。

“The Way is human nature. It is wrong to seek human nature outside the Way, or the Way outside human nature.”

1 Throughout this essay I shall speak of class membership and ignore class inclusion, since the logical difference between the two is not reflected in the ordinary forms of either Chinese or English.

2 Ch’eng Hao 釋義 (1032-92), in Ho-nan Ch’eng-shih yi-shu 河南程氏遺書, BSS, 1/1.

D. ROLES. “HE IS A SOLDIER”

As we have seen, the copula yeh does not provide for time reference. In order to deal with temporary roles, classical Chinese used the verb wei 為 “make”. Wei can hardly be called a copula: it has the flavour of an active verb, “to act as”... 為君 “to be ruler”, 為臣 “to be minister”.

七日化為虎......方其為虎也, 不知其為人也, 方其為人, 不知其且為虎也。

“After seven days he changed into a tiger . . . When he was a tiger, he did not know that he had been a man; when he was a man, he did not know that he was going to be a tiger.”

1 Huai-nan-ts’ou, SPTK, 2/2B/1, 5f.

E. COPULA WITH ADJECTIVES. “HE IS TALL”

In Indo-European languages adjectives have much in common with nouns (especially when they are declined, as in Latin); in Chinese, on the other hand, it is doubtful whether there is any formal division between adjectives and verbs. Thus in English an adjective, like a noun, is linked as predicate to the subject by a copula (“He is tall”); in Chinese it stands in the position of the main verb without a final yeh (人稱義 “Human nature is (good)”). Like a verb, it is negated by pu instead of fei, can be preceded by temporal particles such as chang 將, “about to” and chi 齋 “already”, and can be followed by the perfective particle yi 為.

It is of course true that the final yeh often occurs after a verb or adjective, among other reasons because the verb or adjective is substantivized (是也、也 “This is also running away”), or because the sentence as a whole is linked with what precedes (見不見羊也 “It is because you
had seen the ox but not yet seen the sheep”). In the case of adjectives, one is sometimes tempted to suppose that the yeh is linking the adjective to the subject; but closer inspection shows that this is not the case. In the following examples of jen, “benevolent” from 孟子⁴ there is no yeh:

君仁莫不仁。

“If the ruler (is) benevolent, no one (is) not benevolent.”

為富不仁矣，為仁不富矣。

“Those whose concern is riches (are) no longer benevolent, those whose concern is benevolence (are) no longer rich.”

In the following, there is yeh:

憐恤之心仁也。

“A sympathetic heart is benevolence” (not “is benevolent”).

“Kill one guiltless person is not benevolence” (not “is not benevolent”).

In the following, the first jen (with yeh) contrasts with the second (without yeh):

有人於此，其待我以側陋，則君子必自反也，‘我必不仁也，必無福也，此物豈宜乎哉。’自反而仁矣，自反而有福矣，其側陋由是也……君子曰，‘此亦異人也已矣。’

“Suppose there is a man who treats one unreasonably; then a gentleman will always examine himself, thinking: It must be that I have not (been) benevolent, that I have failed in courtesy. How could such a thing happen to me? If after examining himself he (is) benevolent, does behave courteously, but the man remains as unreasonable as before . . . the gentleman will say: ‘After all he is just a man without principles’.”

As we have seen, one refers back to a noun by shih, “this”; similarly, one refers back to a verb by jen 然, “thus”:

皆有憐惜憐恤之心……非惡其側陋然而也。

“All have the feeling of sympathy and distress . . . It is not because they hate getting a bad reputation that it is thus (that they have this feeling).”

In this respect also the adjective goes with the verb against the noun:

人情善不美……唯賢者為不然。

“Human passions are utterly evil . . . it is only in the worthy that it is not thus (they are not evil).”

Like shih, jen may be used to approve a statement, an action or a thing; and in this usage the difference between the two diminishes:

聚其所而愛之，則萬物莫不愛。因其所非而蔽之，則萬物莫不蔽。

“If you approve them on the basis of what they approve, the myriad things are all right (jen); if you condemn them on the basis of what they condemn, they are all wrong (fei).”

F. COPULA WITH LOCATION. “HE IS IN PARIS”

There is a special verb of location, ts'ai in “is in”:

‘所謂道，吾在斯?’莊子曰:‘无所不在。’

“Where is it, what you call the Tao?’ Chuang-tzu said, “There is no place where it is not.”

Ts'ai is sometimes used without an indication of place—“is present, is alive”:

父在觀其志，父沒觀其行。

“When his father is alive, observe his intentions; when his father is dead, observe his conduct.”

CONCLUSIONS

The verb “to be” is a characteristic of Indo-European languages which may well be unique; according to Ernst Locher⁵ languages outside this group generally distinguish between existential and copulative being, and the majority also have a single word for having and existential being. Are we to conclude that only Indo-European languages have a word for the concept of Being, and that other languages are forced to fill the gap with words which really mean “have”, “this” and “make”? The absurdity of this conclusion becomes apparent as soon as it is put into words; but since as a hidden presupposition it may be fatal to the understanding of Chinese discussions of shih/fei and yu/wu, let us consider more closely what is wrong with it.

An Englishman learning Chinese takes a little time to rid himself of the impression that something is missing from such a sentence as 人性善 “Human nature (is) good”. If I say “The rose red” or “He in Paris”, haven’t I left out the relationship between the rose and its colour, the man
and the place—a relationship which is exactly defined by the splendidly unambiguous word "is"? No, for "the red rose" and "the man in Paris" are no more ambiguous than "the rose which is red" and "the man who is in Paris". But these phrases do not pretend to be sentences. "The rose red" needs a verb, not to show how redness is related to the rose, but to assert the redness; for it is a rule of English that there is no sentence without a verb.

The conviction that a sentence needs a verb is so deeply rooted in us that when we try to define a proposition we find it very hard to resist the feeling that its nature is somehow bound up with the nature of the verb. But this rule is of course merely a grammatical convention, not universal even among Indo-European languages. It may be objected that what is asserted must be located in time, and that a verb locating it in time must be understood even if it is not present. But in Chinese temporal particles precede adjectives as well as verbs, and in Japanese adjectives even have tense conjugation (tahai, "is-high", takahatta, "was-high", parallel to yuku, "go", itta, "went"). Further, as we have noticed in section B above, many kinds of proposition have no time reference. In such cases English generally puts the verb in the present tense ("Two and two make four", "The lion is a mammal"), but sometimes uses other tenses:

"Augustus was the greatest of the Roman Emperors" (Has he stopped being the greatest? Did he become the greatest before the last Roman Emperor had proved inferior?)

Besides linking the subject to a verb, a sentence may, to take the most obvious possibilities, link it to another noun or to an adjective:

X comes X來
X is a man X 人也
X is good X 好

In Chinese only the first sentence has a verb. The English rule that a sentence must have a verb is only practicable because there is a stop-gap verb, "to be", which can be supplied in the latter cases also. There is no concept of Being which languages are well or ill fitted to express. The functions of "to be" depend on a grammatical rule for the formation of the sentence; it would merely be a coincidence if one found anything resembling it in a language without this rule.


PART II. SHIH/FEI AND YU/WU IN CHINESE PHILOSOPHY

INTRODUCTION

In 1934 Dr. Waley wrote in The Way and Its Power:

"A large number of the tangles in which European thinkers have involved themselves have been due to the fact that the verb 'to be' means a great many different things. The fact that Chinese lacks anything exactly corresponding to the verb 'to be' might at first sight seem to put Chinese logicians at an initial advantage. But this is far from being the case. Chinese assertions take the form 'commence begin indeed', i.e., 'To commence is to begin'. And this pattern of words, attended upon by the harmless-looking particle yeh, 'indeed', has caused by its reticence far more trouble than any Western copulative by its assertiveness. Some of the things that this simple pattern may express are as follows: (1) Identity, as in the example given above; (2) that A is a member of a larger class, B. For example, 'Boat woodening-thing indeed', i.e., 'boats are made of wood'; (3) that A has a quality B. For example, 'Tail long indeed', i.e., 'its tail is long'. If words have a fixed connexion with realities, the Chinese argued, yeh ('indeed') ought always to mean the same thing. If for example it implies identity, one ought to be able to travel hundreds of leagues on any 'wooden-thing'; but in point of fact one can only travel on a boat.'

This is one of the first attempts to pin down a problem which will remain elusive for a long time to come; and the value of such an attempt (the present essay is merely another) is that, by presenting for criticism a clear idea on an obstinately obscure subject, it helps to clarify the ideas of its critics. In the first place it is doubtful, for reasons given in Part I, whether yeh has more than the first two of the functions attributed to it. "Tail long yeh" would mean something like "It is that the tail is long". But even accepting Waley's three functions, it is difficult to see why yeh should cause "far more trouble" than "to be", which has all these functions and the existential function besides.

Again, in what way is yeh more 'reticent', less 'assertive' than 'to be'? Both words have the function of bringing two units into relation, but neither, in isolation from a context, is either reticent or assertive about how units are related. "To be" can link the subject with a past participle to form a passive ("is eaten"), with a present participle to indicate duration ("is raining") or the future ("is coming tomorrow"), with an adjective ("is red"), with a preposition ("is in"): when it links the subject with a noun, it can indicate identity, class membership, and in special patterns many other relations ("Time is money", "His speech is a sensation", "It must be the lobster I ate"). Yeh occurs in just as wide a variety of contexts. What matters is not the meaning of "being" and yeh in isolation, but the structure of the sentence patterns "X is Y" and "X Y yeh".

Now in classical Chinese there are two main kinds of sentence, nominal and verbal:

(A) Nominal, with a noun complement: 日馬馬也, "White horse, horse yeh".

(B) Verbal, with a main verb (which may be an adjective in the position of main verb): 孔子聞之, "Confucius heard of it".

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A is negated by fei, B by pu; A generally (but not always) has the final yeh, B may have the perfective final yi; the interrogative particles in A are yu and yeh, in B hu; for comparison, A uses yu 雨, B uses ju 如 and jo 若. The structural difference is thus much sharper than between English “A white horse is a horse” and “Confucius heard of it”. Both the latter have a main verb; and although traditional grammar distinguishes between complement and object, the noun’s loss of case endings has almost obliterated the distinction. (English pronouns still have case, but “It is me” has good claims to be better contemporary English than “It is I”. The only remaining difference between “to be” and a transitive verb is that it has no passive voice.)

A sentence is marked as type A, not only by yeh, but by the presence of a noun complement and the absence of a main verb, and by the ways in which it is negated and turned into a question. The yeh by itself is not a decisive criterion; it is sometimes absent from type A, and is found in at least one class of sentence which does not fit easily into either type, that in which 俱, “may” (negated by pu) is followed by a passive verb. It is therefore difficult to agree with Waley that the Chinese can ever have argued that “yeh ought always to mean the same thing”. In any case Chinese thinkers do not talk about yeh, which as a final particle cannot stand in the position of subject or object, and therefore cannot be treated as indicating a thing to be discussed (although, of course, one can discuss 名字 “the word yeh”). They talk instead of shih and fei (which can replace the complement in type A) and of jan (which can replace the main verb in type B).

It is not clear what examples Waley has in mind when he says that yeh has caused “far more trouble than any Western copulative”, and that it was assumed that yeh “ought always to mean the same thing”. His illustrations in this section are taken largely from the Mohist Hsiang-chu 小取, which contains some interesting examples of confusion which are impossible in English because of number and the indefinite article, but none connected with “to be”. There are more than fifty propositions ending in yeh, limited exclusively to class membership and identity, and without a single case of confusion between the two. The one case of confusion mentioned by Waley is an argument the existence of which he infers from a Mohist text which he interprets as a criticism of it. Although this instance is very questionable, there is certainly one really spectacular case of confusion between identity and class membership in early Chinese literature, the Essay on the White Horse of Kung-sun Lung 公孫龍 (c.300 B.C.) in this the claim that “A white horse is not a horse” is justified by arguments which in fact prove merely that a horse is not necessarily a white horse, for example: 馬者無去取於色, 故黃黑皆所應. 自者有去取於色, 黃黑皆所應色去, 故唯白馬獨可以應耳. 無去者非有去者. 故曰, 白馬非馬.

The last has a less direct connexion with Being than the others have, and we shall not discuss it in detail.

2 I have given reasons for this claim in The Relation between the Final Particles yu and yee (Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 1957, 10/1-105-93).
3 At p. 113-17.
5 “白馬非馬”.
6 I should translate (reading 名 for 名: “A boat is tree (wood), but to enter a boat is not to enter a tree” (implying a confusion in the thought which is excluded in
English by the indefinite article). Waley prefers “wooden-thing” for “tree”; but to enter a boat is to enter a wooden-thing.

In any case the passage does not imply that there were people who argued that one should be able to do with any wooden-thing whatever one can do with a boat. It is one of a series of propositions, deliberately chosen as unquestionable, adduced in support of the highly questionable Mohist thesis that “A robber is not to kill a man” (穢人弗殺). We are told explicitly that “the world agrees in accepting them” (併相與公是之), and, of the Mohist thesis, “This is of the same class as those; the world admires those without condemning itself, but condemns the Mohists for admitting this.” (比與世許, 爰有從而不由己也。是者有此而弗之, a/b/a).

1 Kong-sun Lung Tzu chia-chih / 金松龍子集, edited Ch'en Chu 軒 (Commercial Press, 1937), 71.

1 Of Waley's two other examples of confusion due to ambiguities in the Chinese language (op. cit. 65f), I accept the one connected with number (Mo-tzu 11/10b/7-11a/2). But his example of ambiguity due to the absence of tense, “An orphan coil has never had a mother” (無子无母有母, Chung-tzu 10/42a/7) has the temporal particles 未有, “never.” This seems to me to make a perfectly good paradox in English; compare “No Pope has ever been a young man.” Waley seems to be interpreting it in the light of certain Mohist passages with which it may not have so close a connexion (Mo-tzu 4a/2-4, 4b/1, 51, canons; 18a/4-7, 11a/4-6, 18b/8-19a/1 their explanations).

A. SHIH AND FEI IN CHUANG-T'ZU AND THE MOHIST CANONS

The controversy over shih and fei in the third century B.C. originated in the disputes between the Confucian and Mohist schools over such issues as universal love, destiny and music. These disputes had led to an increasing concern with methods of proof, culminating towards the end of the fourth century in the schools of Hui Shih 惠施, and Kung-sun Lung, who especially studied the arguments by which one “discriminates” (pien 辨) between right and wrong. The failure of Confucians and Mohists to convince each other led other thinkers of the late fourth century, such as Shen Tao 慎到, to deny that judgments of right and wrong are absolute.1 The classic statement of this relativism is the chapter on Treating Things as Equal (物物論) in the third century compilation Chuang-tzu.2 The absoluteness of right and wrong is defended in the Mohist canons, which probably also date from the third century B.C.

This controversy involved judgements of shih and fei and to a lesser extent of jan and not jan; since the same arguments apply to both, there is no need to give separate attention to the latter. As we have seen, shih and fei can be used either (A) of a thing which is “this” (an ox, a horse) or is “not”, or (B) of an assertion (that human effort cannot alter destiny) or an action or principle of action (aggressive war, universal love, mourning one's parents for three years) which is “this” (the right alternative) or “not”. In practice it is the latter use of shih and fei (in which it is convenient to translate them “right” and “wrong”) which concerns philosophers; but this is only an extension of the former usage, and when they discuss shih and fei

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in the abstract their examples are of the former type—"Is or is not X an ox, a horse, a dog?"

The Mohist canons confine the name pien, “discrimination” to disputes of the form “X is or is not Y”, in which one alternative must be right and the other wrong; they do not admit disputes as to whether X is Y or Z, in which both contestants may be wrong. They recognise the principle of the excluded middle in practice if not in theory:

經 彼不可兩不可也。

說（彼）凡非非亦，為 不合。無以非也。

'Canon' The other's case must be "paired".

Explanation All that is an ox side by side (literally, "pivoted") with all that is not an ox, is 'pairing'. There is no way for it not to be (one or the other).

經 辭彼彼也，彼左當也。

說（彼）或謂之牛，或謂之非牛，是爭彼也。是不俱當，

不俱當必不當。不若大犬。

'Canon' Discrimination is disputing the other's case. Victory in discrimination is one's claim fitting the facts.

Explanation One saying that it is an ox, the other that it is not, is 'contesting the other's case'. Their claims will not both fit, and if they do not both fit one necessarily does not fit. It is not like one's claim fitting a dog. (If you argue that it is a dog, instead of merely that it is not an ox, both contestants may be wrong.)3

經 講茲無勝必不當。說在辯。

說（彼）所謂非同也，則異也，同則或謂之狗，其或謂之犬也。

異則或謂之牛，其或謂之馬也。俱無勝，是不辯也。

辯也者，謂之是，或謂之非，常者勝也。

'Canon' To say that there is no winner in "discrimination" necessarily does not fit the facts. Explanation: "discrimination".

Explanation What the contestants call it is either the same or different. If it is the same, one calls it "puppy" and the other calls it "dog". If different, one calls it "ox", the other calls it "horse". Neither winning is because they have not "discriminated". Discrimination is one saying that it is this (shih), the other that it is not (fei), and the claim which fits winning.4

We possess three full-length examples of Discrimination, the two genuine essays in the Kung-sun Lung tzu,5 and the Mohist Hsiao-ch'i. All use the "X is or is not Y" form as regularly as Aristotle does. Kung-sun Lung argues that a white horse is not a horse, and in a second essay the significance of which is much disputed, that "No thing is not chih but chih are not chih" (物非理而指非指). The arguments of the Hsiao-ch'i begin with "A white horse is a horse. To ride a white horse is to ride a horse" (quoted in Part I, B above), and show only slight variations from this formula throughout.
According to the relativist argument of *Treating Things as Equal*, judgments of *shih* and *fēi* depend on making distinctions between things by giving them separate names; but the sage unlearns these distinctions and recovers the experience of an undifferentiated world which precedes language:

“古之人，其知有所至矣。靠乎至？有以爲未始有物者，至矣，盡矣，不可加矣。其次以爲有物矣，而未始有封也。其次以爲有封焉，而未始有是非也。”

“There were men in ancient times whose knowledge was perfect. Wherein was it perfect? There were some who thought there had not yet begun to be things. Perfect! Exhaustive! One can go no further! The next in knowledge thought that there were things, but that there had not yet begun to be boundaries. The next thought that there were boundaries around them, but that there had not yet begun to be *shih* and *fēi* (one being itself and not being another).”

As soon as men begin to distinguish themselves from the external world, and things from each other, preference arises; and all clings to what he likes, dismisses from him what he dislikes. What is near to him he calls *This* (*shih*), what is distant *That* (*pī*). Whether a thing is *This* or *That* depends on one’s point of view; thus music, prolonged mourning, and belief in destiny are-*this* (*shih*) for Confucians, are-*not* (*fēi*) for Mohists. But there is no true contradiction between them, since what is *This* to itself is *That* to another:

物非更物非，物非是者，物亦是者也。彼亦是者，彼亦非者，彼亦非，是亦是，彼亦是，是亦非。彼亦是，彼亦非，是亦是，彼亦非，是亦非。彼亦是，彼亦非，是亦是，彼亦非，是亦非。彼亦是，彼亦非，是亦是，彼亦非，是亦非。

“No thing is not *That*, no thing is not *This*. . . . *This* is also *That*, *That* is also *This*. There they use *is-this* and *is-not* from one point of view; here we use *is-this* and *is-not* from another point of view. Are there really *That* and *This*? Or really no *That* and *This*? Where neither *That* nor *This* finds its opposite is called the axis of the Tao. Once the axis is found at the centre of the circle (where everything is equally near), we respond without end. On the one hand there is no end to what is *is-this*, on the other end to what is *is-not*.”

This argument depends on the fact that where in English we say “true” or “right”, Chinese use words which are primarily demonstrative — *shih*, “this” and *jan*, “thus”. In order to make his point convincingly, the writer uses *shih* regularly as the opposite of *pī*, “that” as well as of *fēi*, “is-not”, avoiding as far as possible the use of *ts‘āi*, the ordinary opposite of *pī*. Whether he confused two senses of *shih* distinguished in English, or whether the expression of approval by *shih* justly calls attention to the subjective element in judgment, is outside the scope of this article; in any case it is not a question with a simple answer.

Even when I ask whether something is or is not a horse, I am asking whether or not *it* is *This*. . . . Names are given only by convention (“Words are about something, it is only that what they are about is not fixed!” *Words are about something, it is only that what they are about is not fixed!*). The horse will not be the meaning of “horse”, will not be a horse, if I give the name to another thing. Kung-sun Lung’s elaborate arguments about meanings (*shih*) and horses were quite unnecessary:

以指喻指之非指, 不若以非指喻指之非指也。以馬喻馬之非馬, 不若以非馬喻馬之非馬也。天地一指也, 夫物一馬也。

“Using the meaning to show that the meaning is not as good as showing it by means of what is not the meaning. Using a horse to show that a horse is not a horse is not as good as showing it by means of what is not a horse. Heaven and earth are the one meaning; the myriad things are the one horse.”

The absolute *This* which Confucians and Mohists confuse with their own limited points of view can be reached only by unlearning all distinctions, recognizing every variety of conduct as equally right, embracing the entire universe as *This*; for it is only the universe which is *This* from every point of view:

是，然然。是，不果是也，則是之異固不異也，亦無辯也。然不果然，則然之異固不異也，亦無辯也。

“Treat even what is not *This* as *This*, even what is not *Thus* as *Thus*. If *This* and *Thus* are really (from every point of view) *This* and *Thus*, there can be no discrimination between *This* and not *This*, *Thus* and not *Thus*.”

It is assumed that, in the words of the commentator Kuo Hsiang 郭象 (died c. 313), “If *shih* is really *shih*, there can no longer be anyone in the world who considers it *fēi*” (是果是，則天下不得有之者也).11 Judgments (not only value judgements, but “X is a horse” also) cannot be absolute unless there is universal agreement. This presupposition seems strange if we forget that *shih* is primarily demonstrative and take it as equivalent to English “right”; but the claim that X is absolutely *This* is of course discredited by the appearance of a single person for whom it is *That*. Consequently, “discrimination” (*pīen*) cannot reconcile different points of view:

既使我果為馬矣，若謂是，我果非馬也，果非馬也邪？良使同若夫者正之，我果與同矣，豈能正之？

“Suppose that I dispute (*pīen*) with you; if you defeat me, if I do not defeat you, it is that what you say really ‘is-this’, what I say really ‘is-not’. . . . [Whom shall I call in to decide it?] Suppose that one whose point of view is the same as yours decides it, since his point of view is the same as yours how can he decide it?”

[Whom shall I call in to decide it?] Suppose that one whose point of view is the same as yours decides it, since his point of view is the same as yours how can he decide it?”
The dialectician Hui Shih had tried to show, by arguments similar to Kung-sun Lung's sophistries about the white horse and about hardness and whiteness, that "Heaven and earth are one body" (天地一體也). But Discrimination is useless even for this purpose. I cease to distinguish between things by an inward, wordless illumination; as soon as I use words to say that everything is one, I have fallen back into a world of things distinguished by words. "The Tao is brought about by walking it; things are thus because of what we call them."（道行之而成，物謂之而然）

Language by its nature selects and excludes. One who describes in words is like a musician who, as long as he plays, must choose certain notes and ignore others; he ceases to leave out only when he ceases to play and silence returns. Hui Shih is compared with two famous musicians:

其中名者也，故載之未年，唯其名，以異於彼，其好之也，欲以明之。彼非所明而明之，故以堅白之味矣。

They were all men who excelled, therefore their names will be carried to later generations. But they liked something, and differentiated it from That. Liking it, they wished to understand it; but since they understood it without 'That being what they understood, they ended in the obscurity of hair-splitting discussions of hardness and whiteness."

Suppose that I try to make a statement in which nothing is left out. At first sight it seems possible to say something, and then go on enlarging its scope until everything is included without exception:

今且有言於者，不知其言是有名乎?其名不顯乎?於名不顯，相與顯知，故異於彼而異矣。

"Now let me say something. I do not know whether what is said is of the same class as This? Or not of the same class? If we make a class of both things which are and things which are not of the same class, then there is no longer any difference from That.""

But however many additions I make to the original statement, there is always an elusive That still to be included:

雖然，諸言之。有有之者，有有之者，有未有之有有之者，有未有之未有之有者。

"However, let us try to say it... There is something (ya)—there is nothing (mu)—there is having not yet begun to have nothing—there is having not yet begun not to have begun to have nothing."

Further, my attempted description of everything is a failure at the very first step, since 有 and 无 are both involved, and yet they are the same thing. I then have already referred to them, but I still do not know whether what I referred to is really referred to or not.

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Again, if I say that "the myriad things are one with me" (萬物與我為一), there are already two—the universe and my own statement about it. I cannot affirm my own unity with things, for it is by ceasing to affirm and deny that distinctions disappear for me.

At least six of the Mohist canons attack theses found in "Treatise Things as Equal. One defending Discrimination is quoted above. Another points out that shih and fei are not subject to degree, and are therefore not relative in the way that "long" and "short" are:

經 物者不也。此言者也。

Cano: Whether or not a thing is so to the highest degree—Explanaiton: "As much as this."

Explanation If a thing were to the highest degree long or short, nothing would be longer or shorter than it. As for this being this or not being this, nothing reaches a higher degree than this.""19

According to "Treatise Things as Equal", we can treat every statement either as shih or as fei. The Mohist canons reject these claims as self-contradictory:

經 以言為有者，詐也。詐在其言。

Cano One who considers all statements mistaken is mistaken. Explanation: "His own statement."

Explanation "Mistaken" means "inadmissible". If this man's statement is admissible, that is to say not mistaken, then this means that there are admissible statements. This man's statement cannot fit the facts: it must be ill-considered."

The opposite claim that all statements may be accepted as right is exposed as self-contradictory by turning it into a double negative—"Denial may be rejected":

經 非詐者詐，詐在非詐。

Cano One who rejects denial is mistaken. Explanation: "He does not reject it."

Explanation If he does not reject his own denial, he does not reject denial. If "Rejection may be rejected" may not be rejected, this is not rejecting denial."12

Another canon rejects the claim that one can abandon the distinction between This and That, treating everything either as one or as the other.
It points out that although my This may be treated as That, whoever does so must also treat My That as This:

彼此彼此與彼此同。此異異。

彼此彼彼著彼此於彼，此此止於此，彼此止於彼此，彼此亦可。彼此止於彼，此此止於此，彼此彼此此之此之。故此此之此之。

Canon One cannot treat This as That without exchanging That and This. Explanation: "The two sides are different." It is admissible for those who use names correctly to exchange That and This. If what you treat as That is confined to That, and what you treat as This is confined to This, it is inadmissible to treat This as That. If That is also treated as This, it is admissible to treat This as That. If in treating This as That, you go so far as to confuse This for That, what you treat as That, then That is also being treated as This. Finally, an obscure canon attacks the assertion in Treating Things as Equal that one should "treat even what is not This as This" (is not), approve even the wrong alternative as right. A key word in the text has been corrupted to [missing text] throughout the explanation; although other suggestions have been offered, it seems likely that the word was "[missing]". This translation is offered without much confidence:

經 於 是 之 其 同。是 在 不 州。

說 不 是 現，則 是 且 是 質。今 是 不 止 於，而不 止 於。故 是 不 止 於，而不 止 於。今 是 止 於，而不 止 於。故 "是 前 " 止 " 不止 " 同 說。

Canon You cannot approve as right without approving as right only the right. Explanation: "(Right) is not all-embracing". When even the wrong is approved as right, the right is also being approved as right. Now if right is confined to the right, your approval is not being confined to right. Therefore your approval as right is not confined. But when approval as right is not confined, right itself is not being confined. Now if right is not confined to the right, your approval is being confined to right. Therefore you cannot show that your approval as right is not confined without showing that it is confined.29

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1 Chuang-tzu 10/33A/8-34B.
2 Peng Yu-lan does not question Chuang-tzu's authorship of this chapter, and argues that its ideas are not identical with those of Shen Tao's circle although influenced by them. (History of Chinese Philosophy, translated Derek Bodde, Princeton, 1959, 1/133-8) Fu Ssu-nien suggests so far as to claim that Shen Tao actually wrote the chapter. (Authorship of the Ti-chu-ti in Chuang-tzu, Academia Sinica, 6/4 (1939), 557-67).
3 Mo-tzu SPTK 10/3A/1f, 9A/6-8. The first word of the canon is, as usual, repeated as the first word of the explanation. It is corrupted to "ou" in both the canons but not in the explanations. This part of Mo-tzu is notoriously corrupt; a considerable proportion of emendations (mostly the work of Sun Yü-jang in his Mo-tzu ki-shen-kuan 墨子闢謬) are solidly established, but many passages are unintelligible unless virtually rewritten at the whim of the commentator. Fortunately, most of the corrections in the sections quoted are of the former kind and generally accepted.
4 ut sup. 1b/4, 13b/6-16A/2. In the second but not the first the first character is corrupted to "佛".
5 I have argued elsewhere that the last three essays belong to the time of the Six Dynasties (Composition of the Gongweng Long tzu, Asia Major, New Series, 2/2 (1957), 147-8).
7 ut sup. 1/3A/3f, 3bA/1-2B/3.
8 Chuang-tzu chih-ku 與子隴語, 3A/2-4, in Chuang-tzu t'ung-shu 與子隴書.
9 Chuang-tzu 1/36A/2. One of the contents of the suttah was that "a dog might be regarded as a sheep" (大可為稱). Commentary on this (Chuang-tzu 10/40B/4), Shao-ma Piao 陶馬 said (died A.D. 306) that "the shape belongs to the thing, the name belongs to man" (形在於物，名在於人), and points out that "大者 " "unlocked jade" in one dialect and "dried rat-meat" in another. (This was a favourite illustration of the pitfalls of language. Cf. Chu-Huo-t'ie, SPTK 3/3A/11-5B/3; Yin Wen-tzu 聲文子, SPTK 13B/4-4; Shih-tzu 聲子, SPPY, 8/7/6; Hou Han shu, Pa-nu 博學, Biographies, 38/19B/11).
10 Chuang-tzu 1/38B/7-5.
11 ut sup. 1/45B/7-46A/2.
12 ut sup. 1/45B/8, commentary.
13 ut sup. 1/45B/6f, 43A/5f.
14 ut sup. 1/50B/7f.
15 ut sup. 1/32A/4-5.
16 ut sup. 1/33A/3-7, 33B/2, 33B/3-34A/4.
17 ut sup. 1/24A/7.
18 Mo-tzu 10/6A/4f, 22A/1f. The first in the canon is corrupted to "入".
19 This type of argument is found in other canons; thus one points out the self-contradiction in teaching (causing to learn) that learning is useless (ut sup. 5B/4f, 21B/5, translated Bodde, ut sup. 276).
20 Mo-tzu 10/5A/8, 20B/3-5. The first but not the second second is corrupted to "入. (The canons do not use 此 as adjectival "this", always preferring 者)."
21 ut sup. 6A/2, 21B/7-22A/1. 者 is corrupted to "是. The first word of the canon is repeated (cf. no above) after instead of before the first word of the explanation and is corrupted by the addition of the speech radical. (It is remarkable that the repeated word is often found one word too late, never one word too early; this suggests that it was originally written by the side of the first word of the explanation and later incorporated in the text, generally before, sometimes after the first word).
22 One text omits this character (Mo-tzu ki-shen-kuan, BSS, 240/6, commentary).
23 The formula "Doing X is the same as doing Y" is used in the canons to deny that one can do Y without being logically committed to doing X. Cf. 6A/4f, translated below (where 聞 in the canon is expanded to 聞 and 知 in the explanation), and 5A/3f, translated Composition of the Gongweng Long tzu, ut sup. 163 (where, however, I failed to recognize that the second word of the explanation is the repeated first word of the canon, cf. No. 22 above).
24 ut sup. 5A/4f, 10B/7-72A/2. In the canon 聞 is in both cases corrupted to "要. There is a parallel in one of the spurious essays of the Kung-sun Lang tzu (1.217), which, however, says "pillage and theft etc. These go so far as to claim that Mo-tzu is saying the same thing as the major canons without understanding them (cf. 11 above).
25 Contrast Hsin-tzu 聞子, 1/7A/3f. 聞子 is 聞子, 聞子, 聞子, 聞子, 聞子. "To treat right as right, wrong as wrong, is called wisdom; to treat right as wrong, wrong as right, is called foolishness."
B. YU AND WU IN TAOISM AND NEO-CONFUCIANISM

The words *yu* ("have", "there is") and *wu* ("have not", "there is not") give rise to metaphysical problems in some ways like, in some ways very unlike, those connected with "to be". They become especially important in the Taoism of the third and succeeding centuries A.D. and in the Neo-Confucianism of the Sung dynasty (A.D.906-1279).

As we saw in Part IA above, the subject of the English "is" corresponds to the object of Chinese *yu*. In Indo-European languages a thing simply *is*, without implying anything outside it, and it is the most abstract entities which the Platonic tradition most willingly credits with being. In Chinese, on the other hand, one approaches the thing from outside, from the world which *has* it, in which "there is" it. From this point of view, the more concrete a thing is, the more plainly the world has it; for example, one can emphasize the absolute non-existence of *X* by saying "天不無 *X*", "the world does not have *X*" (more literally, "there is no *X* under the sky"). In this respect, as in the absence of the copulative functions of "to be", *wu* is like "exist", which also implies a concrete thing with a background from which it stands out (ex situ). But there remains the difference that "exists", like "is", is attached to a subject and not to an object.

This is the source of one of the most striking differences between Chinese thinking about *yu* and *wu* and Western thinking about Being. In English, a table is a thing, exists, is; Beauty is not a thing, does not exist, but we can still say it is. Having a verb "to be" (exist), we can form a noun from it and say that Beauty, although not a thing, is an "entity" (ens, entitas). We can also form an adjective from "thing" (thesis) and say that it is "real". To indicate the kind of being which is not existence we can invent a "subexistence". Beauty, that real, subsisting entity, is assimilated as closely as possible to the table, that real, existing thing. As a last refinement, we may find reasons for claiming that such an immaterial entity more truly *is*, is more real, than the phenomena perceived by the senses.

In Chinese, on the other hand, the word *wu* is used primarily of concrete things (*wu*物). So is the word *shih* 試, "solid", "real", the opposite of *hsii* 虛, "tenuous" (if absolute, "void") or "unreal". There are horses, they are things, they are solid or real; but what of the Tao, or the Neo-Confucian 理, "principle"? Occasionally philosophers extend the scope of *wu* to cover these abstractions; but it is more usual to decide either that they are Nothing, the Void, or that the distinction between *yu* and *wu* does not apply to them.

When *yu* and *wu* are used as nouns, a serious ambiguity arises; they may mean either "(there-)being" and "(there-)not-being" or "something" and "nothing". This confusion is inherent in Classical Chinese, which has no convenient way of distinguishing the substantivized verb from the agent, even when the verb is followed by *chê* (知者 may mean either "knowing" or "he who knows"). *Wu* may be taken as either (A) "there not being" (non-existence), or (B) "that which there is not", "that in which there is not" (the non-existent, nothing). Speculations about *yu* and *wu* generally assume the latter sense, but without clearly distinguishing it from the former. An argument of the Neo-Confucian Ch'êng Hao 程顥 (1032-85) provides a good illustration. Taoists had identified the Tao with Nothing, *wu* in sense B; the Neo-Confucian Chang Ts'ao 張載 (1020-77) replied that "there is no Nothing", *wu* *wu* (1); Ch'êng Hao holds that both positions are self-contradictory:

言有無/則多有字，言無無/則多無字

"If you say that there is what there is not (*wu* *wu*), you have no right to say 'there is'; if you say that there is no (*wu* *wu*), you have no right to say 'there is no'."

Chang Ts'ao meant by *wu* *wu* that "there is not what there is not", and this sense is also demanded by the analogy with *yu* *wu*. But in this sense *wu* *wu* is not self-contradictory; on the contrary, it is a tautology.

The second sense of *wu* has just been defined as "that which there is not" or "that in which there is not". Logically, there is no difference between these alternatives, as Ch'êng Hao assumes. But grammatically *wu* is only "that in which there is not" (what does not have); the substantivized verb is confused with the agent, not with the object, and "that which there is not" (what is not had) should be *wu* *wu* 所無. Those who identify the Tao with *wu* mean primarily that it lacks form and other qualities, and only secondarily that it is not a thing which exists in the world. Compare these two Taoist definitions of the Tao, the first by Wang Pi 王弼 (A.D.226-49) the second by Ho Yen 何宴 (died A.D.249):

道者，無之謂也。無不道，無不由也；名之曰道。寂然
無體，不可為象。
"The Tao is a term for Nothing. Since there is nothing it does not pass through and nothing which does not follow it, it is called by metaphor the Tao (Way). It is still and has no body, and cannot be conceived as an image."  

The second passage deals, not with Nothing in general, but with the parts of the wheel, vessel or house which do not exist (其無). Each is a combination of something and nothing; the hole in the wheel which takes the axle, the empty space inside the vessel, doors and windows in the house, are nothing yet belong to the things which could not be used without them. To live in the world we must use the Tao, just as to keep things in a vessel we must use the void inside it.

It is thus possible for the Taoist to hold that the world depends on the Tao in spite of the latter's nothingness. But the dependence must be mutual; "Something and Nothing give birth to each other." The verb "to be" allows us to conceive immaterial "entities" detached from the material, for example God before the Creation. But if the immaterial is a Nothing which complements Something, it cannot be isolated; the immanence of the Tao in the universe is not an accident of Chinese thought, it is inherent in the functions of the words 物 and 无. Admittedly "Something is born from Nothing", things with form and colour emerge out of the formless, and in early Taoism it is not always clear whether this is a continuous process or a single event before which Nothing reigned alone. But as soon as this issue is clearly perceived, for example by Kuo Huang 郭象 (died c. A.D. 324), the second interpretation is definitely excluded:

"Who can precede things? I may suppose that the Yin and Yang preceded things; but the Yin and Yang are exactly what is meant by 'things'. I may suppose that Nature (tao-tao, 'being so of itself') preceded them; but Nature is simply things being as they are of themselves. I may suppose that the utmost Tao preceded them; but the utmost Tao is utmost Nothing. Since it does not exist, how can it be considered to precede? Then who is it that preceded them? But still things exist without coming to an end. This shows that things are so of themselves, there is nothing which makes them so."  

A sentence of the Lao-tzu (third century B.C.), "Something is born from nothing" (有生於無), reappears in the Huai-nan-tzu (second century B.C.) in the following context:

無形而有形生焉，無聲而五音聞焉，無味而五味形焉，無色而五色成焉。是故有生於無，實出於虛。

"It has no form but what has form is born from it, no sound but the five notes resound from it, no taste but the five tastes are formed from it, no colour but the five colours come about from it. Therefore what has (yu) is born from what does not have (wu), the solid comes out of the tenuous."  

The English word "Nothing" implies the absence of any "entity", the Chinese 无 only the absence of concrete things. Taoists agree with Western idealists in exalting the immaterial, but cannot like them identify it with pure Being; for Taoists all that lacks material form is by definition 无. But if the Tao is Nothing, then Nothing is a positive complement of Something, not its mere absence. A similar conception of Nothing is found in the West (for example, in Hegel and in Existentialism), but the Chinese language gives it special encouragement. Yu, "there is" and shih, "solid" are not, like most verbs and adjectives, negated by 无, "not", but form pairs with 无, "there is not" and hui, "tenuous", similar to such pairs as long and short, left and right, Yin and Yang. It is therefore easy to see them as mutually dependent, as in these passages from the Lao-tzu:

有無相生，難易相成，長短相較，高下相傾，音聲相和，前後相隨。

"Something and Nothing give birth to each other, difficult and easy complete each other, long and short offset each other, high and low determine each other, voice and accompaniment harmonize with each other, front and back give each other sequence."

三十輻共一轂，當其無有車之用，埏埴以為器，當其無有器之用。鐙戶以為室，當其無有室之用。故有之以為利，無之以為用。

"Thirty spokes share one hub; it is just where it does not exist that the wheel is useful. We turn clay to make a vessel; it is just where it does not exist that the vessel is useful. We chisel out doors and windows to make a house; it is just where it does not exist that the house is useful. Therefore we draw advantage from them where they exist, use them where they do not exist."
In Western and Indian mystical philosophies, God, the One, the Absolute, Brahma, are conceived as more real than the phenomenal world. These systems were developed in Indo-European languages, in which “to be” is not confined to speaking of concrete things, and in which it is easy to argue that what is heavy or light, large or small, does not enjoy the pure being of what simply is. Even Buddhism, which rejects the Brahma identified in the Upanishads with sat (“being”), and refuses to attribute either being or non-being to the void (tāṇḍā, "void"), puts the main stress on the unreality of phenomena. For Taoists, on the other hand, it is concrete things which exist and are solid or real, the Tao which does not exist and is tenous or unreal.

This difference is all the more striking since in each of these mystical traditions, Western and Chinese, we find elements which are better suited to the intellectual scheme of the other. In the West there is a tendency to emphasize the absence of sensible qualities by saying that the object of the mystic’s search is Nothing—an assertion which Taoists call quite literally, but which Christians can offer only as a daring paradox. On the other hand, Taoists play with the idea that the world is a dream, without being able to fit it into their philosophy. When Chuang-tzu wakes from dreaming that he is a butterfly, he does not conclude that the Tao is the reality behind all dreaming; he merely suspects that he is a butterfly dreaming that he is a man. The third chapter of the Lieh-tzu argues at length that there is no difference between dreaming and waking, but never suggests that we should wake from both to some deeper reality. The idea that the world is a dream has the same kind of significance in Taoism as the idea that God is Nothing has in Christian mysticism—it is a metaphor expressing an intuition for which the system has no place. The difference between yu and “to be” is one of the factors which radically alter the interpretation of what may well be very similar experiences.

Chinese Buddhism at first confused the Void (tāṇḍā) with the sat of Taoism, but later learned to deny that it is either yu or sat.10 In place of the sat (Being) of the central Hindu tradition, Buddhism speaks of tathādhatu, generally translated “suchness” or “thusness”. The Chinese translation of tathādhatu is jù, generally used in the combination chín-jù, "genuine jù", jù, “like, as much as”, comparing qualities and actions rather than things, is related to jóm, “thus” (like this, as much as this). As a noun, one may take jù as “being as (not ‘what’ it is)”,—Being in sense E above (“He is tall”), quite different from yu, which is comparable with Being in sense A (“There is a man”). But the reception of a recent book by D. T. Suzuki provides an interesting example of how easily such an equation can cause misunderstanding:

“Eckhart’s experiences are deeply, basically, abundantly rooted in God as Being which is at once being and non-being; he sees in the ‘meaniest’ thing among God’s creatures all the glories of his is-ness (istieheit). The Buddhist enlightenment is nothing more than this experience of is-ness or suchness (tathādhatu) which in itself has all the possible values (gaṇa) we humans can conceive.”

But “suchness”, however vague it may sound, is much narrower than “being”, overlapping with only one of the six senses of the latter which we have distinguished, and having no connexion with existence. It is clear to an Orientalist that Suzuki is aware of this, but it is not clear to the general reader to whom the book is addressed; one reviewer drew the conclusion that “what links them (Eckhart and the Zen Buddhists) must closely be their common recognition of God as Being”,

Confucians always disliked the Taoist doctrine of Nothing because of its practical corollary, that just as the world depends on Nothing, so the good government of the Empire depends on wu-wei, “no action”.

P’ei Wei 貝麒 (267–330) wrote an essay, Honouring the Existing (崇有論), in which he argued that Nothing is not the complement of Something, but merely its absence:

夫至無者無以能生故。始生者自生也。自生而必實有，則有虛而生虗矣。生以有為已分，則虛無有之所遺者也。故聖賢之有，非無用之所能盡也，理之有之，非無用之所能盡也。

“Utmost Nothing (‘that which to the utmost degree does not have’) does not have the means to produce. Therefore what was produced first was produced of itself. If what is produced of itself exist bodily, then what it leaves out it will produce a gap. If what is produced takes existence for its own share, then the void and Nothing are what the existing leaves out. Once the existing has developed, one cannot maintain it by using nothing; once the people exist, one cannot govern them by doing nothing.”

More than a thousand years later Wang Fu-chih 王夫之 (1619–92) attacks from a slightly different angle:

言無者激言有者而破除之也。言言者所謂有而謂無其有也。天下果何者而可謂之無哉？言之無毛，言犬也，非言之犬，言之無犬，非言之犬也。言之有其，其所立而後其說成。今使言之立一無于前，傳之上下四維古今存亡而不可得窮矣。

“Whoever says ‘There is not’ is provoked to denial by someone saying there is. He takes up what the other says there is and says there is no such thing. What is there in the world really which can be called Nothing? If you say there is no hair on a tortoise, you are talking about (something on) a dog, not (nothing on) a tortoise. If you say there are no horns on a hare, you are talking about (something on) a deer, not (nothing on) a hare. A speaker must set something up before he can argue successfully. Now if he is to set a Nothing in front of us, he can see everywhere above and below, North,
South, East and West, in the past and the present, the surviving and the lost, without succeeding in getting to the end of it."14

Wang Fu-chih goes so far as to claim that even abstractions such as principles (li) exist:

"天下若有所謂無者哉? 于物或未有，于事或未有，于理非无。"15

"How can there be anything in the world which is called Nothing? What we do not find existing as a thing may exist as an activity, what we do not find existing as an activity may exist as a principle."14

It is natural that some Confucians should carry their reaction against the Taoist concept of a non-existent Tao justifying "No Action" to the point of insisting that moral principles are real, solid, existing. An earlier example is Ch'êng Yi 程頤 (1033-1107), who held that "nothing in the world is real more than Principle" 天下無實於理者. Yet this conflicts sharply with the ordinary use of the words "yu" and "wu", as can be seen from a dialogue in which Ch'êng Yi declares that moral Right exists:

"義還因事而見否?曰，'非也，性中自有。'或曰，'無狀可見。'曰，'說有，便兼見。但人自不見昭然在天地之中也。'"17

"Q. I suppose that it is through conduct that Right becomes visible? A. No. It exists of itself within human nature. Q. It has no visible features. A. To say that it exists is to say that it is visible. But men do not let themselves see it. It is there quite plainly between heaven and earth."17

"Yu applies to concrete things, as the questioner recognizes; in crediting moral Right with existence, Ch'êng Yi finds himself saying that it is there quite plainly between heaven and earth. It is easy to understand why other Neo-Confucians should prefer to deny that principle (li), its basic metaphysical concept, can be discussed in terms of "yu" and "wu". According to Hu Hung 胡宏 (died 1161):

"義若可見則有之,死散而不可見則無之。夫可以有無見者,物之形也。物之理,則未嘗有無也。"18

"When something is born, comes together and is visible, it is considered to exist; when it dies, disperses and is invisible, it is considered not to exist. What is visible as existing or not existing is a thing's form. A thing's principle, however, never exists or does not exist."

Chu Hsi 劉蕺 (1130-1200), the most influential of the Neo-Confucians, says:

"理之一字, 不可以有無論。未有天地之時, 便已如此矣。"19

"The word 'principle' cannot be discussed in terms of existence and non-existence. Before there was a heaven or an earth, it was already as it is now."19

We may note the implication that if li existed it would be a material thing, originating with heaven and earth.

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14 Chang-ts'ai ch'ien-shu 張子全書 BSS 24/a.
15 Ho-nan Chêng-shih yi-shu 134/a.
16 Lu-yü chou-yü 誠語諸箴, SPPY 7/1b/7.
17 Ch'êng-ki chih-chêng shên-chih 神聖主德氣理 (Li-12b), SPPY 4/2b/12 commentary.
19 Lao-tzu 2, 11.
20 Ch'êng-ts'ai 7/55A/7-55B/1 commentary.
21 ut sup. 7/55b/5-6.
22 ut sup. 7/45b/6-8.
26 ap. Chin-shu, Pao-nu 35/7b/2-5.
29 Ho-nan Chêng-shih yi-shu 71/2.
30 ut sup. 206/5f.
31 Hu-tsu 胡適, Yu-wu-ting-shu 愚語警世 SPPY 49A/6-8.
32 Chêng-ts'ai ta-ch'ien 張子全書, SPPY 56/10b/12-11A/2.

C. THE TREATMENT OF "TO BE" IN CHINESE TRANSLATIONS OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHERS

In order to see the relation between Being and shih/fei and yu/wu in perspective, we must compare them also from the opposite point of view. How do Chinese translators deal with the verb "to be"? Outside philosophy, "to be" of course gives no special difficulty to the translator, who simply uses whichever is suitable among the words and constructions described in Part I above. But philosophers do not merely use the verb "to be", they talk about Being; and they are liable to switch without warning from the being of "There is a man" (yu/wu) to that of "He is a man" (shih/fei) or of "He is tall". The need to translate the same word differently in different contexts does not by itself prove that the word is ambiguous; thus yu as a verb is not ambiguous, although we represent it sometimes by "there is", sometimes by "has", Nevertheless, Western philosophers do tend to confuse functions of "to be" which, in addition to being separated in Chinese, have different logical implications in their own languages. In such cases, the failure of the Chinese translation shows up the flaw in the argument, in the same way that the difficulties of English translators sometimes expose confusion in the thought of the Chinese.

We may begin with a notoriously fallacious argument of Plato:

"Q. And what about things which are double something else? If they are double one thing, can't they be equally well regarded as half something else?

A. Yes."
Q. And things which are large or heavy may equally well, from another point of view, be called small and light.
A. Yes; any such thing will in a sense have both characteristics.
Q. Then can we say that such things are, any more than they are not, any of the many things we say they are?
A. They are ambiguous like the puzzles you hear at parties (he replied), or the children's riddle about the eunuch hitting the bat and what he threw at it and what it was sitting on. They are neither one thing nor the other, and one can't think of them either as being or as not being, or as both or as neither.17

Whatever one says a thing is (double or half, heavy or light, large or small), one can also say it is not; therefore one has as much right to say it is not (does not exist) as that it is. The reproduction of this fallacy in Chinese presents the Chinese translator Wu Hsien-shu 吳載書2 with an insoluble problem. In the first passage in italics above "to be" is a copula. Since Chinese does not use a copula in saying "X is heavy" or "X is large" (Function E above), Wu Hsien-shu has to use shih/fei, which are used only to link nouns (Function B):

然則世間真不之似是而實非，似非而實是之物耶？

"In that case, the world certainly does not lack things which seem to be (shih) what really they are not (fei), seem not to be what really they are!"

To complete the argument the translator must jump from shih/fei to the existential yu/wu; and we catch him in the act in the second italicised passage:

欲誰知其是與非，有與無，誠非易事。

"It is truly not an easy matter to know definitely whether these things are (shih) something or are not so (fei), whether there are (yu) these things or there are not (wu)."

As a second example, let us take this Chinese summary of the Ontological Argument for the existence of God:

神者，至高之存在也。假設有更高於神而存在者，此人心中所不可得而思惟，故一切存在者之中，惟神為完全，故神為絕對完全者。凡謂之絕對完全者，必具具備性質，一無所屬。故神不可不具有存在性。神而無存在性，是不得謂之完全也。

"God is the highest existence (ts' un-tsi). If we suppose that there is anything existing which is higher than God, this would be inconceivable to the human mind. Therefore, among everything that exists, only God is perfect; and therefore God is that which is absolutely perfect. Whatever is called absolutely perfect, must have no deficiency among the qualities which comprise it. Therefore God must include existence. If God did not include existence, He could not be called perfect."3

The success of this summary of the argument depends on the use of ts' un-tsi, which follows a subject like "exist" instead of preceding an object like yu, and which modern Chinese writers have deliberately adopted as the equivalent of "exist". It is clear that the argument cannot be stated in terms of yu and wu. In the first place, it assumes that existence is included by the side of omnipotence and omniscience among the attributes which make up perfection. But yu, unlike ts' un-tsi, cannot be treated as an attribute, since the noun in question is not its subject—X 謂,"X is good", but yu X, "The world has X", "There is X". Again, it would be absurd to take yu as a precondition of perfection; it is precisely because the Tao is wu, without confining properties, that it is limitless and pervades all things. Kuo Hsiang's criticism of the idea of a personal Creator is unintelligible unless one remembers that something there is (yu) is necessarily a material thing, limited and imperfect:

請問夫造物者有耶，無耶，無也，則胡能造物哉？有也，則不足以物表形。故明乎物表之自物，而後始可與言造物耳。

"I should like to ask whether the Creator is something or nothing. If he is nothing, how is he able to create things? If he is something, he is unequal to making things in their multitude of forms. It is pointless to discuss creation with someone until he understands that the multitude of forms become things by themselves."

In Chinese one cannot treat yu as a predicate; but in Western languages it is so natural to treat existence as a predicate that it was nearly 700 years before Kant exposed this flaw in the Ontological Argument. Even Kant's refutation confesses existential and copulative "to be", and therefore defies translation into Chinese:

"Sein ist offenbar kein reales Prädikat, d.i. ein Begriff von irgend etwas, was zu dem Begriffe eines Dinges hinzukommen könnte. Es ist bloss die Position eines Dinges, oder gewisser Bestimmungen an sich selbst. Im logischen Gebrauche ist es lediglich die Copula eines Urteils. Der Satz: Gott ist allmächtig, enthält zwei Begriffe, die ihre Objekte haben: Gott und Allmacht; das Wörtchen ist, ist nicht noch ein Prädikat obenein, sondern nur das, was das Prädikat bezeichnungsweise aufs Subjekt setzt. Nehme ich nun das Subjekt (Gott) mit allen seinen Prädikaten (warunter auch die Allmacht gehört) zusammen, und sage: Gott ist, oder es ist ein Gott, so setze ich kein neues Prädikat zum Begriffe von Gott, sondern nur das Subjekt an sich selbst mit allen seinen Prädikaten, und zwar den Gegenstand in Beziehung auf meinen Begriff."4

Lan Kung-wu 蘭公武 translated Kant, not from the German original, but from Norman Kemp Smith's English version. I therefore append Kemp Smith's translation after the Chinese, and insert notes on the Chinese into it:
"Being" in Western Philosophy Compared with Shih/Pei and Yu/Wu

"Being (yu) may be defined as I = (chi-shih) 1, as Absolute Indifference, or Identity and so on" (Wallace).

Ho Lin's translation of the next passage is not very literal, and we shall have to make a second English translation direct from the Chinese.

"Die Qualităts ist zunächst die mit dem Sein identische Bestimmtheit, dergestalt, dass etwas aufhält, das zu sein, was es ist, wenn es seine Qualität verliert. Die Qualitäts ist dagegen die dem Sein äusserliche, für dasselbe gleichgültige Bestimmtheit. So bleibt z.B. ein Haus das was es ist, es mag grisser oder kleiner sein, und Roth bleibt Roth, es mag dasselbe heller oder dunkler sein."

"Quality is, in the first place, the character identical with being; thus a thing ceases to be what it is, if it loses its quality. Quantity, again, is the character external to being, and does not affect the being at all. Thus e.g. a house remains what it is, whether it be greater or smaller; and red remains red, whether it be brighter or darker." (Wallace).

"质'首先即具有与“有”相同一的性质,两者的性质相同到同样程度,如果一物失掉它的质,则该物便失其所以为该物。反之,“有”的性质即可“有”相外在,最少多少并不影响到“有”。“譬如,一所房子,仍然是一所房子,无论大小,一至小,一至大,同样,红色仍然是红色,无论深一至浅或淡一至深。”

"Quality, in the first place, includes a character identical with being (yu). The identity of the characters of both is so complete, that if a thing loses its quality, then it loses the reason why it is (mer, Part I, D above) this thing. On the other hand, the character of quantity is external to being, and the degree of quantity does not affect the being at all. For example, a house is (shih) still a house, whether it (be) greater or smaller; similarly, red is (shih) still red, whether it (be) lighter or darker.

Reading this passage in Chinese, it seems illogical; granted that “if a thing loses its quality, then it loses the reason why it is this thing”, how does this illustrate the claim that quality has “a character identical with existence (yu)?” If a two-dimensional figure ceases to be round, it ceases to be a circle, but it does not cease to be (exist). But the fault is Hegel’s, not Ho Lin’s; translation exposes the ambiguity in “to be” on which the argument depends.

It is curious to watch Chinese translators struggling to reproduce Western fallacies in a language which, whatever its defects, does not permit them to make these particular mistakes. But there is nothing very surprising in the spectacle; until Wittgenstein’s revolution in philosophy, it was generally assumed everywhere that if one cannot state a philosophical argument in another language, it is the language and not the argument which is at fault. The adaptation of philosophy to a new language (from Greek and Latin to modern languages, from Sanskrit and from Western
languages to Chinese) often involves both an improvement in terminology and a deterioration in syntax. It is a remarkable fact that although Western philosophers have hardly yet rid themselves of confusion between existential and copulative being, the languages in which the ambiguity of both have been philosophizing since the decline of scholastic Latin distinguish the two almost as sharply as does Chinese. Standard English, French and German confine “to be” almost entirely to its copulative functions, using special formulae for existence—“there is”, “il y a”, “es gibt”. Nevertheless, philosophers have continued to say “X is” instead of “There is X”, and to speak of “being” wherever they used to say “be”. (One reason is no doubt that one cannot conveniently turn these formulae into verbal nouns, and philosophers who hold that they are studying entities, not the logical structure of language, have to operate with nouns.) The passage from Kant quoted above provides a good illustration—“Gott ist (Deus est),” to which Kant adds a translation into his own language, *Ei ist ein Gott*. Traditional English grammar, framed on the analogy of Greek and Latin, parses “There is X” with X as the subject of “is”; the way we think is affected, not only by the language we speak, but by the grammatical language we impose on it and by the languages in which the problems were originally stated.

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1 Republic 479, translated H. D. P. Lee (Penguin, 1953), 224f. I do not know Greek.
3 Ch'ê-hsiêh ts'ai-tien 哲學詞典, edited Fan Ping-ch'ing 范炳清 (1939), 497.
4 Chuang-tzu t'n 4/47A/3f.
6 K'ang-teh 堯德 (Kant), *Ch'ên-t'u ui li-hsing shu-p'ien 續編性批判* (Peking, 1957), 430.
7 Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, and impressions with corrections (London, 1933), 504f.
8 System der Philosophie. Erster Teil; die Logik. § 86.
9 Hei-kâ-eh 黑格爾 (Hegel), *Hsiao lo-ch'i 小羅駱* (Peking, 1954), 199.
10 The Logic of Hegel (Oxford, 1874), 135.
11 Logik § 85.
12 The Logic of Hegel, 134.
13 Hsiao lo-ch'i, 198.

APPENDIX

THE SUPPOSED VAGUENESS OF CHINESE

Most scholars who reflect on the differences between Chinese and Western languages agree on one point—that Chinese is an exceptionally loose and ambiguous language, in which logical precision is almost unattainable. This generalization seems indeed so obvious as hardly to need illustration; it is therefore disconcerting to notice how often the illustrations which have been offered prove to be baseless. Apart from Waley’s observations, already quoted, the only attempt known to me to expose in detail a

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Chinese ambiguity connected with “to be” is made by Bodde in a footnote to his translation of Kung-sun Lung’s Essay on Chih and Things:

“The chief difficulty arises in connexion with the Chinese word *chih*, which occurs consistently throughout the text linked with the word *chih*, and which seems to hold three different meanings: (1) *Meaning ‘not’*, as in the phrase, ‘There are no things are not *chih*’ (*fei-chih* 物物非指). (2) *Meaning ‘no’,* as in the phrase ‘But these *chih* are no *chih*’ (*fei-chih* 指非指). (3) *Meaning ‘non-chih’*, as in the phrase ‘There are no *chih* that are non-*chih*’ (*fei-chih* 指非非指). This third sense seems to be required in the last lines of the passage, which speak about *chih* and non-*chih* in opposition to one another.”

This essay of Kung-sun Lung is notoriously difficult, but it is possible to challenge Bodde’s comments without concerning ourselves with Kung-sun Lung’s meaning:

(1) *Not.* As we have seen, *fei* is “is not”, a negative copula linking nouns and substantival clauses only. Classical Chinese is a language especially rich in sharply distinguished negatives, none of which except *fu* has such a wide range as the English “not”—*wu* 無 “have not”, *mo* 莫 “none, no one”, *wei* 未 “not get to, not yet”, *wu* 勿 “don’t” *wei* 微 “if there were not”, *fu* 否 “not so”, *fu* 弗 “不之, *wu* 勿之” Bodde, who of course knows all this in practice, does supply “to be” in eight of the nine cases in which he translates *fei* as “not”.

(2) *No.* It is strange to define one of the meanings of *fei* by the English “no”, which is itself ambiguous outside a context. Bodde in fact understands *fei* in two different ways when he uses “no” as an equivalent:

A. (指) 非指 is four times rendered “*chih* are no *chih*”. But how does this differ from *chih* are not *chih*? There is no doubt a slight difference between “He is not a gentleman” and “He is no gentleman”, but the distinction is hardly significant even for post-Wittgensteinian philosophy. By “are no *chih*” Bodde perhaps understands “are not true *chih*”; but if so he is accusing Kung-sun Lung of not making that clear when he is using *chih* in a special narrow sense, rather than of using *fei* ambiguously. Bodde has succeeded in illustrating the vagueness of English rather than of Chinese.

B. 非指 is four times rendered “there are no *chih*” (with slight variations). This does give a different sense, but it is impossible as a translation, unless Bodde is emending *fei* to *wu* 無.

(3) *Non.* A non-smoker is someone who *is not* a smoker. When *fei* is the main verb, Bodde generally translates it “are not” or “are no”. When it occurs in the substantival phrase *fei-chih* he could have translated “what is not a *chih*”, but prefers to express the same sense by the terser “non-*chih*”.

Thus on Bodde’s own showing *fei* has only one function in Kung-sun Lung’s essay (except for the examples in aB above, in which his translation
is unacceptable), a function narrower than the English "is not", let alone "not" or "no". His only reason for claiming that it "seems to hold three different meanings" is that it is convenient to translate it by three words in English.

The present study does not encourage one to take it for granted that Chinese is either better or worse than English as an instrument of thought; each language has its own sources of confusion, some of which are exposed by translation into the other. Although the supposed vagueness of classical Chinese may not be altogether an illusion, some of the factors which contribute to this impression are certainly misleading. We discover by listening or reading that a foreign word is used in contexts where a similar English word is not; we also discover by speaking or writing that we cannot use the foreign word in contexts where we can use the English one. But most Western sinologists (including myself) read literary Chinese without being able to write it, so that, although we gradually learn to narrow down meanings, every classical Chinese word seems a little vaguer than it really is. Again, we know too little about Chinese grammar. We say that ju 如 has two senses, "if" and "like". In the former sense, it is obviously used quite differently from, for example, how 如, also translated "if", and in the latter quite differently from ju 如, the dictionary meaning of which is also "like". Has anyone ever clearly explained what these differences are? Until we can distinguish between the ordinary words with which classical Chinese deals with such basic ways of thinking as hypothesis and comparison, how can we tell whether it is a vague language or not? None of us yet knows classical Chinese. Even if the accusation of vagueness eventually proves to be true, it is a truth which it is unhealthy to keep too much in mind.


HSI P'EI-LAN

by DAVID HAWKES

Say not that love is like a cloud
One moment dense, the next dispersed.
Say not that love is like a flower
That blooms so soon and falls so fast.
True love is hard as rock or iron;
Knows no to-day or yesterday;
A flower whose fragrance does not fade,
A cloud whose vapour constant stays;
That only fears the untrue thought,
The ruthless smile, the tear constrained;
The clouds that wet a dreamer's clothes,
The flowers in the mirror feigned . . .

Hsi P'ai-lan ac. c. 34.

Readers of Dr. Waley's delightful Yuan Mei will recall that only one of the poet's lady disciples, Chin I, is mentioned there by name. Perhaps the most famous of them, and certainly the one whose poetry Yuan Mei regarded with most approval, was Hsi P'ai-lan (席佩蘭, T. 趙芬, 追華, 洪嘉), wife of the poet Sun Yuan-hsiang (孫原湘, T. 子潯, 長眞, H. 心昇, 1760-1829).

Yuan Mei's high regard for her as a poetess is expressed in the introduction he wrote for a volume of her poems:

Every word from the heart; no echo of the ancients; a jadeful sonority; these are the qualities that make Hsi P'ai-lan's verse so unusual—and not only among her own sex, either. For with her, inspiration always comes first before the poem is written; and in this respect she puts to shame many of the so-called poets of our time. His Excellency Ho-lin wrote to me from the Army to say that every line of verse which he can get hold of is conned and chanted by him night and day with as much devotion as if it were from the Sutras.

I, too, feel this way about Hsi P'ai-lan's poems.¹

Yuan Mei knew the husband before he met the wife, and seems at first to have been dubious about her talents:

My lady disciple Hsi P'ai-lan has a pure and ingenious poetic talent. I used to suspect that her poems were written for her by her

¹ Ch'ang-ch'en ho chi 袁枚簡集, Preface.