DAVID A. GRAFF

The Battle of Huo-i

INTRODUCTION

The Battle of Huo-i 霍邑 on September 8, 617 (thirteenth year, eighth month, third day of the Ta-yeh 大業 reign period of Sui Yang-ti 隋煬帝), was the only major pitched battle to occur during the campaign to capture the Sui capital Ta-hsing-ch'eng 大興城 (Ch'ang-an 長安). The campaign was undertaken by Li Yüan 李淵, duke of T'ang 唐, who established the T'ang dynasty the following year. This brief, violent episode is worthy of attention on several accounts. At that moment the future of Chinese political history hung in the balance, dependent on the outcome of battle. Moreover, we possess a rare eyewitness account of the event from the brush of the chief secretary of Li Yüan's headquarters.

Wen Ta-ya 溫大雅 was a former Sui official living in retirement at T'ai-yüan 太原 during the time when Li Yüan, the garrison commander there, was preparing for his rising against the faltering Sui dynasty. He became a member of Li's inner circle of advisers and was made administrator of the secretarial staff (*chi-shih ts'an-chün* 記室參軍) at his Headquarters of the Grand General (Ta chiang-chün fu 大將軍府) on July 22, 617. In this capacity Wen was responsible for handling official documents and drafting correspondence for Li Yüan, whom he accompanied throughout the campaign from T'ai-yüan to Ch'ang-an.[1] As Woodbridge Bingham has written, "Wen Ta-ya was on the inside of what was happening and Li Yüan himself later referred to him as an important member of those who shared in the responsibility for the success of the whole enterprise."[2]

Following the capture of Ch'ang-an, Wen played a key role in arranging

[1] Wen Ta-ya was born sometime before 574 and probably died during the first decade of T'ai-tsung's 太宗 reign; his biographies can be found in Liu Hsü 劉昫 et al., *Chiu T'ang-shu* 舊唐書 (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1975; hereafter cited as *CTS*) 61, pp. 2359–60, and in Ou-yang Hsiu 歐陽修 et al., *Hsin T'ang-shu* 新唐書 (Peking: Chung-hua, 1975; hereafter cited as *HTS*) 91, p. 3781. See also Woodbridge Bingham, "Wen Ta-ya: The First Recorder of T'ang History," *JAOS* 57.4 (1937), pp. 368–74. Wen seems to have been responsible in particular for Li Yüan's secret correspondence. For his duties at the headquarters, see Ssu-ma Kuang 司馬光, *Tzu-chih t'ung-chien* 資治通鑑 (Peking: Ku-chi ch'u-pan-she, 1956; hereafter cited as *TCTC*) 184, p. 5739; and Wen Ta-ya, *Ta-T'ang ch'uang-yeh ch'i-chü-chu* 大唐創業起居注 (Shanghai: Shanghai ku-chi, 1983; hereafter cited as *CYC*), p. 21.

[2] Bingham, "Wen Ta-ya," p. 374.

the ritual for Li Yüan's assumption of the imperial dignity, and he later held several important offices, including that of minister of works (*kung-pu shang-shu* 工部尚書). Some time during Li Yüan's reign (618–626), he wrote the three-*chüan* account of the T'ang founding that has survived as *Diary of the Founding of Great T'ang* (*Ta-T'ang ch'uang-yeh ch'i-chü-chu* 大唐創業起居注).[3] The middle *chüan* of this work is a detailed account of the campaign from T'ai-yüan to Ta-hsing-ch'eng, containing much that is of interest to the military historian.

This paper consists first of all of a description and analysis of the battle of Huo-i, based largely on material in Wen Ta-ya's book and focusing on questions of military tactics and techniques. In addition, however, I compare Wen's account with five other surviving accounts of the battle of Huo-i in an effort to shed light on the way in which traditional Chinese historians dealt with military history.

THE CAMPAIGN

I do not examine several fundamental political questions, for example, the origin of Li Yüan's revolt against the Sui, the considerations leading to his decision to proceed openly, and the relative importance of Li Yüan and his son Li Shih-min 李世民 in the decision making process. Instead I concentrate on problems that arose once the momentous decision had been made, probably by the fifth lunar month of 617. The first of these was the recruitment of an army, which was met fairly easily thanks to Li Yüan's control over the local Sui militia forces and to the presence of large numbers of willing recruits in the neighborhood of T'ai-yüan.[4] Supply, too, was easily taken care of, since the storerooms of the Chin-yang 晉陽 Palace contained large stocks of grain, cloth, and military equipment. The one exception to the favorable supply situation was horses, an item of critical importance to medieval armies and, the sources tell us, exceedingly scarce in T'ai-yüan during the summer of 617.[5]

[3] For discussions of the dating and authenticity of this text, see Howard Wechsler, *Mirror to the Son of Heaven: Wei Cheng at the Court of T'ang T'ai-tsung* (New Haven: Yale U.P., 1974), pp. 19 ff; Lo Hsiang-lin 羅香林, "Ta-T'ang ch'uang-yeh ch'i-chü-chu k'ao-cheng" 大唐創業起居注考證, in idem, *T'ang-tai wen-hua shih* 唐代文化史 (Taipei: Taiwan Commercial Press, 1955), p. 3; and Bingham, "Wen Ta-ya." A convenient, punctuated edition of Wen's book published by Ku-chi is cited in n. 1, above; an earlier edition can be found in Miao Ch'üan-sun 繆荃孫, ed., *Ou-hsiang ling-shih* 藕香零拾 (Taipei: Kuang-wen shu-chü, 1968).

[4] *CYC*, p. 11; Nunome Chōfū 布目潮渢, *Zui Tō shi kenkyū* 隋唐史研究 (Kyoto: Toyōshi kenkyūkai, Kyoto University, 1968), p. 132.

[5] For the role of horses in medieval Chinese warfare, see Li Shu-t'ung 李樹桐, "T'ang-tai



Map 1
The Ho-tung region in 617.

Another problem, however, was not so easily taken care of, namely, to secure the T'ang base area in T'ai-yüan commandery. Any plan of Li Yüan to undertake long-range military adventures made such security more urgent. To the north, a renegade Sui official, Liu Wu-chou 劉武周, had held Ma-i 馬邑 in rebellion for several months (see map 1). Liu's patron Shih-pi 始畢 khaghan of the Eastern Turks dominated the steppes and had already raided the T'ai-yüan area more than once. To the east, Ching-hsing 井陘 Pass represented a potential avenue of invasion from the plains of Ho-pei, where an assortment of bandit and rebel leaders were slugging it out with one another and with the remaining Sui forces. The commanderies to the south and west of T'ai-yüan, Hsi-ho 西河 and Li-shih 離石, were still held by officers loyal to the Sui, as was Liao-shan 遼山 county to the southeast, nominally part of Li Yüan's own jurisdiction.

The negotiation of an alliance with Shih-pi khaghan, who represented the most significant threat, brought security for the northern frontier. The alliance also provided a much-needed infusion of horseflesh when a thousand Turkish mounts arrived to be sold in T'ai-yüan. These advantages carried a price, however, for Li Yüan had to assume a humble posture in order to gain Turkish support.[6] A second agreement, this time with Hsi Shih-ling 郄士陵, the rebel leader who controlled the town of Ling-shou 靈壽 at the mouth of Ching-hsing Pass, assured the T'ang leaders that they would not have to worry about an incursion from Ho-pei. As for the magistrate of Liao-shan, Li Yüan and his advisers concluded that his county, deep in the T'ai-hang Mountains, was too small and remote to pose a significant threat.[7]

A different strategy was required in dealing with the commandery of Hsi-ho, which lay immediately south of T'ai-yüan in the Fen 汾 River valley. Li Yüan sent his first and second sons Chien-ch'eng 建成 and Shih-min with a force to take the commandery seat at Hsi-ch'eng 隰城. They set out on July 13, 617, covered the fifty miles to Hsi-ch'eng, which they stormed on July 18, and returned to T'ai-yüan no more than nine days after they had first set out. The quick success achieved by this campaign persuaded Li Yüan and his associates to undertake the much more hazardous expedition against the distant Western Capital.[8]

A suitable administrative and command organization, the Headquarters

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chih chün-shih yü ma" 唐代之軍事與馬, in idem, *T'ang shih yen-chiu* 唐史研究 (Taipei: Chung Hwa Book Co., 1979), pp. 231–76; for the scarcity of horses in T'ai-yüan, see *TCTC* 184, p. 5738; for an inventory of the Chin-yang Palace, see Nunome, *Zui Tō*, p. 122.

[6] *TCTC* 184, p. 5737; *CYC*, p. 10. [7] *CYC*, p. 12.

[8] *TCTC* 184, pp. 5738–39; *CYC*, p. 13.

of the Grand General, was set up immediately after the brothers returned from Hsi-ho, and preparations proceeded apace. By August 10 Li Yüan had recruited 30,000 men into his "righteous army" (*i-shih* 義師). They were stationed just south of his commandery seat of Chin-yang and were supported by a contingent of Western Turks under the *tigin* A-shih-na Ta-nai 阿史那大柰.[9] The army began its march southward the next day. Li Yüan was accompanied on the expedition by Chien-ch'eng and Shih-min, who served as his principal subordinate commanders, while his fourth son Yüan-chi 元吉, only fifteen years old, was left behind as garrison commander at T'ai-yüan.[10]

On the second day of the march, August 12, a force under Chang Lun 張綸 was detached in order to capture Li-shih 離石, which lay to the west through the territory of the Chi-hu 稽胡, a non-Chinese people dwelling between the Fen and Shih 石 Rivers. This move would not only secure T'ai-yüan against western attacks, but would also put Chang Lun in a position to threaten the Sui commanderies farther south along the left bank of the Yellow River. Chang took Li-shih on August 23 and then began to move southward on a path parallel to that taken by the main body of the T'ang army. On October 12, after the men of the main army had reached Lung-men 龍門 on the Yellow River, they learned that Chang had gone on to capture the commanderies of Lung-ch'üan 龍泉 and Wen-ch'eng 文城.[11]

After parting company with Chang Lun and his men, the main army under Li Yüan continued its march toward Hsi-ho, which it reached on August 14, then followed the Fen River into the narrow gorge called Ch'üeh-shu-ku 雀鼠谷, emerging near the county town of Ling-shih 靈石. On August 20 the army camped at a place called Ku-hu-pao 賈胡堡, some twelve miles south of Ling-shih near the east bank of the Fen River.[12] Here the advance was stopped short by the onset of prolonged summer rains, which kept the army in its bivouac for more than a fortnight.

The weather, however, was probably not the only cause for the delay. Although the campaign of the T'ang army seems to have been unopposed up to this point, the Sui viceroy in Ta-hsing-ch'eng had been apprised of the situation and had begun to take countermeasures. A force numbering several tens of thousands had been placed under the command of Ch'ü-t'u T'ung 屈突通, a general of the imperial guards, and sent to garrison the

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[9] *TCTC* 184, p. 5741; *CTS* 194B, p. 5180.

[10] For Yüan-chi's biographies, see *CTS* 64, p. 2420, and *HTS* 79, p. 3545.

[11] *TCTC* 184, p. 5753; *CYC*, p. 32.

[12] Li Chi-fu 李吉甫, *Yüan-ho chün-hsien t'u-chih* 元和郡縣圖志 (Peking: Chung-hua, 1983) 13, p. 379.

strategic commandery city of Ho-tung 河東 near the bend of the Yellow River. Of more immediate concern to the T'ang army, however, was another force of 20,000 crack troops, which had been stationed in the town of Huo-i to form a first line of defense. This army seems to have been moved north from the southern part of Shansi, where its commander, Sung Lao-sheng 宋老生, another guard officer, had made something of a name for himself by defeating the local bandit gangs.[13]

Huo-i lay about seventeen miles south of Ku-hu-pao, on the east bank of the Fen River. In between, the road ran through a narrow defile; the southbound traveler would have had the river on his right hand and steep hills hard by his left before the land opened up again near Huo-i.[14] Furthermore, the lay of the land was such that an army approaching the town from the north would be visible to watchers on the walls when still more than three miles away.[15] This naturally represented a major disadvantage for a force moving against the town since the head of its column might be attacked by the defenders before the follow-up elements had a chance to issue from the gorge and deploy for battle.

On August 22, two days after the T'ang army reached Ku-hu-pao, Wen Ta-ya tells us that an elderly commoner (*pai-i* 白衣) approached the camp seeking an audience with Li Yüan. He was, he said, a servant at a mountain temple and had heard the disembodied voice of Mount Huo-t'ai 霍太山 (east of Huo-i) instruct him to tell the T'ang army to march on Huo-i by going southeast from Ku-hu-pao along a precipitous path through the foothills of the Huo Mountains, where they could not be seen by watchers in the town.[16] Though our sources are silent on this point, it seems probable that he stayed with the T'ang force to serve as its guide when the time came to resume the advance.

Whether or not the advance was to continue soon became a matter for debate. Many in the T'ang army had left families behind in T'ai-yüan, and during the long days of inaction at Ku-hu-pao they began to fear that Shih-pi khaghan and Liu Wu-chou would take advantage of their absence to launch an attack. Li Yüan called a council of war, and some of his officers pressed for a withdrawal to T'ai-yüan. However, according to Wen Ta-ya, Chien-ch'eng and Shih-min argued that a retreat would be fatal to the T'ang

[13] *HTS* 92, p. 3808; *CYC*, pp. 23, 26–27.
[14] *TCTC* 184, p. 5741. Refer also to the U.S. Army Map Service's 1:250,000 map of Lin-fen 臨汾 (No. NJ49-15 in the L500 series).
[15] *CYC*, p. 23. It also stands to reason that Sung Lao-sheng would have placed scouts and outposts within the gorge itself, though the text curiously makes no mention of this.
[16] *CYC*, p. 23.

cause, pointing in particular to the negative effect of retrograde motion on the morale of the troops. Li Yüan agreed with his sons; the campaign would continue when the rains stopped.

One factor influencing this decision may have been the contempt in which Li Yüan and his sons seem to have held Sung Lao-sheng. Chien-ch'eng and Shih-min argued that Sung could certainly be beaten on account of his rashness, while Li Yüan found him totally lacking in tactical subtlety and cunning; to quote the pungent metaphor that Wen Ta-ya attributes to Li Yüan, "Lao-sheng reeks of his mother's milk." It seems that the Sui commander's reputation was based solely on his victories over bandits, and the fact that he came from a humble background (*han-wei* 寒微) certainly did not help him in the eyes of the aristocratic Li family.[17]

The rains finally ended on September 6, and Li Yüan had his men pack their baggage and prepare their weapons. In the early morning of September 8, the T'ang army left its camp at Ku-hu-pao and began a twenty-three-mile march southeastward through the foothills of the Huo Mountains to emerge on the east side of Huo-i. When the army first set out a dense fog filled the valleys, but as the morning passed the mist burned off and the fine autumn weather must have raised the spirits of the marchers.[18]

THE ARMIES: ORGANIZATION AND NUMBERS

Both the *Diary of the Founding of Great T'ang* and *Tzu-chih t'ung-chien* offer a great deal of information regarding the structure of the army that Li Yüan led out of T'ai-yüan, making it possible to draw up a rough table of organization (see appended figure). At the head of the army was Li Yüan, who had taken the title of grand general (*ta-chiang-chün* 大將軍). He was assisted by a large staff known collectively as the Headquarters of the Grand General, of whom the most senior was P'ei Chi 裴寂, who held the position of *chang-shih* 長史 (effectively, chief of staff).[19] P'ei was assisted by several generalist administrators, including an adjutant (*ssu-ma* 司馬) and a clerk (*yüan* 掾), while the staff also included at least four functionally specialized departments. One of these, the Secretarial Office (Chi-shih 記室) seems to have handled documents and correspondence; the other three were the Revenue Section (Hu-ts'ao 戶曹), the Armor Section (K'ai-ts'ao 鎧曹), and the Per-

[17] *CYC*, pp. 23, 26–27; *TCTC* 184, p. 5744. [18] *CYC*, p. 27.
[19] Robert des Rotours, *Traité des Fonctionnaires et Traité de l'Armée* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1947), p. 648, n. 2.

sonnel Evaluation Section (Kung-ts'ao 功曹).[20] These specialized offices all seem to have been filled with civil administrators rather than military men.

Although the overlap of civilian, that is, administrative or court, and military tasks might occur within careers, I am assuming that most officials had a primary orientation based on the particular package of skills they had acquired early in life, and that the overlap of civilian and military tasks was most likely to occur at an advanced stage in a man's career. Most of the men who filled Li Yüan's specialized staff offices were relatively junior figures, and their biographies offer no indication that any of them had any military training or combat experience prior to the campaign of 617. Instead, their training seems to have been purely literary. Many went on to hold high civil offices after the founding of the T'ang, but only one was sent on a military mission—and he had to share authority with an experienced soldier.[21]

The troop units were under the command of Li Yüan's sons Chien-ch'eng and Shih-min, each of whom was assisted by a chief of staff (*chang-shih*) of his own. Chien-ch'eng had the title of left commander of the armies (*tso ling-chün ta tu-tu* 左領軍大都督) and had the three army commanders of the left (*tso san t'ung-chün* 左三統軍) placed under him; Shih-min headed an identical structure prefixed "right" instead of "left." Each of the six army commanders seems to have been assisted by a deputy commander (*fu t'ung-chün* 副統軍).[22]

Most commentators have interpreted this arrangement as meaning that the T'ang force consisted of six divisions (*chün* 軍) grouped in two corps under Shih-min and Chien-ch'eng.[23] This was certainly true after October 23, when Li Yüan sent Shih-min and the three army commanders of the right marching along the north bank of the Wei River while Chien-ch'eng and his three subordinates occupied T'ung-kuan 潼關 and the Yung-feng 永豐 Granary.[24] Up until that time, however, the army appears to have operated

[20] *TCTC* 184, p. 5739; Charles O. Hucker, *A Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial China* (Stanford: Stanford U.P., 1985), nos. 2798, 3126, and 3489.

[21] See the biographies of the Revenue Section administrators Ts'ui Shan-wei 崔善爲 (*CTS* 191, pp. 5088–89) and Chang Tao-yüan 張道源 (*CTS* 187A, pp. 4869–70), the Armor Section administrator Wu Shih-huo 武士彠 (*CTS* 58, pp. 2316–17), and the Personnel Evaluation Section administrator Chiang Mo 姜謩 (*CTS* 59, pp. 2332–33). Chiang shared authority with Tou Kuei 竇軌 during a campaign against Hsüeh Chü 薛舉 in 618.

[22] *CYC*, p. 13; *TCTC* 184, p. 5739. Both the *Hsin T'ang-shu* annals (*HTS* 1, p. 4) and the treatise on the bureaucracy mention the creation of a "center army" (*chung chün* 中軍) under Yüan-chi alongside the left and right armies, but it seems doubtful that such a force actually existed; see des Rotours, *Traité*, p. 755, n. 1; and Nunome, *Zui Tō*, p. 118.

[23] See, for example, Woodbridge Bingham, *The Founding of the T'ang Dynasty: The Fall of Sui and Rise of T'ang* (rpt. New York: Octagon Books, 1975), p. 97; Nunome, *Zui Tō*, p. 117; des Rotours, *Traité*, pp. 753–55.

[24] *CYC*, p. 33.

as a unified whole. Moreover, the left-right distinction does not seem very important in Wen Ta-ya's description of the battle of Huo-i, where the T'ang infantry is organized into three divisions, designated as the van, middle, and rear *chün*.

Was the T'ang army at Huo-i organized as two corps or three divisions? I would like to suggest that up until the time that the T'ang army crossed the Yellow River in early October, the left-right distinction represented an administrative arrangement (in keeping with the Sui-T'ang penchant for dividing offices between two incumbents in order to diffuse authority) rather than an operational troop configuration. If this was the case, the army could have been divided into three divisions for combat, with each division under the joint command of two *t'ung-chün*, one of whom reported to Chien-ch'eng and the other to Shih-min. This would explain some otherwise puzzling bits of information in the sources, such as the fact that the initial crossing of the Yellow River was accomplished by 6,000 men led by two *t'ung-chün*, one left and one right, rather than by a force made up entirely of men drawn from the command of either Chien-ch'eng or Shih-min.[25]

The basic troop units combining to form the divisions under the *t'ung-chün* were commanded by men with the title of army chief (*chün-t'ou* 軍頭). This term was used in the T'ang forces briefly in 617 and 618 as a substitute for the Sui title of Soaring-Hawk garrison commander (*ying-yang lang-chiang* 鷹揚郎將), which designated the commander of a *fu-ping* militia unit.[26] As

[25] *TCTC* 184, p. 5750. It is also perhaps worth noting that when the T'ang leaders first proposed to raise an army, they spoke of forming three armies in emulation of the feudal lords of Chou times, each to be divided into left and right (*CYC*, p. 11).

[26] Nunome Chōfū believes that the *t'ung-chün* was the equivalent of the Sui *ying-yang lang-chiang*, i.e., the commander of a *fu-ping* militia unit, and the T'ang *chün-t'ou* was the equivalent of a *hsiao-wei* 校尉, the commander of a smaller unit. His main evidence is that several of Li Yüan's *t'ung-chün* had been *ying-yang lang-chiang* under the Sui; his view is supported by the *Hsin T'ang-shu* treatise on the army, which indicates that in 624 *t'ung-chün* was used as the title for a *fu-ping* commander (Nunome, *Zui Tō*, pp. 129–30; des Rotours, *Traité*, p. 760). Strong evidence suggests, however, that in 617 the T'ang used *chün-t'ou* for a *fu-ping* commander, while *t'ung-chün* was a higher-level officer:

1. Hu San-hsing's 胡三省 commentary states that the T'ang used *chün-t'ou* in place of the Sui title of *ying-yang lang-chiang* in 618 (*TCTC* 184, p. 5748).
2. In T'ang times a *fu-ping* militia contained only 800–1,200 men, and the battalion under a *hsiao-wei* (equivalent to Nunome's *chün-t'ou*) was 200. Yet Tuan Chih-hsüan 段志玄, who recruited 1,000 men for Li Yüan's army, was made a *chün-t'ou*; after this stellar recruiting performance, it would have been surprising if Tuan were allowed to keep only 200 men under his own command. Meanwhile, Liu Hung-chi 劉弘基, who recruited 2,000, was made *t'ung-chün*. See Swee Fo Lai, "The Military and Defense System under the T'ang Dynasty" (unpub. Ph.D., Princeton University, 1986), p. 32; *CTS* 68, p. 2505; *CTS* 58, p. 2309.
3. I do not question that some of the Sui militia commanders became *t'ung-chün*, but I believe that this was a promotion. Li Yüan's army expanded in summer 617 (by

Nunome Chōfū has demonstrated, a large portion of the T'ang army consisted of the Sui militia units that Li Yüan had under his authority when he was garrison commander of T'ai-yüan, and it seems likely that the supplementary forces recruited by his followers on the eve of the campaign would have adopted the same organizational pattern.[27] Little is known about the Sui *fu-ping* units except the titles of their officers, which changed with bewildering frequency. However, since the underlying organization was probably more stable, we may be able to find the broad contour of the Sui-period units in the better-known *fu-ping* system of T'ang times, when militia units generally consisted of 800–1,200 men each, organized into four to six battalions (*t'uan* 團) of 200 men, while lower-level units included companies (*lü* 旅) of 100 men, platoons (*tui* 隊) of 50, and sections (*huo* 火) of 10.[28]

Our sources agree that Li Yüan marched out of T'ai-yüan at the head of 30,000 men. Shortly thereafter, however, a strong column was detached to attack Li-shih, and, after the army had reached Ku-hu-pao, an unspecified number of weak and infirm soldiers was sent back to T'ai-yüan.[29] This suggests that if the T'ang army was not reinforced (and there is no evidence that it was) its strength may have been about 25,000 when it reached the battlefield east of Huo-i. The sources indicate that at least 10,000 of the original 30,000 were volunteers recruited on the eve of the campaign (though it is possible that the number was even higher), with the balance having been drawn from the Sui militia units in the T'ai-yüan area.[30] And, as Nunome Chōfū has also pointed out, the population of T'ai-yüan in Sui times was large enough that we need have no qualms about accepting the figure of 30,000.[31]

We have no hard figures on the relative strength of the infantry and cavalry components of the T'ang army. The scarcity of horses in T'ai-yüan, however, suggests that the infantry was very much the more numerous arm, and that the followers brought along by the Western Turk Ta-nai may have accounted for a large proportion of what little cavalry there was.[32] None of the accounts of the battle of Huo-i mentions the presence of more than a few hundred horsemen on the battlefield.

Wen Ta-ya's narrative, in particular, also indicates that the cavalry was able to to operate independently of the six *t'ung-chün* and the left-right army

Nunome's own figures, at least a third were new recruits; Nunome, *Zui Tō*, p. 134). Experienced officers would normally expect rapid elevation; e.g., early in the American Civil War, men who had been captains in the small peacetime army rose to become generals virtually overnight.

[27] Nunome, *Zui Tō*, pp. 129–30. [28] Lai, "Military and Defense System," p. 32.

[29] *CYC*, p. 23. [30] Nunome, *Zui Tō*, pp. 132, 134. [31] Ibid., pp. 121–22.

[32] *CYC*, pp. 10–11, 14; *TCTC* 184, p. 5738; *CTS* 194B, p. 5180.

structure. At the beginning of the battle we see a body of several hundred cavalry under the direct command of Li Yüan himself. He divides these men into a dozen groups and sends them riding by the city walls, then re-forms them into two ad hoc divisions under Chien-ch'eng and Shih-min. This testimony, coupled with the fact that Shih-min's chief of staff Ch'ai Shao 柴紹 was concurrently a cavalry commander (*ling ma-chün tsung-kuan* 領馬軍總管), strongly suggests that the cavalrymen of the T'ang army were directly attached to the headquarters of its three highest commanders.[33]

In sharp contrast to the wealth of information about the T'ang army, virtually nothing is known about the Sui force that garrisoned Huo-i. The sources tell us that Sung Lao-sheng brought 20,000 crack troops (*ching-ping* 精兵) with him to Huo-i, some of whom seem to have been veterans of Yang-ti's campaigns against Koguryŏ in northeast Asia.[34] Some of the same sources, however, also say that Sung had 30,000 men under his command when he joined battle with the T'ang army.[35] It is possible that he had recruited additional troops in Huo-i, but it is even more likely that observers on the T'ang side (through whom we receive our knowledge of the battle) had only a vague idea of the size of his army. All accounts of the battle of Huo-i portray the Sui army as a homogeneous mass, with no mention of infantry, cavalry, or any sort of subdivision into operational units on the battlefield.

TERRAIN

The walled county town of Huo-i was located in the valley of the Chih River 彘水; in Han times the area had been known as Chih-shui county. The Chih rises in the Huo Mountain range more than ten miles east of Huo-i and flows westward to join the Fen River. In T'ang times it passed about one-third mile south of the walled town of Huo-i, which was located close to the east bank of the Fen. The town is approximately 1,700 feet above sea level. To the south, on the far side of the Chih River, the ground rises to 2,000 feet and levels off into a plateau. To the east, a narrow strip of level ground extends for several miles along the river. Tangled hills north of the town rise to over 3,300 feet, from which several small streams flow down into the Fen River.[36] The road from T'ai-yüan follows the river and approaches the town from the north, but on the afternoon of September 8 the

[33] *CTS* 58, p. 2314. [34] *CTS* 2, p. 22; *TCTC* 184, p. 5741; *CYC*, p. 23.

[35] *TCTC* 184, p. 5748; *CYC*, p. 28.

[36] Li, *Yüan-ho chün-hsien* 12, p. 340; also the U.S. Army Map Service (see n. 14).

T'ang army made their way down to Huo-i through the deep valleys to the northeast.

THE BATTLE OF HUO-I: THE WEN TA-YA VERSION

In the early afternoon, sometime between one and three p.m., Li Yüan, accompanied by his sons Chien-ch'eng and Shih-min and a body of several hundred cavalry, reached a point about two miles east of the walled town of Huo-i (see map 2).[37] On the march down from Ku-hu-pao, he had voiced his concern that the Sui commander Sung Lao-sheng would refuse to come out of the town and offer battle, thereby forcing the T'ang army to undertake a difficult and time-consuming siege. The sons, however, expressed confidence that Sung could be provoked by a light cavalry demonstration on account of his rashness and lack of cunning. Putting this plan into effect immediately, Li Yüan sent his horsemen riding toward the town. They approached the east wall, veered left, turned the southeast corner, and continued along the south wall, waving their banners as they went. The purpose of this demonstration was not solely to enrage Sung Lao-sheng, as if he were a bull and the T'ang riders the matador's red cape. Our text hints that the T'ang leaders were also trying to offer Sung Lao-sheng the prospect of a tactical advantage by giving the impression that they were going to camp hard by the walls of Huo-i. Their intent, then, may well have been to give Sung the impression that they did not expect him to come out and were planning to bring their infantry columns right up to the city wall. In other words, the T'ang generals wanted Sung to think that he could successfully attack the T'ang army on the march, before it had the opportunity to deploy for battle.

The T'ang infantry, meanwhile, had fallen some distance behind the cavalry during the long march down from Ku-hu-pao. At the same time that he sent his cavalry toward the walls, Li Yüan sent one of his aides racing back to bring the infantry of the main body forward at the double. The sight of this approaching infantry column apparently convinced Sung Lao-sheng to send the bulk of his army out through the south and east gates of Huo-i (see map 3), although the fact that he deployed immediately in front of the east wall of the town and at first refused to advance any further seems to belie his reputation for rashness.

Since Sung Lao-sheng was not living up to expectation, Li Yüan resorted to another stratagem in order to lure him forward. Taking the cavalry, which had now returned from its gallop beneath the walls, he divided it into two wings under his two sons, with Chien-ch'eng taking the left and Shih-min the right. These detachments then drew back in feigned retreat, which emboldened the Sui commander to move farther forward to a point more than one-third mile east of the town.

The T'ang infantry was by now arriving on the field of battle, probably north of the cavalry. The lead division deployed into a square formation, apparently as a precaution against any Sui attack that might be launched during the interval of maximum vulnerability before the other two divisions had come up and completed their deployment. What happened next is not entirely clear. Wen Ta-ya's account becomes exceedingly sketchy at this point but gives the impression that the T'ang infantry gave a mighty shout and rushed upon the Sui army (see map 4). In the confusion of the ensuing melee, Wen tells us that Li Yüan resorted to yet another stratagem, raising the shout that Sung Lao-sheng had already been killed. This is supposed to have broken the morale of the Sui soldiers, who fled in panic toward the town gates. The rout became a massacre when they found their escape routes blocked by the T'ang cavalry.

When Li Yüan had first assigned the cavalry to his sons and ordered them to pull back with the aim of drawing Sung Lao-sheng forward, he had also instructed them to swing wide around the Sui flank once the infantry had engaged and cut the roads to the south and east gates. Although Wen does not give the details of this maneuver, it seems likely that both Chien-ch'eng and Shih-min crossed the Chih River in order to get around Sung's right flank, which probably rested on the stream. In any case, Shih-min and Chien-ch'eng seem to have arrived in front of the south and east gates, respectively, without encountering any opposition (see map 5).[38] The small garrison that Sung Lao-sheng had left inside the town dropped the port-

[37] This narrative is based on information in *CYC*.

[38] A small but perplexing problem exists. If Chien-ch'eng was put in command of the left-hand cavalry detachment and Shih-min was given the right-hand one, why was the former sent to attack the east gate and the latter to attack the south gate? A glance at the map suggests that the opposite should be the case.

One answer is that Chien-ch'eng, as the senior of the two brothers, always received the more esteemed left designation regardless of his actual position on the field. Thus he would have been stationed on the right and went around the left (north) flank of the Sui army to reach the east gate. Yet since this seems to have been an ad hoc division of the cavalry, would it not have been simpler to put Chien-ch'eng on the real left (instead of putting him on the right and calling it left)? Another answer is that Chien-ch'eng and Shih-min initially deployed facing west with Chien-ch'eng on the left and Shih-min on the right. They then wheeled about and withdrew before swinging around by their right in a wide arc to go around the right (south) flank of the Sui army. This would have put Chien-ch'eng on the inside track, heading for the east gate, while Shih-min was on the outside track toward the south gate (see map).

cullis gates in order to bar their entry, thereby cutting their comrades' line of retreat.

The battle was over by around four p.m., but Li Yüan decided to take advantage of his troops' enthusiasm (fanned no doubt by the victory and ensuing massacre) to launch an immediate assault on the walls of Huo-i. The T'ang army had no siege equipment, but ladders or crude scaling devices of some sort were no doubt cobbled together. The weakness of the defenders made the outcome a foregone conclusion, and the T'ang army was in possession of the town by seven p.m.

THE BATTLE OF HUO-I: THE LI SHIH-MIN VERSION

The preceding description of the battle of Huo-i is based almost entirely on the account given by Wen Ta-ya in the second *chüan* of his *Diary of the Founding of Great T'ang*. As already mentioned above, Wen accompanied Li Yüan on the march to Ta-hsing-ch'eng as administrator of his secretarial office and participated in the councils of the T'ang leaders. Although Wen was a civil official rather than a military man, he was almost certainly present on or near the battlefield of Huo-i on September 8, and there is reason to believe that he was an eyewitness to the action. His description of the initial collision of the T'ang and Sui armies emphasizes the tremendous sound of the clash of arms but offers no visual image except for an enormous dust cloud which completely veils the encounter. This is just what an observer some distance away might be expected to see and hear; it is not what we would expect from a scholar in his study, able to give his imagination free rein in describing the battle. This strongly suggests that Wen was indeed present on the battlefield, and even if he was not, he was certainly in a position to be able to debrief a great many of the participants.

Wen is believed to have written the final version of his account some time during the Wu-te 武德 period (618–626), not long after the events he relates. However, another version of the battle of Huo-i took shape during the Chen-kuan 貞觀 period (627–649) and dominated subsequent historical treatment of the event. This second version is so different from Wen's account that it seems almost to describe a different battle; here the emphasis is on the heroic deeds of Li Shih-min and his decisive impact on the outcome. I have found five variants of this second version of the battle of Huo-i. The purest and probably the earliest of them survives in *Ts'e-fu yüan-kuei* 册

府元龜 as part of a longer text dealing with the martial exploits of T'ang T'ai-tsung 太宗 (Li Shih-min). *Ts'e-fu yüan-kuei* was compiled between 1005 and 1013 but includes material of much earlier date. The fact that T'ai-tsung is referred to as emperor suggests that this passage was written some time during his reign (that is, during the Chen-kuan period); it is possible that it derives from the Veritable Records (*shih-lu* 實錄) compiled for T'ai-tsung. Later variants of this version are found in *Chiu T'ang-shu* 舊唐書, *Hsin T'ang-shu* 新唐書, *T'ai-p'ing yü-lan* 太平御覽, and *Tzu-chih t'ung-chien* 資治通鑑. These later variants all incorporate material drawn from Wen Ta-ya's account, mainly as additional detail of an ornamental nature. Ssu-ma Kuang's description of the battle of Huo-i is the most sophisticated effort to synthesize Wen Ta-ya's account with the version that took shape during the Chen-kuan period, but even in *Tzu-chih t'ung-chien* the latter is still the dominant narrative line.[39]

Although differing a great deal among themselves, the several variants of the Chen-kuan (or Li Shih-min) version share a number of key features:

1. As in Wen Ta-ya's account, the T'ang cavalry opens the battle by flouting the defenders of Huo-i, but this version differs in that Li Shih-min is very much the star of the show.
2. Chien-ch'eng and his left army, accompanied by Li Yüan, deploy to the east of Huo-i, while Shih-min and his right army draw up on the plateau south of the town.
3. Sung Lao-sheng advances, apparently with his entire force, and launches an impetuous attack on the left army, which is driven back. In three of the five variants (*Chiu T'ang-shu*, *Hsin T'ang-shu*, and *T'ai-p'ing yü-lan*), Chien-ch'eng fails the army at the critical moment by falling from his horse.
4. Shih-min charges down the steep slope from the southern plateau with a small party of horsemen and cuts his way through the Sui army, which breaks and runs. The battle is won.

[39] I have found five variants of the Chen-kuan, or Li Shih-min, version:

1. Wang Ch'in-jo 王欽若, comp., *Ts'e-fu yüan-kuei* (Sung edn.; facs. rpt. Peking: Chung-hua, 1989) 44, p. 7a.
2. *CTS* 2, pp. 22–23.
3. *HTS* 2, p. 24. This is basically no more than a condensed version of the account in no. 2.
4. Li Fang 李昉, comp., *T'ai-p'ing yü-lan* (SPTK edn.) 311, pp. 5a–b. This account and that in no. 2 appear to descend from a common prototype, most likely Liu Fang's 柳芳 National History (*kuo-shih* 國史), completed in 759–760.
5. *TCTC* 184, p. 5748.

The Li Shih-min version contains several elements that are difficult to accept at face value. If, for example, Shih-min deployed south of Huo-i with a large part of the T'ang force, why didn't Sung Lao-sheng detach a large part of his own force to face him? Shih-min seems to have encountered little or no opposition in his attack on the Sui flank. Even more disquieting, however, is the relentlessly heroic role that Shih-min is made to play, especially in contrast with the lackluster performance of his father and brother. It is now generally accepted that Shih-min, who murdered his brother and usurped his father's throne in 626, was deeply concerned about how history would judge him, and that this concern prompted him to intervene in the process of compilation of historical records during his reign in order to play up his own role in the T'ang founding and belittle those of his father and brother.[40] The description of Huo-i preserved in *Ts'e-fu yüan-kuei*, apparently written during Shih-min's reign, serves this agenda well. Once this new version of the battle of Huo-i had entered the stream of official historical writing, it came to enjoy a privileged status relative to the private and unofficial narrative recorded by Wen Ta-ya. This would explain why the Li Shih-min version continued to provide the basis for all subsequent treatments of the battle, even though most of the later historians were well aware of Wen's version and did not hestitate to draw on it for embellishment.

Despite its probable distortions, the Li Shih-min version of the battle of Huo-i is by no means entirely useless. Not all of the information contained in its five variants need necessarily be viewed as spurious. Some of it may be of great value in filling in gaps in Wen Ta-ya's version. Wen's account of the clash between the main bodies of the two armies, in particular, leaves a great deal to be desired. When we supplement Wen's story with material from the other version, however, we see clearly that Sung Lao-sheng took the initiative to attack the T'ang army. He inflicted a reversal and drove it back, perhaps because he was able to hit T'ang's lead division before the middle and rear divisions had had a chance to deploy. Then something happened that broke the morale of the Sui troops and delivered the victory to T'ang. Whether that something was the entry of the middle and rear divisions into the fray, a rumor about the death of Sung Lao-sheng, or a sudden awareness among the Sui troops that enemy cavalry had gotten around to their rear will probably never be known. However, the picture of an initial T'ang reverse finds independent corroboration in a *Hsin T'ang-shu* biography. It seems that Ch'ang Ta 常達, one of Li Yüan's officers, was so unnerved by an initial reverse at Huo-i that he fled and hid. Li Yüan at first thought that

[40] See, for example, Wechsler, *Mirror*, pp. 22 ff.

he had been killed in the battle. When Ch'ang finally reappeared, the T'ang leader welcomed him back into the fold, eventually promoting him to *t'ung-chün* and making him prefect of Lung-chou 隴州.[41]

All this suggests that the Wen Ta-ya version as well as the Li Shih-min one has its blind spots. Scholars who have studied the *Diary of the Founding of Great T'ang* have long suspected Wen Ta-ya of being a little too lavish in his praise of Li Yüan.[42] That Wen should fail to record his imperial master's discomfiture does not seem at all surprising.

CONCLUSIONS

What does this study of the encounter at Huo-i tell us about the phenomenon of battle in medieval China? What generalizations can be drawn from these accounts?

First and most obviously, the battle narratives examined in this paper substantiate Peter A. Boodberg's well-grounded observation that traditional Chinese authors saw morale as the critical factor in battle.[43] Boodberg's outline of the typical Chinese battle narrative as consisting of (1) the initial encounter, (2) the panic and disintegration of one side or the other, and (3) the massacre can be seen in most of the accounts of Huo-i, especially that of Wen Ta-ya, which is probably the most reliable overall. This outline conforms remarkably well with the pattern that Ardant du Picq (1821–1870) long ago discerned in the warfare of Mediterranean antiquity: armies did little damage to each other when they clashed head-on; since each man was more concerned with his own safety than with encompassing his enemy's destruction, the battle initially took the form of a somewhat diffident fencing rather than the full-blown melee of romantic imagination. The outcome was eventually decided by the panic of one side, often the result of a sudden threat to flank or rear, and what followed was nothing but a slaughter.[44]

All this suggests that the psychology of battle in premodern times was basically the same in both China and the West. What is remarkable, as Boodberg has pointed out, is how frank the Chinese historians were in recognizing this psychology, especially when compared with their Western counterparts, who had a pronounced penchant for heroic fictions.[45] The

[41] *HTS* 191, p. 5498.
[42] See *TCTC* 184, p. 5737; and Bingham, *The Founding of the T'ang Dynasty*, p. 120.
[43] Peter A. Boodberg, "The Art of War in Ancient China" (unpub. Ph.D., U. of California, 1930), pp. xix–xx.
[44] Ardant du Picq, *Battle Studies* (New York: Macmillan, 1921), pp. 89, 107–108, 110–119.
[45] Ibid., p. 89; Boodberg, "Art of War," p. xix.

pattern that lies so close to the surface in Wen Ta-ya's account of Huo-i had to be dug out of Roman battle narratives by du Picq's painstaking detective work.

Another feature of medieval Chinese warfare that emerges from these accounts is the great importance attached to tricks and stratagems. Li Yüan sent his cavalry galloping around Huo-i hoping to draw Sung Lao-sheng out of the city, then had them retreat some distance in order to entice his foe even farther away from the protection of the walls. When the main bodies engaged, he had the cavalry ride around the flank to cut off the enemy retreat. And, if we are to believe Wen Ta-ya, the rout of the Sui army was precipitated by a ruse designed to persuade them that their commander was dead. There seems to have been a recognition that a head-on clash involving pure brawn was insufficient to bring about the defeat of the enemy, an understanding that something extra was necessary.

The ancient Chinese had a word for that "something extra": *ch'i* 奇. This hoary concept first appears in the text of *Sun-tzu* 孫子, and it has been elaborated by many subsequent Chinese military theorists.[46] Commentators differ as to the exact translations that are most appropriate for this term and its polar counterpart, *cheng* 正, but it is generally agreed that the basic idea of *cheng* is a straightforward, frontal attack, often encountered in the opening stages of a battle in order to pin down the enemy or fix him in position. Once the enemy has been pinned by the *cheng*, he may be susceptible to the knockout blow of a *ch'i* attack, usually characterized as an unexpected strike against the flank or rear. Yet in its wider sense, as Boodberg has pointed out, *ch'i* may refer to any unorthodox maneuver designed to throw the enemy off balance.[47] It is worth noting in this connection that the author of *Li Wei-kung wen-tui* 李衛公問對, an early Sung military text that devotes special attention to questions of *ch'i* and *cheng*, cites Chien-ch'eng's fall from his horse at Huo-i as an example of a successful (albeit unintentional) *ch'i* maneuver, since it encouraged Sung Lao-sheng to launch an ill-advised attack.[48] *Ch'i* may apply to both the knockout blow itself and the deft move that sets the enemy up for that blow.

The accounts of Huo-i also tend to substantiate Benjamin Wallacker's

[46] Ibid., pp. xx ff; Samuel B. Griffith, trans., *The Art of War* (New York: Oxford U.P., 1971), pp. 34–35; Benjamin Wallacker, "Two Concepts in Early Chinese Military Thought," *Language* 42.2 (1966), pp. 295–99.

[47] Boodberg, "Art of War," p. xx.

[48] Ibid., pp. 7–8; for the Chinese text, see pp. 3–5 of *Li Wei-kung wen-tui* in Hatori Unokichi 服部宇之吉, ed., *Kambun taikei* 漢文大系 (rpt. Taipei: Hui-feng hsüeh-hui, 1978), vol. 13.

suggestion that there is an intimate relationship between the *ch'i* scheme and its instrument par excellence, the cavalry arm. Of the T'ang maneuvers at Huo-i that might be characterized as *ch'i*, all but one were carried out by cavalry, from the initial flouting of the defenders to the feigned retreat to the surprise rush that sealed off the gates. The infantry, on the other hand, seem to have fought a straightforward, linear action. It should be recalled that the top T'ang commanders, Li Yüan and his sons Chien-ch'eng and Shih-min, appear to have kept the cavalry separate from the infantry and under their own direct control, an arrangement serving to maximize the flexibility and responsiveness of their mobile arm.

Finally, it should also be pointed out that the main purpose of Li Yüan's stratagems was to get Sung Lao-sheng out of Huo-i and, once he had come out, to make sure that he couldn't get back in again. This concern is perfectly in keeping with the well-known strength of fortified positions, especially walled cities and towns, during the T'ang period.[49] Had the Sui commander chosen to defend the walls of Huo-i, the T'ang army would have faced a long and costly siege for which it was ill-equipped. Once the defenders of the city had been reduced to a bare minimum, however, the T'ang army was able to storm the walls and overcome all resistance very quickly, even though it lacked the siege equipment usually considered necessary for such an operation. The lesson here is that even massive ramparts of tamped earth had little or no intrinsic defensive value unless adequately garrisoned, and it may go a long way toward explaining how such blitz-like operations as An Lu-shan's 安祿山 march on Lo-yang in the eleventh and twelfth lunar months of 755 could occur during a period when most towns and cities were all but impregnable.

The scholars who recorded military events in the official histories and other sources seem to have been fairly conscientious in their treatment of such matters as prebattle dispositions and overall battle strategy, and they also display a great deal of interest in clever or unusual stratagems. On the other hand, there seems to have been little or no interest in weapons and tactical details; the accounts have little to say about these matters, and the information that does slip in occasionally is ornamental rather than truly descriptive.

One explanation is that the historian considered such things to be too mundane or trivial to be worth recording. Another explanation, by no

[49] See, for example, Charles A. Peterson, "Regional Defense Against the Central Power: The Huai-hsi Campaign, 815–817," in John K. Fairbank and Frank A. Kierman, Jr., eds., *Chinese Ways in Warfare* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U.P., 1974), pp. 145–46.

means irreconcilable with the first, is that this is a reflection of the Confucian scholar's well-known abhorrence of violence and bloodshed. Boodberg, among others, has written that "the total absence of the glorification of war" is a "marked . . .feature of Chinese philosophy and literature," and goes on to assert that "Chinese knighthood rarely experienced the lust of battle."[50]

Yet the Li Shih-min version of the battle of Huo-i (with its numerous derivatives) clearly indicates that, in the early T'ang at least, military heroism was still an important virtue. Indeed, some of its variants do not spare the sort of gory details that we would more readily associate with Japanese tales of the *gunki monogatari* 軍記物語 genre than with Chinese dynastic histories; we are told that the future T'ai-tsung killed dozens of foemen, that his two swords were broken, that he fought until his sleeves were filled with blood. While the accuracy of this account may be called into question, there can be little doubt that this was a part of the picture of himself that T'ai-tsung wished to bequeath to the ages. And this suggests that martial valor and its associated violence were not necessarily regarded with unmixed loathing by the society in which he lived.

The battle of Huo-i is remarkable in that we possess an eyewitness (or near-eyewitness) account which can be compared with the versions in the official histories. Under ideal circumstances, this should allow us to reconstruct the process by which the final, official versions were derived from their original sources, and give us the opportunity to detect any tendencies toward distortion. In this particular case, however, it is both unfortunate and ironic that the participation of T'ang T'ai-tsung in the battle, one of the main reasons why it is so well documented, also serves to vitiate its value as a basis for more general conclusions about the writing of military history in imperial China. In this case the direction of the distortions in the official version is only too clear, but that distortion comes from a very special source: Li Shih-min's deliberate and calculated campaign of self-glorification.

[50] Boodberg, "Art of War," p. xv. For a study of T'ang literati attitudes toward the military, see D. L. McMullen, "The Cult of Ch'i T'ai-kung and T'ang Attitudes to the Military," *T'ang Studies* 7 (1989), pp. 59–103.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CTS — *Chiu T'ang-shu* 舊唐書
CYC — *Ta T'ang ch'uang-yeh ch'i-chü-chu* 大唐創業起居注
HTS — *Hsin T'ang-shu* 新唐書
TCTC — *Tzu-chih t'ung-chien* 資治通鑑



Map 2
September 8, 617. Li Yüan arrives east of Huo-i (1) and sends his cavalry riding past the town (2).



Map 3
The Sui army issues from the town through the south and east gates and deploys (1). T'ang cavalry under Shih-min (S) and Chien-ch'eng (C) pulls back (2). T'ang infantry begins to arrive (3).



Map 4
The Sui army attacks the T'ang van (1), which is driven back (2). T'ang cavalry under Shih-min (S) and Chien-ch'eng (C) sweeps around the Sui flank (3).



Map 5
T'ang cavalry under Shih-min (S) and Chien-ch'eng (C) blocks south and east gates (1). The Sui army panics and flees (2).

T'ang Military Command Structure at the Battle of Huo-i



EXPLANATION:
1. Hierarchic status descends vertically downward; persons descending from the same horizontal bar are consultatively equal.
2. Analytically, all *t'ung-chün* have consultative equality.
3. Dotted horizontals indicate how left and right *t'ung-chün* may have shared command of the 3 divisions. Probably 4 or 5 *chün-t'ou* reported to each *t'ung-chün*.

SOURCES: *CYC*, pp. 13, 33; *TCTC* 184, pp. 5739–40; Nunome, *Zui Tō*, p. 117; and des Rotours, *Traité*, pp. 648–49.

KEY: Larger type used for person's names.
Smaller type used for office titles.

[A]*TCTC* has 陽屯 instead of 揚毛