

THE COMPOSITION OF THE GONGSUEN LONG TZYY

公孫龍子

by A. C. GRAHAM

Introduction

- Part I. Differences between ch. 2 and 3 and ch. 4-6
A. General differences
B. Linguistic criteria
- Part II. Sources of ch. 4-6
A. The Mohist canons
B. Three paradoxes
- Part III. External evidence for dating the two parts of the *Gongsuen Long tzyy*
A. The *Gongsuen Long tzyy* in the Swei (589-618) and Tarng (618-907) dynasties and later
B. External evidence before the Swei dynasty; the *White Horse* and *Meanings and Things*
C. External evidence before the Swei dynasty; *Understanding Change, Hard and White, and Names and Actualities*
D. The evidence of Luu Sheng
- Part IV. Conclusion

INTRODUCTION

The *Gongsuen Long tzyy* is the principal surviving document of the dialecticians, *biannjee* 辯者 or School of Names 名家. It consists of an introductory chapter on the life of the dialectician Gongsuen Long (4th c. b.c.), and of five philosophical essays:

- Chapter 2. 白馬論 Essay on the White Horse
3. 指物論 " " " Meanings and Things
4. 通變論 " " " Understanding Change
5. 堅白論 " " " Hard and White
6. 名實論 " " " Names and Actualities

I wish to show that while the first two essays are genuine writings of the

dialecticians of the Warring Kingdoms, the last three were written much later, probably in the time of the Six Dynasties.¹

PART I. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CH. 2 AND 3 AND CH. 4-6

A. GENERAL DIFFERENCES

There is a marked difference between ch. 2 and 3 and ch. 4-6 in the method of reasoning. Ch. 2 and 3 are among the few examples in Chinese philosophical literature of sustained systematic reasoning of the kind which European philosophy achieved under the discipline of Greek logic. The writer tries to put each proposition in a chain of arguments in the same verbal form, and to omit no intermediate link however obvious (as in the sentences underlined in the examples below), so that the conclusion can be seen to follow infallibly from the premises:

GSL A, 5A/2-4 (ch. 2) 馬者所以命形也。白者所以命色也。命色者非命形也。故曰，白馬非馬

"'Horse', is that by which one designates the form. 'White', is that by which one designates the colour. *That which designates the colour is not that which designates the form.* Therefore I say, a white horse is not a horse."

A, 7B/2-9 (ch. 2) 馬者無去取於色，故黃黑皆所以應。白馬者有去取於色，黃黑馬皆所以色去。故唯白馬獨可以應耳。無去者非有去也，故曰白馬非馬。

"'Horse', does not reject or select with respect to colour; therefore one can reply with either a yellow or a black one. 'White horse', does reject and select with respect to colour; yellow and black horses are both rejected because of their colour; therefore one can reply only with a white horse. *What does not reject is not what does reject.* Therefore I say, a white horse is not a horse."

B, 1A/2-4. 1B/2-8 (ch. 3) 天下無指物，無可以謂物非指者。……天下無指而物不可謂指也。不可謂指者，非指也。非指者，物莫非指也。天下無指而物不可謂指者，非有非指也。非有非指者，物莫非指也。物莫非指者而指非指也。

"If in the world there were no meaning one thing rather than another, it would be impossible to say that a thing was *not one's meaning*... If meanings do not exist in the world, a thing cannot be said to be one's meaning. *That it cannot be said to be one's meaning implies that it is not one's meaning.* That (any) thing is not one's meaning implies that *no thing is not one's meaning.*

¹ The following abbreviations will be used: SBTk, Syhuh Tsongkan 四部叢刊. GSL, *Gongsuen Long tsayy* 公孫龍子 Dawtzanq 遺編 edition. (The three divisions 上, 中 and 下, will be indicated by A, B, and C.) JJ, *Gongsuen Long tsayy jyjijie* 公孫龍子集解 edited Chern Juh 陳柱, Commercial Press, 1937. YJ, *Mohjing yijijie* 墨經易解, edited by Tarn Jiehfu 譚介甫. Commercial Press, 1935.

"That if meanings do not exist in the world a thing cannot be said to be one's meaning implies that there is not anything which is *not one's meaning.* *That there is not anything which is not one's meaning implies that no thing is not one's meaning.* If no thing is not one's meaning, it is meanings which are not one's meaning."¹

Although the reasoning of ch. 2 and 3 may often be faulty, it is presented in a form which enables one to see where it is at fault; thus in the first example above one can see that what has been proved is merely "Whiteness is not a horse", not "A white horse is not a horse". From ch. 4 onwards there is none of this logical precision. No commentator has succeeded in making any sense out of *Understanding Change*, and it will be seen later that part of it has been strung together haphazardly out of misunderstood fragments of the Mohist canons. In the *Hard and White*, although the general drift is clearer, one is never sure in what sense whiteness and hardness are supposed to be "separate", and there is no attempt to put the arguments in such a form that the conclusion can be seen to follow from them. The *Names and Actualities* contains nothing but the commonplace that words must be used in accordance with the things to which they refer, expressed in very obscure and sententious language. Further, in these essays dialectics is no longer pursued purely for its own sake; they show a tendency to introduce ethical and political implications quite absent in ch. 2 and 3, and each of the three essays points a moral at the conclusion:

B, 5A/8, 9 (ch. 4) 其有君臣之於國焉，故強壽矣。

"There is the relation of ruler and minister to the state in it, and therefore strength and long life."

B, 6A/5 (ch. 4) 暴則君臣爭而兩明也。

"If they do violence to each other, ruler and minister contend and both shine."

B, 6A/8, 9 (Conclusion of ch. 4) 兩明而道喪，其無以正焉。

"Both shining, the Tao decays, and they have no means to become correct."

C, 4B/2 (Conclusion of ch. 5) 離也者，天下故獨而正。

"As for separation, it is therefore by the isolation of each that the world is correct."

C, 6A/9 (Conclusion of ch. 6) 至矣哉，古之明王。審其名實，慎其所謂。至矣哉，古之明王。

"Unsurpassable, the enlightened rulers of old! They scrutinized names and actualities, and were careful about what what they said. Unsurpassable, the enlightened rulers of old!"

The difference in the quality of the thought is accompanied by an

¹ I have defended the general explanation of the essay which this translation assumes in *Kung-sun Lung's Essay on Meanings and Things*, *Journal of Oriental Studies* (Hongkong), vol. 2, No. 2, July 1955.

equally marked difference in style. There is no part of the *Gongsuen Long tzyy* which does not present difficulties to a modern reader. But the difficulty of ch. 2 and 3 is merely that of understanding a philosophical school for which this book is almost the only surviving source; the style is very simple and lucid, renouncing all rhetorical effect for the single aim of expressing the thought clearly. On the other hand, the obscurity of ch. 4-6 is inherent in the language, which is vague, grammatically loose, decorative, mannered, often using words eccentrically. In ch. 2 and 3 parallelism is used only to emphasize comparisons and contrasts in the argument. In ch. 4-6, although parallelism is not used as consistently as in *pyanwen* 駢文, it is seldom suspended for more than a few sentences; and it is a stylistic frame into which the thought is forced:

C, 3A/7-9 (ch. 5) 目不能堅, 手不能白。不可調無堅, 不可謂無白。其異任也, 其無以代也。

"The eye cannot perceive hardness, the hand cannot perceive whiteness; but one cannot say there is no hardness, one cannot say there is no whiteness. It is because eye and hand have different functions, because one cannot take over the task of the other."

Ch. 2 and 3 consist largely of long, closely organized sentences, in which clauses are knit together by such patterns as . . . 者 . . . 也 and . . . 以 . . . 爲 . . . Ch. 4-6 consist rather of short clauses, often paired, strung together without links, or loosely connected by 而:

	2	3	4	5	6
者 . . . 也	11	10 ²	1	3	3
以 . . . 爲	9	2 ¹	1 ³	-	-
而	5	7	21	19	8

B. LINGUISTIC CRITERIA

(1) 所

In ch. 4, 所 is used only once, in the sense of "place". But in ch. 5 and 6 it is used twenty-one times,⁴ nineteen of them in the four-word pattern verb 十其所十 verb, for example:

GSL, C, 1A/8, 9 (ch. 5) 得其所白, 不可謂無白。得其所堅, 不可謂無堅。

"If you get its whiteness, it cannot be said that there is no whiteness; if you get its hardness, it cannot be said that there is no hardness."

Eighteen of the nineteen phrases fall into pairs, as in the example quoted, in accordance with the parallelism general throughout ch. 4-6.

¹ GSL, B, 2A/3. Read 爲 for 之. See JJ, 99/8.

² GSL, B, 2A/7-9. Omit 非有非指也 . . . 物莫非指. See JJ 105/4, 5.

³ GSL, B, 4A/5, 6 以是獨. Read 以是爲, following the parallel *Mohzzyy* 墨子 SBTk 10/19B/1.

⁴ Including the restored text of GSL, C, 5A/8.

This pattern is completely absent from ch. 2 and 3, which do not even use the combination 其所:

	2	3	4	5	6
其所	-	-	1	8	12
所 not preceded by 其	11	5	-	1	-
Verb 十其所十 verb	-	-	-	8	11
所 outside this pattern	11	5	1	1	1

Ch. 2 and 3 use both 所 alone and 所以, the former always followed by a verb used transitively: 求 "seek" 去 "get rid of" 取 "take" 白 "make white" 有 "have" 無 "not have" 兼 "attach to itself, annex". A strange feature of the style of ch. 4-6 is that 所以 is not used at all, while 所 is often forced into combination with verbs which remain intransitive and with nouns used as verbs:

	2	3	4	5	6
所 with transitive verb	7	5	-	1	2
所 with intransitive verb or noun (白, 堅, 物, 位, 實, 正)	-	-	-	8	10
所以	4	-	-	-	-
所 "place"	-	-	1	-	-

Several striking examples are found side by side in the *Names and Actualities*:

GSL, C, 5A/2-8 物以物其所物, 而不過焉, 實也。實以實其所實, 不曠焉, 位也。出其所位非位, 位其所位焉, 正也。以其所正, 正其所不正。(不以所不正) 疑其所正。

"A thing which is a thing where it should be a thing, without going beyond it, is an actuality. An actuality which is actual (literally "fills") where it should be actual, without leaving a void, is in place. To leave its place is to be out of place; to be in place in its place is correctness. By means of what is correct correct what is not correct; do not, because of what is not correct, doubt what is correct."

This passage is very characteristic of ch. 4-6 . . . the parallelism, the obscure and overblown style, the vagueness of the thought. In the opening sentences, the use of the second 物 and the second 實 as verbs, together with the looseness with which such words as 以, 其, 所 and 焉 are employed throughout this section of the book, make it impossible to be certain even of the grammatical structure.

It will be noticed that the word 白 has been classed as transitive in ch. 2 and 3, and as intransitive in ch. 4-6. In the *White House* 所 is the object of the transitive 白 "make white":

GSL, A, 7A/9-7B/1 白者不定所白, 忘之而可也。白焉者言白, 定所白也。

¹ The bracketed words, which are demanded by the parallelism, are restored with the aid of the parallel passage in *Mohzzyy* 10/20B/1, 2. Cf. JJ, 211-212.

“‘White’ does not determine what it makes white; that question can be left out of account. The word ‘white’ in ‘white horse’ does determine what it makes white.”

On the other hand, in the *Hard and White* 所 cannot be treated as the object of 白:

GSL, C, 1A/5f 得其所白, 不可謂無白。得其所堅, 不可謂無堅。

“If you get its (the stone’s) whiteness, it cannot be said not to have whiteness; if you get its hardness, it cannot be said not to have hardness.”

(ii) 也

也 is used in the middle of sentences in both parts of the book, although more frequently in the latter part. A striking feature of ch. 4-6, again illustrating its tendency to parallelism, is a habit of using the medial 也 twice in a single sentence, to mark off two generally parallel phrases:

GSL, B, 3B/5, 6 (ch. 4) 羊與牛唯(=雖)異, 羊有齒, 牛無齒, 而羊牛之非羊也, 之非牛也, 未可。

“Although sheep are different from oxen, it is inadmissible to conclude that sheep and oxen are not sheep and are not oxen on the grounds that sheep have incisors and oxen have not.”

GSL, C, 2A/3, 4 (ch. 5) 其白也, 其堅也, 而石必得以相盛盪。

“Whether it is whiteness or hardness, the stone without fail pervades and is pervaded by it.”

GSL, C, 6A/5, 6 (ch. 6) 知彼之非彼也, 知彼之不在彼也, 則不謂也。

“If you know that that is not that and is not there, then you will not say it is.”¹

	2	3	4	5	6
Medial 也 alone	3	-	-	2	-
„ „ in a pair	-	-	4	6	4

(iii) 者

In ch. 2 and 3, a word or phrase followed by 者 is always either followed by a complement (usually ending in 也。),

GSL, A, 6A/6 (ch. 2) 白馬者, 馬與白也。

“A white horse is a horse and whiteness”, or is the subject or object of a verb,

GSL, A, 7A/9 (ch. 2) 白者不定所白。

“‘White’ does not determine what it makes white.”

In ch. 4-6, the 者 phrase is much more loosely connected with what follows in nearly half the examples:

GSL, C, 4B/2 (ch. 5) 離也者, 天下故獨而正。

¹ The other pairs of medial 也 are in GSL, B, 3B/10. C, 1A/9, 10. 3A/2. 6A/4, 5.

“As for separation, it is therefore by the isolation of each that the world is correct.”

GSL, B, 4A/4, 5 (ch. 4) 無馬者, 羊不二, 牛不二而羊牛二。是而羊而牛非馬可也。

“As for there being no horse (in the combination of sheep and ox), sheep is not two and ox is not two but sheep and ox are two, so that it is permissible to say that sheep and ox are not horse.”¹

	2	3	4	5	6
者 phrase and rest of sentence closely linked	18	13	2	5	3
” ” ” ” ” ” loosely linked	-	-	5	2	-

(iv) In ch. 2, 3, the formula for rejecting a proposition is 未可 at the end of the sentence; in ch. 4-6 it is 不可 at the end of the sentence:

	2	3	4	5	6
未可	3	2	(2)	-	-
不可	-	-	4	1	1

The two cases of 未可 in ch. 4 both occur in the argument that “sheep combined with oxen are not horses”.² It will be seen later that this argument has been concocted out of a passage in the Mohist *Explanations* which uses both 未可 and 不可。

(v) Ch. 4-6 use 於 and the prepositional 乎 indiscriminately, while ch. 2-3 use 於 alone:

	2	3	4	5	6
於	4	2	3	4	2
乎	-	-	1	2	7

(vi) Of 若 and 如, the former is confined to ch. 4-6, while the two cases of the latter are both in ch. 2:

	2	3	4	5	6
如	2	-	-	-	-
若	-	-	3	4	-

With the exception of one case of 若 as “if”,³ both are used only in the sense “like”.

(vii) Apart from the copula 也 and the interrogative 乎, the following final particles are used:

	2	3	4	5	6
耳	3	-	-	-	-
焉	-	-	3	8	5
矣	1	-	6	-	2
哉	1	-	3	1	2

It will be observed that ch. 2-3 are very bare of final particles; apart from 也 and 乎, the only one to be used more than once is 耳, which does

¹ The other examples are GSL, B, 5A/5, 5B/4, 6A/6, 8. C, 2B/9.

² B, 3B/6, 10.

³ B/4A/5.

not occur at all in ch. 4-6. The use of 耳 illustrates the writer's concern for logical precision; moreover in two out of three cases he finds it necessary to reinforce it with 唯 or 獨:

A, 7A/5-7 (ch. 2) 故所以爲有馬者，獨以「馬」爲有馬耳，非有「白馬」爲有馬。

"Therefore that it is considered that there is a horse (if there is a 'white horse') is because of the 'horse' alone, not because there is 'white horse'."

A, 7B/5f (ch. 2) 黃黑馬皆所以色去。故唯白馬獨可以應耳。

"Yellow and black horses are both rejected because of their colour. Therefore it is only white horses which can answer to the description (of 'white horse')".

Of the other final particles (焉, 矣, 哉) there are only two examples in ch. 2-3, and no less than thirty in ch. 4-6. The most striking case is that of 焉, which is used regularly in ch. 4-6 and not at all in ch. 2-3. It is employed very loosely, and it is sometimes difficult to find any relation to the root meaning 於之:¹

C, 2B/5 (ch. 5) 物白焉，不定其所白。物堅焉，不定其所堅。

"A thing is white does not determine what is white; a thing is hard does not determine what is hard."

C, 3B/6f (ch. 5) 若白者必白，則不白物而白焉。

"If what is like whiteness is necessarily white, it is whiteness even without whitening things."

(viii) For the "if... then..." pattern, the *Gongsuen Long tzyy* uses 則, 使 and 苟:

	2	3	4	5	6
則	-	-	3	1	6
使	2	2	-	-	-
苟	-	-	3	-	-

It is remarkable that 則, a logical connective which one might have supposed indispensable in a philosophical text, is confined to ch. 4-6. Of the two words for "if", 使 is used only in ch. 2 and 3, 苟 only in the "Left and Right" section of ch. 4.

(ix) The distribution of the verb 爲 is as follows:

	2	3	4	5	6
	15	8	1	2	-

爲 (especially in the pattern 以... 爲) is among the essential words in ch. 2-3. The rarity of so common a word in ch. 4-6 is very remarkable.

(x) A curious linguistic feature of the *Gongsuen Long tzyy* is the use in

ch. 4 of 合 and 以 where one might have expected 與 "together with". 合 is used four times:

B, 3B/2f 羊合牛非馬。牛合羊非雞。

"Sheep combined with oxen are not horses. Oxen combined with sheep are not chickens."¹

以 in the sense of 與 occurs three times:

B, 4B/6 與馬以雞，寧馬。

"Of horse and chicken, horse is preferable."

B, 4B/9f 青以白非黃，白以青非碧。

"Blue together with white is not yellow. White together with blue is not jade-blue."

There are also three cases in the same essay of 而 used where one might expect 與, but these are more dubious:

GSL, B, 4A/10, 4B/1 謂雞足一，數足二。二而一故三。謂牛羊足一，數足四。四而一故五。

"To say 'chicken foot' makes one, to count the feet makes two; they are two and they are one, therefore three. To say 'ox foot' or 'sheep foot' makes one, to count the feet makes four; they are four and they are one, therefore five."

Here the use of 而 instead of 與 may be deliberate. "Chicken foot" is one (when you are counting the parts of the body) and also two (when you are counting the feet). 一而二 is "are one and are two", not "one plus two". GSL, B, 4A/5 是而羊而牛非馬可也。

"Thus it is admissible that sheep combined with oxen are not horses."

Here the second 而 replaces 合 in the otherwise equivalent sentence just quoted as an example of 合.

But both cases of 而 in the phrase 而羊而牛 are curious, and to explain the second as "combined with" would not account for the first.

(xi) The distribution of 其 is as follows:

	2	3	4	5	6
	2	-	14	22	20

In both examples of 其 in the *White Horse*, it is the ordinary possessive pronoun:

GSL, A, 5B/6 可與不可，其相非明。

"It is plain that permissible and impermissible are mutually exclusive."

GSL, A, 7A/6, 7 非有白馬爲有馬。故其爲有馬也，不可以謂馬馬也。

"It is not that having a white horse is counted as having a horse. Therefore, if it were counted as having a horse, one could not call a horse a horse." (Here the 其 is equivalent to 有白馬之.)

其, like the final particles 矣, 焉 and 哉, is used rarely and precisely

¹ George A. Kennedy, *Journal of the American Oriental Society* (1940), 60/1-22, 193-207.

¹ Also B, 4A/3, 4B/2.

in the first two essays, abundantly and loosely in the last three, where its function often defies analysis:

GSL, B, 5A/7-9 (ch. 4) 故一於青不可，一於白不可。惡乎其有黃矣哉。黃其正矣。是正舉也。其有君臣之於國焉，故強壽矣。

"Therefore (blue and white) cannot be united in blue or in white. How can they have yellow! Yellow is the correct colour; this is referring correctly. There is the relation of ruler and minister to the state in it, and therefore strength and long life."

GSL, B, 6A/2-4 (ch. 4) 與其碧寧黃。黃其馬也，其與類乎。碧其難也，其與暴乎。

"Yellow is preferable to jade-blue. If you make the horse yellow, is it not to be classed with them? If you make the chicken jade-blue, is it not in conflict with them?"

GSL, C, 5B/5, 9, 10 其以當不當也，不當而亂也……其以當而當也，以當而當，正也。

"It does not fit where it should fit; not fitting, it is disordered. . . It fits where it should fit; to fit where it should fit is correctness."

PART II. SOURCES OF CH. 4-6

A. THE MOHIST CANONS

It is well known that a number of passages in the *Gongsuen Long tzyy* have close parallels in the Mohist canons:

GSL, ch. 4			
B, 3B/2-4A/6	..	<i>Mohtzzy</i> 10/19A/6-19B/7	(YJ, B, 66, 67)
4A/10-4B/3	13A/1-3 B, 12
Ch. 5			
C, 1A/2	13A/4 B, 14
1B/4, 5	1B/3, 4 A, 66
2A/6-2B/3	12A/7 B, 4
3A/2, 3	16A/2, 3 B, 37
3B/6	20A/8 B, 70
4A/3, 4	12A/7-12B/1 B, 5
4A/5, 6	17B/3 B, 46
Ch. 6			
5A/7, 8	20B/1, 2 B, 70
5B/2-4	20B/6, 7 B, 72
6A/1-3	19B/7-20A/2 B, 68
6A/4, 5	15B/4 B, 33

This table reveals another important difference between the two parts

of the *Gongsuen Long tzyy*. There are no parallels in the first two essays;¹ all are in the last three essays, throughout which they are fairly evenly distributed, except that in ch. 4, *Understanding Change*, they are abundant in the "Ox and sheep" section, but absent from the "Left and right" and "Blue and white" sections.

Since the Mohist school of dialectics is later than Gongsuen Long, it has generally been taken for granted that in these parallels the *Mohtzzy* is dependent on the *Gongsuen Long tzyy*.² But Wu Yuhjiang has noticed a case in which it is certainly the *Mohtzzy* which is primary.³ I wish to show that the author of the last three essays not only used the Mohist canons, but in some cases misunderstood them so completely as to invite the suspicion that he belongs to a much later period.

(i) The example pointed out by Wu Yuhjiang is from the *Hard and White*:

GSL, C, 3A/2-5 曰，於石一也，堅白二也，而在於石。故有知焉，有不知焉，有見焉，[有不見焉]。故知與不知相與離，見與不見相與藏。藏故執謂之不離。

"In the stone they are one. Hardness and whiteness are two but are in the stone. Therefore there is knowledge of one but not of the other, seeing of one but not of the other. Therefore what is known and what is not known are separate from each other, what is seen and what is not seen are concealed from each other. They are concealed from each other; who, therefore, can say that they are not separate?"

¹ In the *Sheaucheu* 小取 (*Mohtzzy* 11/8B/10) we read that "A white horse is a horse. To ride a white horse is to ride a horse". (白馬，馬也。乘白馬，乘馬也). This is given as a typical case in which "A is B" entitles us to infer that to do something to A is also to do it to B; the author goes on to show that there are other cases where we cannot make this inference: "A thief is a man. To have many thieves is *not* to have many men. To have no thieves is *not* to have no men." (盜人，人也。多盜，衆人也。無盜，非無人也). It is not, therefore, a direct criticism of the thesis about the white horse, although by using this illustration the author is no doubt taking the opportunity to show us that he repudiates the sophistry. The word *jyy* 指 is common in the Mohist canons and *Dahcheu* 大取, but always (so far as the obscurity of the text enables one to judge) as either the noun "finger" or the verb "to point". There are no verbal parallels with the text of the *White Horse* or the *Meanings and Things*, in connection either with horses or with *jyy*.

² See, for example, Fung Yu-lan, *History of Chinese Philosophy*, translated by Derk Bodde, 2nd edition, 1952, vol. I, p. 267.

³ Wu Yuhjiang 吳毓江, *Mohtzzy Jiaozhu* 墨子校注 Dwulih chubuan sheh 獨立出版社, 1944, Appendix 2/12A.

⁴ The restoration of the bracketed characters is required by the parallelism (cf. JJ, 189/1, 2).

Mohtzxy 10/5B/6, 7, 16A/2-4 (YJ, B, 37)¹

(經)於一有知焉，有不知焉，說在存。

(說)於石一也，堅白二也，而在石。故有知焉，有不知焉，可。

Canon. "In one thing having something known and something unknown. Explanation: 'Being in it.'"

Explanation. A stone is one, hardness and whiteness are two but are in the stone. Therefore it is possible to have knowledge of one but not of the other."

The 於 at the beginning of the *Explanation* is the first word of the *Canon*, repeated, as is usually done, to show which canon is being explained. The author of the *Hard and White* has overlooked this, and reproduced 於石一也 as a continuous sentence. This is decisive proof that the original context of the common sentences is that of the *Mohtzxy*.

(ii)

GSL, C, 1B/3-5 天下無白，不可以視石。天下無堅，不可以謂石。堅白石不相外。藏三可乎。

"If there were no whiteness in the world, one could not see the stone; if there were no hardness, one could not call it stone. Hardness, whiteness and stone do not exclude each other. Can one say that there is concealment of the third?"

Mohtzxy 10/1B/3, 4; 9A/1, 2 (YJ, A, 66)

(經)堅白不相外也。

(說)堅。異處不相盈。相非，是相外也。

Canon. "Hardness and whiteness do not exclude each other.

Explanation. (Things in) different places do not pervade each other. They reject each other, that is, exclude each other."

In the dialogue of the *Hard and White*, the common sentence is put in the mouth of the objector, whose argument is immediately refuted. It is natural that the writer should quote a Mohist canon in order to disprove it; but it is incredible that the Mohists should have taken over word for word part of an argument devised by Gongsuen Long as a target for his criticism.

¹ In the *Mohtzxy* the canons are grouped together in *dih* 第 40 and 41, and the explanations presented separately in *dih* 42 and 43. Most canons end with a reference to the explanation, usually too brief to be understood in isolation; most explanations begin by repeating the first word of the canon. Owing to the extreme corruption of the text, restoration of an explanation to the canon to which it belongs, and the division between one canon and the next, cannot always be made with confidence.

The text used in all quotations is that of *Mohtzxy* in the *Syhbuh tsongkan*. But in each case a reference has also been made to the rearranged edition of the *Mohjing yihjue*. These references may also be used for the *Mohtzxy jiauzuh* and for the *Mohjing jiaushyh* 墨經校釋, Commercial Press, 1922) of Liang Chiuchau 梁啟超, in which the numbering of the canons is almost, although not quite, the same.

² Reading 在 有 存, with Liang Chiuchau (*op. cit.*, p. 127).

(iii)

GSL, C, 3B/2, 3 其不堅石物而堅，天下未有若堅而堅藏。

"If it is hardness even without hardening stones and other things, before there is anything like hardness in the world, hardness is concealed."

GSL, C, 3B/5-7 白固不能自白，惡能白石物乎。若白者必白，則不白物而白焉。

"If whiteness really cannot be whiteness by itself, how can it whiten stones and other things? If what is like whiteness is necessarily white, it is whiteness even without whitening things."

Mohtzxy 10/5A/6, 7; 20A/6-20B/3 (YJ, B, 70) (經)聞所不知若所知，則兩知之。說在告。

(說)聞。在外者，所不知也。或曰，「在室者之色，若是其色」。是所不智(=知)若所智也。猶白若黑也，誰勝。是若其色也。若白者必白。今也智其色之若白也，故智其白也。夫名以所明正所不智，不以所不智疑所明。若以尺度所不智長。外，觀智也。室中，說智也。

Canon. "If you hear that something you do not know is like something you know, you know both. Explanation: 'telling'.

Explanation. What is in the house¹ is unknown to you. Someone says: 'The thing in the house is like this in colour.' Then what you do not know is like something you do know. Which is it, white or black? (?) This thing is like it in colour. What is like white is necessarily white. Now you know that its colour is like white; therefore you know that it is white. A name, by means of what you understand, corrects what you do not know; it does not, by means of what you do not know, throw doubt on what you do understand. It is like using a ruler to measure something the length of which you do not know. What is outside the house, you know by experience; what is inside, you know because it is explained to you."

The sentence "What is like white is necessarily white" is quite intelligible in its Mohist context. The unknown X is like the known Y in colour; Y is white, therefore X is also white. But in the *Hard and White* the sentence means "What is like whiteness is necessarily white". There is an abstract whiteness independent of things; and since it is expressly said that white things are "whitened" by it and that they are "necessarily white", it is not at all clear why they should be described as merely "like whiteness". It seems likely that the phrase has been taken from the Mohist *Explanation* without being adapted to its new context.

(iv)

GSL, C, 2A/6-2B/3 曰，得其白，得其堅，見與不見與不見離。一一不相盈，故離。離也者，藏也。

曰，石之白，石之堅，見與不見，二與三，若廣修而相盈也。其非舉乎。

¹ Reading 室 for 外.

"Whether it is the hardness or the whiteness that you perceive, what is seen and what is not seen are separate,¹ one and the other do not pervade each other; therefore they are separate. To be separate is to be concealed from each other.

Objector. The whiteness and hardness of the stone, what is seen and what is not seen, the two and the three, pervade each other like length and breadth. Is this a false comparison?"

GSL, C, 4A/3, 4 力與知果不若因是。

"That strength and knowledge are actually not alike is because of this (??)"

These two passages have parallels in two very corrupt Mohist *Explanations*, the division between which cannot be made with certainty:

Mohtzzy 10/3A/8, 3B/1, 2; 12A/7-12B/1 (YJ, B, 4, 5)

(經)不可偏去而二。說在見與俱，一與二，廣與循。

(經)不能而不害。說在害。

(說)不見離。一二不相盈。廣循堅白，舉不重。

(說)不。與箴非力之任也。爲握者之類倍，非智之任也。若耳目。

Canon. "Two, even though one cannot be removed without the other. Explanation: 'Seeing and being together', 'one and two', 'length² and breadth'.

Canon. Inabilities which are not harmful. Explanation; 'harm'.

Explanation (of former canon). Seeing and being together³ are separate. One and two do not pervade each other. Length² and breadth, hardness and whiteness, are not the same actualities under different names.⁴

Explanation (of latter canon) . . . is not a matter for strength. . . . is not a matter for knowledge. They are like ear and eye (which cannot take over each other's functions)."⁵

¹ Omit 與不見 (cf. JJ, 179/7, 8).

² Read 修 for 循 (cf. YJ, Appendix, p. 19).

³ 俱 in the *Canon* becomes 不見 in the *Explanation*. The former reading is the more probable, since (a) "Seeing and being together" can be taken as a pair of which one member cannot be removed without the other; "seeing and not seeing" cannot. (b) The first word of the *Canon* (不) ought to be repeated at the beginning of the *Explanation*. It is not, but the second word of the latter is the 不 of 不見. It may be suggested that the *Explanation* originally began 不·見俱離. The 俱 was corrupted to 見, and the 不 later moved in front of it in order to make sense of the passage.

⁴ 重 is one of the four kinds of "similarity" (同) distinguished by the Mohists, defined as "two names for one actuality" (二名一實，重同也。Mohtzzy 10/10B/3, 4 YJ, A, 86). Cf. 子智是，有(=又)智是吾所先舉重，則子智是而不智吾所先舉也。"If you know this, and also know that it is another name for what I mentioned before, then even though you know this you do not know what I mentioned before." (Mohtzzy 10/16A/4, 5 YJ, B, 37).

⁵ Tarn Jiehfu, Liang Chiuchau and Wu Yuhjiang (op. cit.) all make the division between the *Explanations* three characters earlier before 舉.

見與不見...離 in the *Hard and White* corresponds to 見不見離 in the Mohist *Explanation*. If it is true that the original text of the latter was 不。見與俱, the *Hard and White* reproduces a corruption in the text of the *Mohtzzy*.

The reference to "strength and knowledge" in the *Hard and White* seems to have no connection with the argument of the essay and has never been satisfactorily explained. It is therefore interesting that in the *Mohtzzy* a section on the different functions of strength and knowledge should happen to follow one which discusses hardness and whiteness. A reader of this obscure and corrupt text who had not connected the *Explanations* with the corresponding canons might well fail to notice the change of theme, and suppose that the senses by which we see whiteness and feel hardness are being compared with strength and knowledge, which also cannot be interchanged.

(v)

GSL, B, 3B/-4A/6 羊合牛非馬，牛合羊非雞。曰，何哉。曰，羊與牛唯(=雞)異，羊有齒，牛無齒，而羊牛之非羊也，之非牛也，未可。是不俱有而或類焉。羊有角，牛有角，牛之而羊也，羊之而牛也，未可。是俱有而類之不同也。羊牛有角，馬無角，馬有尾，羊牛無尾。故曰，羊合牛非馬也。非馬者，無馬也。無馬者，羊不二，牛不二，而羊牛二，是而羊而牛非馬可也。若舉而以是猶[read爲]類之不同，若左右，猶是舉[read是狂舉]¹。

"Sheep combined with oxen are not horses. Oxen combined with sheep are not chickens.

Question. Why?

Answer. Although sheep are different from oxen, it is inadmissible to conclude that sheep and oxen are not sheep and are not oxen on the grounds that sheep have incisors and oxen have not. Even though incisors are not common to both, there are respects in which they are of the same class. It is also inadmissible to conclude that sheep are oxen and oxen are sheep on the grounds that both have horns. Even though horns are common to both, they are not of the same class.

Sheep and oxen have horns, horses do not; horses have tails, sheep and oxen do not. Therefore I say: 'Sheep combined with oxen are not horses'. That they are not horses is because they do not include horses. As for not including horses, sheep are not two kinds of thing and neither are oxen, but sheep and oxen are two kinds of thing, so that it is admissible that sheep and oxen are not horses. If you refer to this as evidence that they are not of the same class, like 'left' and 'right', this is to choose criteria indiscriminately."

¹ Amending according to the Mohist parallel (B. 66 below).

That this passage really is the nonsense it appears to be becomes apparent when we compare it with the Mohist parallel:

Mohzxy 10/5A/2-4, 19A/6-19B/7 (YJ, B, 66, 67)

(經)。狂舉不可以知異。說在有。

(說)。牛(狂)與馬惟(=雖)異，以牛有齒，馬有尾，說牛之非馬也，不可。是俱有，不偏有，偏無有。曰之與馬不類，用牛角馬無角，是類不同也²。若舉牛有角，馬無角，以是爲類之不同也，是狂舉也，猶牛有齒，馬有尾。

Canon. "By choosing criteria indiscriminately one cannot know whether things are different. Explanation: 'what they have'.

Explanation. Although oxen are different from horses, it is inadmissible to explain that oxen are not horses on the grounds that oxen have teeth and horses have tails. These are common to both; they are not possessed by one and not by the other.

If you say that oxen and horses are not of the same class, on the grounds that oxen have horns and horses have not, even though horns are not common to both they are still of the same class(?). If you refer to oxen having and horses not having horns as evidence that they are not of the same class, this is to choose criteria indiscriminately; it is no better than referring to oxen having teeth and horses having tails."

(經)。不可「牛馬之非牛」與可之同。說在兼。

(說)。或不非牛而非牛也可，則或非牛或牛而牛也可。故曰「牛馬非牛也」未可，「牛馬牛也」未可，則或可或不可，而曰「牛馬牛也未可」亦不可。且牛不二，馬不二，而牛馬二，則牛不非牛，馬不非馬，而「牛馬非牛非馬」無難。

¹ The 狂 is the first word of the canon, repeated (as is usual) at the beginning of the explanation, but accidentally misplaced. It should stand before 牛 (cf. YJ, Appendix, p. 32).

² This sentence is extremely corrupt. It seems to be clear that 之 is a graphic error for 牛 (YJ, *ut sup*). The end of the sentence 是類不同也 "In this (the possession of horns) they are not of the same class", is also open to suspicion. Tarn, Liang and Wu (*op. cit.*) all accept it, and assume that "(Oxen and horses) are not of the same class" is merely another way of saying that "Oxen are not horses". But the next sentence says plainly that, although oxen have horns and horses have not, they are of the same class (以是爲類之不同也，狂舉也). Further, by the Mohist definitions of the four kinds of similarity, ox and horse are not "doubles" (重) but certainly are of the same class: "Being two names for one actuality, is sameness as 'doubles' . . . Having respects in which they are the same, is sameness in class." (二名一實，重同也 . . . 有以同，類同也. *Mohzxy* 10/10B/3-5. YJ, A86). The argument is evidently that both the criteria are wrongly chosen; that oxen have teeth and horses have tails does not prove that "oxen are not horses", that oxen have horns and horses have not does not prove they are not of the same class. The *Gongsuen Long tzyy* parallel also gives two criteria and rejects both; of the possession of incisors (replacing the horns in the *Mohzxy*) it is said: "Even though (incisors) are not common to both there are respects in which they are of the same class." (是不俱有而或類焉). The sentence must be reconstructed so that it agrees with this parallel, and at the same time contrasts with the earlier 是俱有，不偏有齒無有. I suggest 是不(俱有而)類同也; it may be supposed that the bracketed words fell out, and was later moved before 同 to restore meaning to the sentence.

Canon.¹ "To deny that 'Oxen and horses are not oxen' is the same as admitting it. Explanation: 'combination'.

Explanation.² If it is admissible that even if some of them are not non-oxen they are not oxen, then it is also admissible that even if some are not and some are oxen they are oxen. Therefore it is inadmissible to say either 'Oxen and horses are not oxen' or 'Oxen and horses are oxen', so that each proposition is admissible for some of them and not for others, and it is also inadmissible to say 'It is inadmissible to say that oxen and horses are oxen'.

Moreover if oxen are not two kinds of thing and neither are horses, but oxen and horses are two kinds of thing, then, the oxen not being the non-oxen and the horses not being the non-horses, there is no objection to 'Oxen and horses are non-oxen and non-horses'."

("Oxen and horses are not oxen" is neither true nor false; the valid way to make the point is "Oxen and horses are either not oxen or not horses".)

It will be noticed that arguments which make no sense in the *Gongsuen Long Tzyy* are intelligible in the Mohist *Explanations*. But in the latter text they belong to two different sections which happen to be adjacent, one concerned with what properties can be used as evidence that "Oxen are not horses" and "Oxen and horses are not of the same class", the other with whether "Oxen and horses are not oxen" is either true or false.³ The division between these sections is still a subject of dispute among scholars; the author of this part of the *Gongsuen Long tzyy* apparently failed to connect them with the canons to which they belong, and read them as a consecutive demonstration that "Oxen and horses are not oxen". He took this as the model for his own demonstration that "Sheep combined with oxen are not horses" . . . a thesis which unlike those of the Mohists has no point, and to which the Mohist arguments are quite inappropriate. It is because he mechanically reproduces arguments designed for two different purposes that he gives the impression of not knowing himself whether he is trying to prove that "Sheep combined with oxen are not horses" or merely that "Sheep are not oxen".

There are two significant details which confirm that it is the *Gongsuen*

¹ The division between the canons is that suggested by Wu Yuhjiang (*op. cit.* 10B/21B/4); the other editors make it after 不可.

² The division between the explanations follows the *Mohjing Yihjee ut sup*. But Wu Yuhjiang (*ut sup.*) and Luu Dahdong 魯大東 (*Mohbiann shirjuh 墨辯新注* Jonghwa shujyu 中華書局, 1936. B, 35A/12) put it later, before 故曰: Liang Chiichau (*ut sup.*) puts it later still, before 且.

³ Sophistries concerning 牛馬 "ox and horse" seem to have risen from such propositions as 牛馬四足 "Oxen and horses have four feet" (*Mohzxy* 10/13A/1. YJ, B, 12), from the Chinese form of which it might well be argued that what has four feet must be a single animal called "ox-horse". How far the argument depends on the logical structure of the Chinese language, and defies reproduction in English, is an interesting question which cannot be discussed here.

Long tzyy which is dependent on the *Mohtzyy*, not the other way round. The phrase 未可 occurs twice in the version of the former and three times in that of the latter. This phrase is common in the Mohist canons; but we have already seen that outside this passage ch. 4, 5 and 6 of the *Gongsuen Long tzyy* use not 未可 but 不可.¹

Again, in one sentence common to both texts, 若 is used in the sense of "if". The word is common in this sense in the *Mohtzyy*; but in all the other six cases in the *Gongsuen long tzyy* 若 is "like", the only word for "if" in ch. 4-6 being 苟.²

B. THREE PARADOXES

(i) Concealing the Third

Gongsuen Long tzyy C, 1B/4-2A/1 堅白石不相外。藏三可乎。曰，有自藏也，非藏而藏也。

Objection. "Hardness, whiteness, and stone do not exclude each other. Is it permissible to say that there is concealment of the third?"

Answer. There is self-concealment; it is not concealed by someone concealing it."

Here the argument of the essay (that one sees the whiteness and the stone but not the hardness, feels the hardness and the stone but not the whiteness) is described by the curious phrase "concealing the third" (藏三). Now there is a story in the *Leu shyh chuenchiou* to which the old commentary calls attention,³ about Gongsuen Long defending the proposition 藏三牙. This phrase is evidently corrupt, the context making it clear that the first word should be a noun. In the following translation it will be rendered provisionally "X has three Y":

Leu shyh chuenchiou 呂氏春秋 (SBTK), *Sheen ying laan*, *Yntsy pian* 審應覽, 淫辭篇 18/11B/8-12A/6

孔穿公孫龍相與論於平原君所，深而辯。至於藏三牙，公孫龍言藏之三牙甚辯。孔穿不應，少選辭而出。明日孔穿朝，平原君謂孔穿曰。「昔者公孫龍之言甚辯」。孔穿曰，「然。幾能令藏三牙矣。雖然，難。願得有問於君。謂藏三牙，甚難而實非也。謂藏兩牙，甚易而實是也。不知君將從易而是也者乎，將從難而非者乎。」

"Koong Chuan and Gongsuen Long debated with one another in the house of the Lord of Pyngyuan, with profundity and eloquence. When they came to 'X has three Y', Gongsuen Long spoke of the three Y of X with the greatest eloquence. Koong Chuan took his leave after a while without answering. Next day, when Koong Chuan came to court, the Lord of Pyngyuan said to him: 'What Gongsuen Long said yesterday was most

¹ See Part I, B, iv above.

² See Part I, B, vi above.

³ GSL, C, 2A/10-2B/1.

eloquent'. Koong Chuan said: 'Yes. He was almost able to make X have three Y. However, it is difficult! I should like to ask you a question. To say that X has three Y is extremely difficult and in fact wrong; to say that it has two is quite easy and in fact right. Would you prefer to be right by taking the easy way, or to be wrong by taking the difficult way?' "

This paradox is also known in two other forms:

(a) 藏三耳. It is given in this form by the old commentator on the *Gongsuen Long tzyy* (quoting the *Leushyh chuenchiou* passage just given)¹ and by Liou Shaw 劉邵, (fl. 224 A.D.),² who mentions it as a typical sophistry without explaining it.

(b) 臧三耳. This is found in a version of the story of Koong Chuan in the *Koong tsongtzyy*,³ otherwise almost identical with that in the *Leushyh chuenchiou*.

It is clear from the story that the first word in the phrase should be a noun, and that the paradox asserted that there are three of something of which it appears to common sense that there are only two. These conditions are perfectly fulfilled by the version of the *Koong tsongtzyy*, 臧三耳 "Tzang has three ears", parallel to the well-known 雞三足 "A chicken has three legs".⁴ "Tzang" was used by the Mohist dialecticians as a typical proper name;⁵ it is natural that after this fact had been forgotten the character should have been corrupted by the addition of the grass radical, making the paradox unintelligible.

But if this is so, the author of the *Hard and White* must have known the paradox in a corrupt form and completely misunderstood it. This accounts for the unnatural use of 三 as "third" in this essay; a phrase in which 三 simply meant "three" has been forced into a new context. Even understood as "concealing the third", the phrase does not quite fit the argument that hardness is concealed from sight and whiteness from touch: it is therefore put in the mouth of the objector and immediately corrected:

"There is self-concealment; it is not concealed by someone concealing it."

(ii) The Yellow Horse and the Jade-blue Chicken

The paradoxes of the yellow horse and the jade-blue chicken are mentioned in the *Goang jyue jiau luenn* 廣絕交論 of Liou Jiunn 劉峻 (462-521):

Wensheuan 文選 (SBTK) 55/8B/2, 3 騁黃馬之劇談，縱碧雞之雄辯。

¹ GSL, C, 2B/1.

² *Jaw du fuh* 趙都賦 ap. *Taiyung yuhlaan* 太平御覽 (SBTK) 464/7A/11, 12.

³ *Koong tsongtzyy* 孔叢子 (SBTK) 1/76A/5-76B/4.

⁴ *Juangtzyy* 莊子 (SBTK) 10/40A/7. GSL, B, 4A/10-4B/2.

⁵ Cf. *Mohtzyy* 10/10A/1, 2 (Y), A, 78) 名。物，達也。……命之「馬」，類也。……命之「藏」，私也。"Names. 'Thing' is all-embracing... To call it 'horse' is to classify... To call it 'Tzang' is to particularize." 11/9A/2 藏人也。愛藏，愛人也 "Tzang is a man. To love Tzang is to love a man."

"They revelled in smart talk about the yellow horse, and bold argument about the jade-blue chicken."

The commentator Lii Shann, 李善 (whose preface is dated 658) explains the "yellow horse" by a reference to the paradox 黃馬驢牛三. "A yellow horse and a black ox are three", ascribed to the dialecticians in the *Juangtzyy*.¹ For the "jade-blue chicken", he quotes a letter (no longer extant) of Ferng Yean (馮衍, first century A.D.): 衍以為, 寫神翰意, 則聊城之說, 碧雞之辯, 不足難也。

"In my opinion, if the spirit and idea are fully expressed, then (even objections as subtle as) the advice about Liaucherng,² and the argument about the jade-blue chicken, will present no difficulty."

The two sophistries seem therefore to have had different origins; but to mention them together as typical examples of dialectical subtlety became, if it was not already, a literary cliché. The Tarn Buddhist Shyuan Nih 玄巖, asserting the ultimate identity of the three religions, says:

雖碧雞黃馬之辯, 未可分焉。

"They cannot be divided even by arguments (as subtle as those of) the jade-blue chicken and the yellow horse."³

Now according to a very obscure section of the *Understanding Change*, "Sheep" together with "ox" is not "horse" or "chicken", "Blue" together with "white" is not "yellow" or "jade-blue", but "horse" is to be preferred to "chicken", "yellow" is to be preferred to "jade-blue". At one point the two series are combined:

GSL, B, 6A/2-4 黃其馬也, 其與類乎。碧其雞也, 其與暴乎。

"If you make the horse yellow, is it not of the same class with them? If you make the chicken jade-blue, is it not in conflict with them?"

We have already seen that in part of this section a nonsensical argument has been put together out of misunderstood fragments of the Mohist canons. It would seem that the author has used the "yellow horse" and the "jade-blue chicken" in the same way, without realising that they are connected only by a literary cliché. If we could be sure that Liou Jiunn was the originator of the cliché, this would put his date as late as the 6th century A.D.

"Yellow" and "horse" (as well as "jade-blue" and "chicken") are elsewhere in the essay mentioned separately. If 黃其馬也 is rightly rendered "If you make the horse yellow . . .", the argument has evidently been forced in order to introduce a reference to the "yellow horse", and it

¹ *Juangtzyy* (SBTK) 10/42A/3, 4.

² The advice of Luu Lian 魯連, who persuaded the army of Yann 燕 to withdraw from Liaucherng in the time of King Miin 閔 (313-284 B.C.) of Chyi 齊 (*Jangwotsch* 戰國策 SBTK 4/52A-54B).

³ *Jenjenq luenn* 甄正論下 Taishō Tripitaka, No. 2112, vol. 52/570A/12, 13.

may even be suspected that the grammatical vagueness of the phrase is deliberate, intended to hide the violence of the transition.¹

(iii) *A Chicken has Three Feet*

GSL, B, 4A/10-4B/2 謂「雞足」一, 數足二。二而一故三。謂「牛羊足」一, 數足四。四而一故五。牛羊足五, 雞足三。故曰, 「牛合羊非雞」。

"To say 'chicken foot' makes one, to count the feet makes two; they are two and they are one, therefore three. To say 'ox foot' or 'sheep foot' makes one, to count the feet makes four; they are four and they are one, therefore five. The ox and the sheep have five feet, the chicken has three. Therefore I say: 'Oxen together with sheep are not chickens'."

Here again, an argument in *Understanding Change* has been twisted out of shape in order to bring in a reference to a known paradox of the dialecticians, 雞三足 "A chicken has three feet". The point could have been made just as well by saying that oxen and sheep have four feet and chickens two. Although the explanation of the paradox is in this case much more plausible, it seems to be no more than a guess based on the Mohist canons and the *Chyi wuh* 齊物 chapter of the *Juangtzyy*:

Mohtzyy 10/4A/1, 13A/1-3 (YJ, B, 12) (經) 獸物一體也。說在「俱一」, 「惟是」。

(說) 俱。「俱一」, 若牛馬四足。「惟是」, 當牛馬。數牛數馬, 則牛馬二。數牛馬, 則牛馬一。若數指, 指五而五一。

Canon. "Things taken together are one unit. Explanation: 'together as one', 'only this'."

Explanation. "Together as one—for example, 'Ox-and-horse has four feet'. 'Only this'—[the name] matching ox or horse(?). If you count 'ox' and count 'horse', ox and horse are two; if you count 'ox-and-horse', ox and horse are one. It is like counting the fingers; the fingers are five but the five are one."

Juangtzyy 1/34B/7-35A/3 既已為一矣, 且得有言乎。既已謂之一矣, 且得無言乎。一與言為二, 二與一為三。

"When it is one, can there also be the word? When you call it one, can there not be the word? One and the word make two, two and one make three."

That the author of ch. 4-6 did in fact use the *Chyi wuh* as a source is suggested by this example:

GSL, C, 2B/8 非彼無石, 非石無所取乎白石。

"If it were not for that (whiteness), there would be no stone; if it were not for the stone it could not be adduced in 'white stone'."

Juangtzyy 1/23A/3 非彼無我, 非我無所取

¹ Scholars have hitherto assumed that the references of Ferng Yean and Liou Jiunn are proof of the antiquity of the *Understanding Change*. See JJ, 24/10, 26/13.

"If it were not for that there would be no self; if it were not for the self, there would be nothing to adduce."

In the *Gongsuen Long tzyy* it is not clear why whiteness should be called "that", without an immediately preceding noun to which the pronoun can refer back. The reason is evidently that a sentence from the *Juangtzyy*, in which 彼 "that, other" is used in opposition to 我 "self", has been adapted to an entirely different context.

PART III. EXTERNAL EVIDENCE FOR DATING THE TWO PARTS OF THE GONGSUEN LONG TZZY

A. THE GONGSUEN LONG TZZY IN THE SWEI (589-618) AND TARNG (618-907) DYNASTIES AND LATER

The earliest witness to the existence of a book entitled *Gongsuen Long tzyy* is the bibliography of the Hann history:

Hann shu (Baenah 百衲), *Jyh* 志 10/17B/8

公孫龍子，十四篇。

"*Gongsuen Long tzyy*, fourteen *pian*."

Can we take it for granted that the surviving text in six *pian* is a part of the work known during the Hann dynasty? A large number of extant works with titles recorded in the Hann catalogue have been said, on evidence of varying weight, to have been forged, groundlessly attributed, or reconstructed from quotations, during the Six Dynasties, or later—*Yuhtzyy* 鬻子, *Guanyüntzyy* 關尹子, *Yiinwoentzyy* 尹文子, *Herguantzyy* 騶冠子, *Shenntzyy* 慎子, *Wutzzy* 吳子, *Weyliautzzy* 尉繚子, *Wentzyy* 文子, *Denqshitzzy* 鄧析子.¹ There was a great deal of interest in the paradoxes of the dialecticians during the period of the Three Kingdoms and the Six Dynasties, so that there is no difficulty in finding a motive for forging a work in the name of Gongsuen Long.²

Yau Jihherng 姚際恆 (born 1647), in his *Guujin weyshu kao* 古今僞書考³ rejected the *Gongsuen Long tzyy* as a forgery, for the single reason that it is not mentioned in the bibliography of the Swei History. Wang Goan 王琯,⁴ and more recently Y. P. Mei,⁵ have shown that the book probably does appear in the Swei bibliography under the title *Shoou bair*

¹ Cf. *Guushu bianmwey syhjoong* 古書辨僞四種 Basic Sinological Series 國學基本叢書. Jang Shincherng 張心激 *Weyshu tongkao* 僞書通考, Commercial Press, 1954. For an estimate of the value of the criteria used by the older Chinese critics to identify forgeries, see B. Karlgren, *The Authenticity of Ancient Chinese Texts*, Bulletin of the Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities (Stockholm), vol. I (1929), 165-184.

² Cf. Heh Changchyun 賀昌羣, *Wey Jim chingtarn syshoang chuluenn* 魏晉清談思想初論 Commercial Press, 1946. 7, 8.

³ *Guushu bianmwey syhjoong*, ut sup. 96.

⁴ JJ, 24-26.

⁵ *The Kung-sun Lung tsü*, Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, Dec. 1953. 16/404-437.

luenn 守白論, and that the *White Horse* is directly quoted by several Hann and Six Dynasty writers. If the book is a unity, as has always been assumed hitherto, this evidence is conclusive; and modern scholars have been unanimous in accepting the authenticity of the *Gongsuen Long tzyy*.¹ But the hypothesis that ch. 2 and 3, and 4-6, are written by different hands, makes it necessary to re-open the question, and to consider whether the evidence collected by Wang Goan and Y. P. Mei applies to both parts of the book or to one only.

The best surviving text of the *Gongsuen Long tzyy* is that of the Taoist canon.² In this the six *pian* 篇 are divided into three *jiuann* 卷, the commentary is anonymous, and there is no preface. Another text, which was the one known to the editors of the *Sykhuh Chyuanshu* catalogue,³ unites the six *pian* in one *jiuann*, and has a preface ascribed to Shieh Jianq 謝絳 (*tyyh* 字 Shishen 希深, 995-1039), to whom the commentary is also attributed.⁴

Wang Goan 王琯⁵ has shown that the ascription of the commentary to Shieh Jianq is groundless. He observes that

- (a) The commentary accepts the value of Gongsuen Long's arguments, and is therefore not from the same hand as the preface, which assumes a sceptical attitude towards them.
- (b) The bibliography of the Song History does not mention a commentary by Shieh Jianq.⁶
- (c) The note at the end of the preface ascribing it to Shieh Jianq

¹ Kou Pao-koh, *Deux sophistes chinois; Houei Che et Kong-souen Long*, Paris, 1953. A. Forke, *The Chinese Sophists*, Journal of the China Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 34 (1901-1902), 1-100. Max Perleberg, *Works of Kung-sun Lung tsü*, Hongkong, 1952. Fung Yu-lan, *History of Chinese Philosophy*, vol. I (2nd edition, Princeton, 1952), 203-214. Hwu Dawjing 胡道靜, *Gongsuen Long tzyy kao* 公孫龍子考, Commercial Press, 1934. Chyan Muh 錢穆, *Huey Shy Gongsuen Long* 墨池公孫龍, Commercial Press, 1934. Chern Juh 陳柱 and others, *Gongsuen Long tzyy jiyijie* 公孫龍子集解, Commercial Press, 1937. Koyanagi Shikita 小柳司氣太, *Kōsonryōshi* 公孫龍子, *Kokuyaku Kambun Taisei* 國譯漢文大成, Tokyo, 1924. *Guushybiann* 古史辨 b (1938) 267-294. Duh Gwoshyang 杜國庠, *Shian-Chyn jutzyy de ruohgan yanjiu* 先秦諸子的若干研究, Peking 1955. 1-65.

² The greater part of the *Dawtzang* 道藏 in its final form (including the *Gongsuen Long tzyy*) was printed in 1445, *tseh* 册 1058-1120 being added in 1607. The edition used is the photographic reprint of the Peking Bairyunguan 白雲觀 copy made by the Commercial Press in 1923-6.

³ *Sykhuh chyuanshu tzoongmuh tyiyaw* 四庫全書總目提要, Commercial Press (1933), 23/6, 7.

⁴ The book appears in this form in the *Mohhae jinhuw* 墨海金壺, edited by Jang Haepeng 張海鵬 (1755-1816), from which it is reproduced in the *Shooshanger tsongshu* 守山閣叢書, edited by Chyan Shitzuoh 錢熙祚 (1801-1844); it has been reprinted from the latter in the *Sybhuh beyyaw* 四部備要.

⁵ JJ, 28, 29.

⁶ *Songshy yihwenjyh* 宋史藝文志 *Tsongshu jycherng* 叢書集成 77/12. The entry is merely: 公孫龍子。一卷 "Gongsuen Long tzyy, one *jiuann*".

(宋謝希深序) must have been added after the end of the Song, since it mentions the dynasty.

It may be concluded that the preface was added to the book in the Yuan dynasty or later, and that the anonymous commentary was henceforth assumed to have been written by the author of the preface.

Between the Tarnq and Ming dynasties, the number of *jiuann* is given by some authorities as three and by others as one. There is abundant evidence that, as in the extant editions, in either case the number of *pian* was six:

Song Lian 宋濂 (1310-1381), *Juzxy biann* 諸子辯¹

公孫龍子，三卷。疏府，白馬，指物，通變，堅白，名實，凡六篇。

"Gongsuen Long tzyy, three *jiuann*. *Sufuu*,² White Horse, Meanings and Things, Understanding Change, Hard and White, Names and Actualities, altogether six *pian*."

Chern Jennsuen 陳振孫 (fl. 1235), *Jyrjai shuluh jieetyi* 直齋書錄解題, Basic Sinological Series, 284:

公孫龍子，三卷。……漢志十四篇，今書六篇。

"Gongsuen Long tzyy, three *jiuann*... In the Hann bibliography fourteen *pian*, in the present book six *pian*."

Jenq Chyau 鄭樵 (1104-1162), *Tongjyh liueh* 通志略, Basic Sinological Series, vol. 4, 179/1, 2:

公孫龍子，一卷。戰國時人，舊十四篇，今亡八篇。

又，一卷，陳嗣古注。又，一卷，賈大隱注。

"Gongsuen Long tzyy, one *jiuann*. A man of the Warring Kingdoms period. Originally fourteen *pian*, now eight are lost.

Idem, one *jiuann*. Commentary by Chern Syhguu.

Idem, one *jiuann*. Commentary by Jea Dahyiin."³

Jiow Tarnqshu jingjyijyh 舊唐書經籍志, *Tsongshu jyicherng*, 67/11, 12

公孫龍子三卷，龍撰。又，一卷，賈大隱注。又，一卷，陳嗣古注。

"Gongsuen Long tzyy, three *jiuann*. Written by Long.

Idem, one *jiuann*. Commentary by Jea Dahyiin.

Idem, one *jiuann*. Commentary by Chern Syhguu."

The titles in the bibliography of the Old Tarnq History were taken from the *Guujin shuluh* 古今書錄, a lost abridgement of the lost *Chyunshu syhbuh* 羣書四部 compiled in 722. The New Tarnq History gives the

¹ *Guushu biannwey syhjoong*, ut sup. 17, 18.

² 疏 is an error for 跡, the title in the *Gongsuen Long tzyy* being 跡府.

³ Jea Dahyiin (fl. 676) was the author of a memorial which is still extant (*Chyuan Tarnq wen* 全唐文, 188/8B-9A). I have failed to discover anything about Chern Syhguu.

same three titles among the books which it says were catalogued during the Kaiyuan 開元 period (713-741).¹

Nü Gongsuen Long tzyy luenn 擬公孫龍子論, *Wenyuann inghwa* 文苑英華 758/8B-10A

咸亨二十年，歲次辛未，十二月庚寅，僕自嵩山遊於汝陽。有宗人王先生，名師政，字元直。……因出其書以示僕，凡六篇，勒成一卷。

"In the second year² of the Shyanheng period, the cyclical year Shinwey, in the twelfth month on the cyclical day Gengyn (February 1, 672), I made an excursion from Songshan to Ruuyang. There was a kinsman of mine, Mr. Wang Shyjenq (*tzyh* Yuanjyr) . . . He therefore brought out this book to show me, altogether six *pian*, united in one *jiuann*."

The unknown author of this essay also gives the titles of the six *pian*, which are those of the book as we know it.³ The "terminus ad quem" for the composition of the *Gongsuen Long tzyy* in its present form can therefore be fixed at 672.

Returning to the commentary, Wang Goan leaves open the question whether it is earlier or later than its supposed date. That it is not much later is proved by the *Nanhwa jenjing jang jih inyih* 南華真經章句音義 of Chern Jiingyuan 陳景元 (preface 1084), an appendix to which reproduces both text and commentary of the *White Horse* and *Meanings and Things*. (The author of the commentary is not named.)⁴ The Song bibliophile Chaur Gongwu 晁公武 seems to have assumed that the anonymous commentary known to him (which, since he wrote after Chern Jiingyuan, was probably also the one which survives) was one of the two mentioned in the Tarnq bibliography:

Jiunjai dtoushu jyh 郡齋讀書志 (Preface 1151) SBTk, 5A/39B

公孫龍子，三卷。古唐藝文志列於名家。陳嗣古賈大隱皆嘗爲之註。今不辨矣。

"Gongsuen Long tzyy, three *jiuann*."

The abovementioned is arranged by the Tarnq bibliography under the school of names. Chern Syhguu and Jea Dahyiin both wrote commentaries on it. Now (? whose the commentary is?) can no longer be distinguished."

I have pointed out elsewhere⁵ that there are strong reasons for dating the commentary as early as the Tarnq dynasty. Yang Lianq 楊儉, explaining the problem of hardness and whiteness in his commentary on the

¹ *Tarnqshu yihwenjyh* 唐書藝文志, *Tsongshu jyicherng*, 51.

² The cyclical year given shows that 二十 is an error for 二.

³ The title *Jihfu* 跡府 is given by mistake as 迹皆.

⁴ *Nanhwa jenjing yuhshyh tsarlueh* 南華真經餘事錄 (Taoist canon 497) A, 1A-8B.

⁵ Review of Kou Pao-koh, *Deux sophistes chinois*, *Journal of Oriental Studies* (Hongkong), vol. 2, No. 2; July 1955.

Shyuntzzy 荀子 (preface dated 818), used the commentary as well as the text of the *Hard and White*:

Gongsuen Long tzyy C, 1A/4-8

堅白石三，可乎。曰，不可。曰，二可乎。曰，可。曰，何哉。曰無堅得白，其舉也二。無白得堅，其舉也二。

(注) 堅也，白也，石也，三物合體而不謂之三者。

人自 (read 目) 視石但見石之白而不見其堅。是舉所見名 (read 石) 與白二物。故曰，「無堅得白，其舉也二」矣。

人手觸石，但知石之堅而不知其白。是舉石與堅二物。故曰「無白得堅，其舉也二」。

May it be said that hardness, whiteness and stone are three?—No.

That they are two?—Yes.

Why?—If you get whiteness without hardness, two of them are picked out; if you get hardness without whiteness, two of them are picked out.

Commentary. Hardness, whiteness and stone are three things which, joined in a body, cannot be called three.

When a man's eye looks at a stone, it only sees the stone's whiteness, not its hardness; this is picking out the two things which it sees, stone and whiteness. Therefore it is said: "If you get whiteness without hardness, two of them are picked out".

When a man's hand touches a stone, it only knows the stone's hardness, not its whiteness; this is picking out two things, stone and hardness. Therefore it is said: "If you get hardness without whiteness, two of them are picked out."

Further, a comparison between the two versions of the story of Yiin Wen 尹文 and the King of Chyi in the *Gongsuen Long tzyy* and the *Leushy chuenchiou*¹ shows that in the former the characters 民 and 治 have been replaced by 人 and 理, evidently in order to avoid the taboos of the T'ang Emperors Taytzong 太宗 (Shyhmin 世民, 627-649) and Gautzong

¹ GSL, A, 3A/6-4B/5 *Leushy chuenchiou* 呂氏春秋 (SBTK) 16/19B/4-20B/3.

Shyuntzzy (SBTK) 1/21B/4, 5

公孫堅白論曰

「堅白石三，可乎。曰，不可。二可乎。曰，可」

謂，目視石，但見白，不知其堅，則謂之白石。

手觸石，則知其堅而不知其白，則謂之堅石。

Gongsuen's *Hard and White* says: "May it be said that hardness, whiteness and stone are three?—No. That they are two?—Yes. That they are two?—Yes."

It says that when the eye looks at a stone, it only sees the whiteness, and does not know its hardness, so that one can call it "white stone".

When the hand touches a stone, it knows its hardness but not its whiteness, so that one can call it "hard stone".

高宗 (Jyh 治, 650-683). The former taboo was observed throughout the dynasty and sporadically as late as 1003, but the latter lapsed in 806.¹ Now these two characters are completely absent from the commentary as well as the text. Of the other early T'ang taboos, the Taoist canon edition of the commentary provides only one example of 世 (Taytzong) and one of Iuan 淵, the personal name of Gautzou 高祖 (618-626).² The latter occurs in one of the passages which were reproduced by Chern Jüngyuan in 1084; his text reads 三 for 淵.³ Since the commentator tries whenever possible to give Gongsuen Long's arguments a moral or political interpretation, and often uses such characters as 君 and 亂, the absence of two such common characters as 民 and 治 can hardly be accidental.

It is therefore likely that the commentary is either that of Jea Dahyün (fl. 676) or that of Chern Syhguu (date unknown), and therefore, since both commentaries were catalogued in the Kaiyuan period, that it is earlier than 722.⁴

The *Gongsuen Long tzyy* is not included in the bibliography of the *Swei shu* 隋書. However, a book which there is reason to identify with it⁵ is entered under the "Taoist school" (*daw jia* 道家):

(*Baenah*), Jyh, 29/4A/6 守白論，一卷。

"Shoou bair luenn, one jiuann."

A work with this title is ascribed to Gongsuen Long in the commentary on the *Juangtzyy* by Cherng Shyuaning 成玄英 (fl. 631-50) and in the commentary on the *Janngwo tseh* by Baw Biau 鮑彪 (whose preface is dated 1147).⁶ Further, it is said at the beginning of the existing text of the *Gongsuen Long tzyy* that Gongsuen Long "wrote an essay on 'keeping the whiteness', and took examples from different things in order to argue about 'keeping the whiteness'" (爲守白之論，假物取譬，以守白辯).⁷ Since the people who discussed the problems of the dialecticians during the

¹ Chern Yuan 陳垣, *Shyhyuey jehlieh* 史讀舉例 (Yenching Journal, vol. 4, Dec. 1928), 590, 588.

² GSL, C, 3B/8, B, 2B/7.

³ *up sup.* A, 8B.

⁴ An examination of the later T'ang taboos (most of which are characters much rarer than 世 and 治), in order to fix a "terminus ad quem" for the commentary, does not give very satisfactory results.

⁵ Cf. JJ, 24-27.

⁶ *Nanhwa jering juh suh* 南華真經注疏 (Taoist canon, 507-519), *Tianshiah* 天下, 35/46B/5f 公孫龍著守白論，見行於世 "Gongsuen Long wrote the *Shoou bair luenn*, which is in circulation." Also 3/5A/5, 14/30B/1f, 19/44B/4f. *Janngwo tseh juh* 戰國策注 (SBTK) *Jaw* 趙, 6/67A/7.

⁷ *Gongsuen Long tzyy*, A, 1A/5. According to the old commentary, to "keep the whiteness" is to speak of "white horse", the opposite being to "separate the colour" (離色) which is to speak of "horse" alone (*ut sup.* A, 2A/9, 5A/6, 5B/10). But it is likely that 守白 is simply a corruption of 堅白 "hardness and whiteness" (cf. JJ, 38/6). This is the reading of an exactly parallel passage in the *Shinluenn* 新論 of Hwan Tarn 桓譚 (1st century A.D.): 爲堅白之論，假物取譬 (ap. *Taypyng yuhlaan* 太平御覽 SBTK, 464/5A/11-13).

Three Kingdoms were for the most part Taoists, the *Gongsuen Long tzyy* is included in the Taoist canon, and the old commentary explains it from the Taoist point of view, the classification of the *Shoou bair luenn* under the Taoist school is not very surprising.

Was the *Shoou bair luenn* merely the present *Gongsuen Long tzyy* under a different title? Cherng Shiuening certainly did not know either the account of the argument between Gongsuen Long and Koong Chuan in the opening chapter, or the *Hard and White*; for he describes Gongsuen Long as a disciple of Koong Chuan, and explains the phrase 堅白 as "firmly maintaining the thesis about the white horse".¹ However, he says nothing about the contents of the *Shoou bair luenn*, and we cannot be certain that he ever read it. More solid evidence is provided by the old commentary on the *Gongsuen Long tzyy*, written not later than 722. A striking feature of the commentary is its repeated use of the phrase 守白 without justification from the text,² which would be comprehensible if the commentator knew the book under the title *Shoou bair luenn*. If so, the *Shoou bair luenn* was virtually identical with the extant *Gongsuen Long tzyy*.

We may conclude that the *Gongsuen Long tzyy* consisted of the extant six *pian* at least as early as 672, and probably as early as the Swei dynasty (589-618).

B. EXTERNAL EVIDENCE BEFORE THE SWEI DYNASTY: THE 'WHITE HORSE' AND THE 'MEANINGS AND THINGS'

We have seen that the *Gongsuen Long tzyy* in six *pian* probably existed in the Swei dynasty under the title *Shoou bair luenn*. Can we trace it back through the Six Dynasties and the Three Kingdoms to the Hann, when the original *Gongsuen Long tzyy* in fourteen *pian* was still extant?

No bibliographies survive later than the *Hann shu* and earlier than the *Swei shu*. Anthologies of philosophers made during this period have also disappeared. We possess, however, the table of contents of the *Tzyychau* 子鈔 of Yeu Jonqrong 廣仲容 (476-549), preserved in the *Tzyyliueh*³ 子略 of Gau Syhsuen 高似孫 (jinshyh 進士 1184). It gives the titles of one hundred and seven philosophical works, which do not include the *Gongsuen Long tzyy* or *Shoou bair luenn*. The *Gongsuen Long tzyy* is also absent from the *Yihlin* 意林 (latest preface 787), an abridgement of the *Tzyychau* made by Maa Tzoong 馬總 (died 823).

Are we to conclude that the *Gongsuen Long tzyy* did not exist at the beginning of the 6th century? The evidence is by no means conclusive, since even in the 7th century the book was ignored in a number of works which

quote abundantly from the minor as well as the major philosophers—the *Chyunshu jyhyaw* 羣書治要 of Wey Jeng 魏徵 (presented in 631), the *Yihwen leyjiuh* 藝文類聚 of Ouyang Shyun 歐陽詢 (557-641), the *Beeitarng Shuchau* 北堂書抄 of Yu Shyhnan 虞世南 (558-638), and Lii Shann's 李善 commentary on the *Wensheuan* 文選 (preface 658). It is remarkable that as late as the 10th century the *Gongsuen Long tzyy* is never quoted in the *Taypyng yuhlaan* 太平御覽 of Lii Faang 李昉 (completed in 983), and that the section on Dialectics 辯 in this encyclopedia reproduces a summary of the White Horse argument by the Hann writer Hwan Tarn 桓譚.¹ It must be remembered that the works of Gongsuen Long are almost unique even among the heterodox philosophical writings in being very nearly devoid of moral, mystical and practical observations, so that there is scarcely anything in them which an ordinary Confucian or Taoist would consider worthy of quotation. But even when all allowances are made, it is natural to suppose that if Yeu Jonqrong had known of the *Gongsuen Long tzyy* he would not have overlooked it in an anthology of one hundred and seven philosophers, which included the other two extant works ascribed to the school of names, the *Denqshitzyy* 鄧析子 and the *Yimwentzyy* 尹文子.

If the book itself cannot be traced back from the Swei to the Hann, can this be done for any of its five essays? Beginning with ch. 2 and 3, the gap can be bridged satisfactorily in the case of the *White Horse*:

(A) Hwan Tarn 桓譚 (1st century A.D.), *Shinluenn* 新論, ap. *Taypyng yuhlaan* 太平御覽 (SBTK) 464/5A/11-13 公孫龍, 六國時辯士也。爲堅白之論, 假物取譬, 謂白馬爲非馬。非馬者, 言白所以名色, 馬所以名形也。色非形, 形非色。

"Gongsuen Long was a dialectician of the time of the Six Kingdoms. He wrote an essay on 'Hard and White' and used things to illustrate his case, saying that a white horse is not a horse. To show that it is not a horse, he said that 'white' is that by which one names the colour, and 'horse' that by which one names the form; the colour is not the form and the form is not the colour."

(B) *Liehtzyy* 列子, *Jonqni* 仲尼 (SBTK) 4/7A/8, 13, 14, 7B/4 龍誑魏王曰.....「白馬非馬」。

"Gongsuen Long, deceiving the King of Wey, said '... A white horse is not a horse'."

¹ See the paragraph below. A possible explanation of the silence of the *Taypyng Yuhlaan* is that the *Gongsuen Long tzyy* was unknown to the editors of its source, the *Shiowendiann Yuhlaan* 修文殿御覽 (compiled in 572), and that Lii Faang did not add to the pre-Tarn material in the section on Dialectics.

Indexes to the *Wensheuan* and the *Taypyng Yuhlaan* are available in the *Harvard-Yenching Sinological Index Series*. For the *Yihwen leyjiuh* and the *Beeitarng Shuchau*, I have not repeated the investigation of Hwu Dawjinq, who found no reference to the works of Gongsuen Long in the former, and in the latter only one in which the name proved to be a mistake for Gongsuen Ni 尼 (*up sup.* 73).

¹ *Nanhwa jenjing juh suh*, *ut sup.* 3/5A/5-5B/1, 6/43B/5, 6, 14/30B/1, 2.

² *GSL*, A, 2A/9, 2B/5, 3B/3, 5A/6, 5B/10, 7B/6, 7.

³ *Tzyyliueh*, *Syhbuh beyyaw* 四部備要 Appendix, 9B-12A.

Comment of Jang Jann 張湛 (late 4th century): 此論見存, 多有辯之者。辯之者皆不弘通, 故闕而不論也。

"This essay is preserved, and there are many who argue over it, but none of them fully understands it. Therefore I pass it over without discussing it."

公子牟曰,「……白馬非馬, 形名離也」

"Gongtzyy Mou said, '... That a white horse is not a horse is because form and colour are separate'."

Comment of Jang Jann: 白馬論曰, 馬者所以命形也。白者所以命色也。命色者非命色也

"The *Essay on the White Horse* says: 'Horse' is that by which one designates the form, 'white' that by which one designates the colour. What designates the colour is not what designates the form."

(C) *Shyhshuo shinyeu* 世說新語 (SBTK) 上之下 16B/8f 謝安年少時請阮光祿道白馬論。爲論以示謝

"Shieh An (謝安, 320-385) in his youth asked Roan Yuh (阮裕) to tell him about the *Essay on the White Horse*. The latter wrote an essay on it and showed it to him."

Comment of Liou Jiunn 劉峻 (462-521) 孔叢子曰, 趙人公孫龍云, 白馬非馬。馬者所以命形, 白者所以命色。夫命色者非命形。故曰, 白馬非馬也。

"According to the *Koong tsongtzyy* Gongsuen Long of Jaw said: 'A white horse is not a horse. "Horse" is that by which one designates the form, "white" that by which one designates the colour. What designates the colour is not what designates the form. Therefore I say: "A white horse is not a horse".'"

In view of these references, it would be unreasonable to doubt that the *Essay on the White Horse* existed in substantially its present form at least as early as the 1st century A.D. But it is to be noted that Jang Jann and the *Shyhshuo shinyeu* refer to it as an independent essay, without mentioning any collection of Gongsuen Long's writings; and that Liou Jiunn quotes it through the *Koong tsongtzyy*.

The *Meanings and Things* contains no striking paradox to catch the eye of the reader, and attracted little attention at any period. (Since there is no agreement as to the significance of *jyy* 指 which I translate "meaning", the statement that "*jyy* are not *jyy*" 指非指 is not so much paradoxical as unintelligible.) There is, however, a passage in the *Juangtzyy* which, without mentioning Gongsuen Long, links the theses of the *White Horse* and the *Meanings and Things*:

Juangtzyy I/28B/4-7 以指喻指之非指, 不若以非指喻指之非指也。以馬喻馬之非馬, 不若以非馬喻馬之非馬也。天地一指也, 萬物一馬也。

¹ This passage is absent from the extant text of the *Koong tsongtzyy*.

"To show by means of meanings that meanings are not one's meaning is not as good as showing it by means of what is not one's meaning. To show by means of horses that a horse is not a horse is not as good as showing it by means of what is not a horse. Heaven and earth are one meaning; the myriad things are one horse."

A paradox of the dialecticians, "Meaning does not reach" (指不至) is mentioned in the *Juangtzyy* and *Liehtzyy*.¹

From the Three Kingdoms to the early Song, no commentator represented in the Taoist canon referred to the *Meanings and Things* in connexion with these three passages, and *jyy* was taken in its primary sense, "finger". The first to appeal to the *Meanings and Things* was Chern Jiing-yuan 陳景元, whose preface to his commentary on the *Juangtzyy* is dated 1084. He noted that previous commentators had overlooked the connexion, and therefore reproduced the *White Horse* and the *Meanings and Things* in an appendix.² Since this silence persisted for some four hundred years after the book was seen in its present form by the author of the *Nii Gongsuen Long tzyy luenn*, it has no bearing on the date of the essay. The fact that during the Six Dynasties *jyy* was already understood as "finger",³ showing that the special significance of the word for the dialecticians had been forgotten, is rather in favour of the antiquity of the essay.

C. EXTERNAL EVIDENCE BEFORE THE SWEI DYNASTY; 'UNDERSTANDING CHANGE', 'HARD AND WHITE', AND 'NAMES AND ACTUALITIES'

Hwu Dawjing's valuable collection of all early references to the *Gongsuen Long tzyy*⁴ does not include a single reference to any of the last three essays earlier than the T'ang dynasty. This silence is not, of course, conclusive evidence that these essays did not exist; the *Gongsuen Long tzyy* was never very widely known, and we have already seen that the *Meanings and Things* was long overlooked by commentators who might be expected to mention it. There is, however, one point on which this silence requires explanation. The problem of hardness and whiteness, like that of the white horse, is often mentioned in early texts. We have seen that commentators were aware of the *White Horse*; if the *Hard and White* had been known to them as part of the same book, they would surely have appealed to it when

¹ *Juangtzyy* 10/41A/8. *Liehtzyy* 列子 (SBTK) 4/7A/9, 10; 7B/1, 2.

² *Nanhwa jenjing jangjiuh inyih* 南華真經章句音義 (*Dawtsanq* 493) 2/5A/6-5B/1. The texts are reproduced in *Nanhwa jenjing yushyh tzarlüh* 南華真經餘事雜錄 (*Dawtsanq* 497) A, 1A-8B.

³ It is not quite clear whether Guo Shianq 郭象 (died 312 A.D.), takes *jyy* as "finger", but Tsuei Juann 崔譔 of the Eastern Jin dynasty (317-420) certainly does so. *Juangtzyy*, I/28B/7-29A/6.

⁴ Hwu Dawjing 胡道靜, *Gongsuen Long tzyy kao* 公孫龍子考, Commercial Press, 1934.

commenting on references to hardness and whiteness. Instead we find them giving two different explanations neither of which has any connection with the *Hard and White*.

One explanation is that the "separation of hardness and whiteness" is merely the separation of form and colour in the problem of the white horse:

(A) Hwan Tarn, *ut sup.*

(B) *Hwainantzzy*, 淮南子 *Chyistou* 齊俗 (SBTK) 11/12A/9 公孫龍折辯抗辭，別同異，離堅白。

"Gongsuen Long discriminated between parallel statements, distinguished sameness and difference, separated hardness and whiteness."

Comment of Sheu Shenn 許慎 (fl. 100 A.D.).

公孫龍趙人，好折詭異之言，以白馬不得合爲一物，離而爲二也。

"Gongsuen Long was a man of Jaw who enjoyed hair-splitting and paradoxical talk. Considering that 'whiteness' and 'horse' cannot be joined together as a single thing, he separated them and regarded them as two."

(C) Luu Sheng 魯勝 (fl. 291 A.D.). Preface to his commentary on the Mohist Canons. ap. *Jinn shu* 晉書.

(Baenah 百衲) *Liehjuann* 列傳 64/6A/9f 名必有形，察莫如別色。故有堅白之辯。

"A name must have a corresponding form; there is no better investigation than to distinguish the colour (from the form). Hence there is the argument about hardness and whiteness."

(D) Symaa Biau 司馬彪 (died 306) ap. Yang Lianq, 楊儵 commentary on *Shyuntzzy* (SBTK) *Shioushen* 修身 1/21B/6 「堅白」謂堅石非石，白馬非馬也。

"'Hardness and whiteness' refers to 'A hard stone is not a stone' and 'A white horse is not a horse'."

Symaa Biau and others also suggested that the problem of hardness and whiteness might be a dispute over the tempering of swords mentioned in the *Lou shyh chuenchiou*:¹

(A) *Juangtzyy* (SBTK), *Chyi wuh* 齊物 1/32A/7f 故以堅白之味終

"Therefore they end in the obscurity of 'hardness and whiteness'."

Comment of Luh Derming 陸德明 (died 627) 「堅白」。司馬云，「謂堅石白馬之辯也」又云「公孫龍有淬劍之法謂之堅白」。崔同。又云或曰，設矛伐之說爲堅，辨白馬之名爲白。

"Hardness and whiteness": Symaa Biau says: "It refers to the arguments about the hard stone and the white horse." He also says: "Gongsuen Long had a method of tempering swords, which was called 'hardness and whiteness'." Tsuei Juann (崔譔) says the same. He also says; "Some say

¹ *Syhsiuann luenn, byeley pian* 似順論，別類篇 (SBTK) 25/3B/4-8.

'Providing explanations for contradictions (?) is the 'hardness'; distinguishing the names 'white' and 'horse' is the 'whiteness'."

(B) *Shyyjih* (史記) *Menqtzzy Shyun Ching liehjuann* 孟子荀卿列傳 (Baenah 百衲) 74/6A/5f 趙亦有公孫龍，爲堅白同異之辯。

"There was also Gongsuen Long of Jaw, who argued about hardness and whiteness, sameness and difference."

Comment of Peir In 裴駟 (Song dynasty, 420-478): 晉太康地記云。汝南西平縣有龍淵水，可用淬刀劍，特堅利。故有堅白之論云，「黃所以爲堅也，白所以爲利也」。咸辯之曰，「白所以爲不堅，黃所以爲不利」。

"The *Topography of the Taykang Period* (280-289) of the *Jinn Dynasty* says: In the Shipyng district of Ruunan there are the waters of Longiuan, which can be used to temper swords, making them unusually hard and sharp. Hence there is the thesis about hardness and whiteness, according to which 'The yellow makes the blade hard, and the white makes it sharp'. Some dispute it, saying: 'The white makes it soft, and the yellow makes it blunt'."

At the beginning of the Tarn dynasty we at last find a writer who mentions the *Hard and White* as extant, the Buddhist Faa Lin 法琳 in his *Poh shyh luenn* 破邪論 (presented in 622):¹

昔公孫龍著堅白論，罪三王，非五帝，至今讀之，人猶切齒

"Formerly Gongsuen Long wrote the *Hard and White*, condemning the Three Kings and denying the Five Emperors. Even now people who read it still gnash their teeth."

Later in the Tarn dynasty Yang Lianq, in a passage already reproduced at length, appealed directly to the *Hard and White* to explain a reference to hardness and whiteness in the *Shyuntzzy*.²

Since pre-Tarn commentators knew the *White Horse* but not the *Hard and White*, we may conclude that the two cannot have been parts of one book, and that there are grounds for suspecting that the *Hard and White* did not yet exist.

D. THE EVIDENCE OF LUU SHENG

Lu Sheng 魯勝 (fl. 291 A.D.) was the author of a lost edition of the Mohist canons, of which the preface is preserved in his biography in the *Jinnshu* 晉書. This preface enables us to judge how much was still known about the dialecticians during the period of the Three Kingdoms:

Jinnshu (Baenah) *Liehjuann* 列傳 64/6A/13-6B/ 自鄧析至秦時，名家者世有篇籍，率頗難知，後學莫復傳習，於今五百餘歲，遂亡絕。墨辯有上下經，經各有說，凡四篇與其書衆篇連第，故獨存。今引說就經，各附其章，疑者闕之。又舉諸衆雜集，爲刑名二篇。

¹ Yangjou *tsarngjyngyuann* 揚州藏經院, 1908. A, 6A/9, 10.

² SBTK, 1/21B/4, 5.

"From Denq Shi to the Chyn dynasty writings of the 'school of names' were in existence. Since they were all rather difficult to understand, none of the later scholars studied them. By now, more than five hundred years afterwards, they have all disappeared. Of the Mohist dialectic, there is a former and a latter *Canon*, each with an *Explanation*, altogether four *pian*; because they are attached to the other *pian* of the book, they alone have survived.

Now I have put the *Explanations* next to their *Canons*, each in its appropriate section, leaving out doubtful passages. I have also put together a *Forms and Names* in two *pian* from passages taken from miscellaneous collections."

Luu Sheng makes it quite clear that about 300 A.D. there was no book ascribed to Gongsuen Long in existence; the original *Gongsuen Long tzyy* in fourteen *pian* had disappeared, together with the other writings of the 'school of names'. However, Luu Sheng was able to find enough extracts from the writings of the dialecticians in "miscellaneous collections" (衆雜集) to fill two *pian*. We have already noticed that Luu Sheng explained the problem of hardness and whiteness as the separation of colour from form, ignoring the *Hard and White*, and apparently (like Symaa Biau and others) having in mind the separation of colour ("white") from form ("horse") in the *White Horse*. It is likely, therefore, that the *White Horse* was among the pieces known to him.

Luu Sheng's book was therefore earlier than the extant *Gongsuen Long tzyy*, and it is at least possible that it was one of the latter's sources. The passages from the Mohist canons used in the composition of the last three essays could have been taken from Luu Sheng's edition; the *White Horse* and *Meanings and Things*, as well as the historical materials in the introductory chapter, could have come from the supplementary *Forms and Names*. Since Luu Sheng's work has long since disappeared, this suggestion cannot be confirmed; but there is a detail which tells in its favour. If the author of the last three essays knew the complete text of the *Mohtzyy*, it is surprising that he should use the *Canons* and *Explanations*, but not the *Dahcheu* 大取 and *Sheaucheu* 小取, which are also concerned with dialectics. But Luu Sheng's edition did not contain the *Dahcheu* and *Sheaucheu*.

PART IV. CONCLUSION

The work known since the 7th century as the *Gongsuen Long tzyy* was compiled at some time between the 4th and the 6th centuries, and was at first entitled the *Shoou bair luenn*, "Essay on Keeping the Whiteness". The compiler placed first a chapter on the life of Gongsuen Long (the *Jihfuu* 跡府, "Store-house of Traces"), made up of three extracts from no longer extant sources:

(i) GSL, A, 1A/1-1B/5. A sketch of Gongsuen Long's teaching, including a summary of the *White Horse*. A shorter version of this passage appears in the *Taypyng yuhlaan*, which gives as its source the *Shinluenn* of Hwam Tarn (1st century A.D.).¹ The compiler took his title, *Essay on Keeping the Whiteness*, from the statement in the second sentence that Gongsuen Long "wrote an essay on keeping the whiteness".

(ii) GSL, A, 1B/5-2B/4. An account of a controversy between Gongsuen Long and Koong Chuan.

(iii) GSL, A, 2B/5-4B/8. A second version of the same story. The opening sentences addressed by Koong Chuan to Gongsuen Long are quoted in the *Wensheuan* commentary, which gives as its source the *Shinshih* 新序 of Liou Shiuq 劉向 (80-9 B.C.).² The anecdote about Yiin Wen 尹文, which Gongsuen Long quotes in this version, is also found, in almost the same words, in the *Leushyh chuenchiou*.³

The compiler placed next the *White Horse* (ch. 2) and the *Meanings and Things* (ch. 3), two essays which, probably because they had been included in the "miscellaneous collections" mentioned by Luu Sheng, had survived the disappearance of the original *Gongsuen Long tzyy* in fourteen *pian*. These essays are genuine writings of the dialecticians of the Warring Kingdoms; whether they are actually from the hand of Gongsuen Long himself is a question which it is hardly profitable to discuss.

Finally, the compiler added three spurious essays, the *Understanding Change* (ch. 4), the *Hard and White* (ch. 5), and the *Names and Actualities* (ch. 6). The first two of these are cast in the dialogue form of the *White Horse*, and throughout all three the arguments are for the most part imitations, sometimes very clumsy, of models in the two older essays,⁴ the Mohist canons and the *Juangtzyy*. It may be assumed that they were written by the compiler; for the writer could hardly have tried to pass them off as Gongsuen Long's except by presenting them as part of a collection containing Gongsuen Long's known essays.

Since the compiler knew two genuine essays of the dialecticians, it is possible that he knew fragments of other writings, and worked them into the spurious essays. There are grounds for suspecting that at least one such

¹ *Taypyng yuhlaan* (SBTK) 464/5A/11-13.

² *Wensheuan* 文選 SBTK, 39/7B/4. The passage is not in the present text of the *Shinshih*.

³ *Leushyh chuenchiou* (SBTK) 16/19B/4-20B/3. The controversy between Gongsuen Long and Koong Chuan is also described in the *Koong tsongtzyy* (SBTK, 1/72A/7-74B/1), which conflates the two versions placed side by side in the *Gongsuen Long tzyy*.

⁴ *Hard and White*, C, 1B/4 .. cf. *Meanings and Things*, B, 1A/2, 3.
2B/5 .. *White Horse*, A, 7A/9.
2B/6 .. *Meanings and Things*, B, 2A/5.
3B/1 .. *White Horse*, A, 6A/8, 9.
3B/4, 5 .. *Meanings and Things*, B, 2B/5, 6.

fragment may survive in *Understanding Change*. In the *Hard and White* and *Names and Actualities*, the compiler, as one would naturally expect him to do, wrote on themes which Gongsuen Long was known to have discussed. But the *Understanding Change* consists of three arguments not elsewhere ascribed to the dialecticians (Left and Right, Sheep and Ox, Blue and White), strung together under a title taken from the Great Appendix of the *Book of Changes*.¹ Further, the Left and Right and Blue and White sections are the only passages of any length in the last three essays which do not borrow from the Mohist canons and other known sources. It is, therefore, not unlikely that in this chapter, placed immediately after the genuine essays, the compiler may be using up his last scraps of older material.

Although the argument on Left and Right is not at all clear, perhaps because of textual corruption, its exhaustive statement of every possibility in the combination of left and right suggests the concern for logical rigour which we have noticed in the two older essays. There is no definite mark of the style of the last essays, except for the use of 不可 for 未可. It is the only section which contains the key word of the title, "change" (變). Whereas in the other two spurious essays the compiler wrote on known topics of the dialecticians, it seems likely that here he took as his starting-point a surviving fragment on the "changes" of left and right. He expanded this into an essay on "understanding change" by adding two nonsensical arguments of his own, in each of which he inserted the phrase "like left and right".² Of his two additions, the Sheep and Ox section is clumsily modelled on passages from the Mohist canons and the *Juangtzyy*, but the Blue and White has no known source. Although the thesis that "Blue and white are not yellow" is nonsense (like "Sheep and ox are not horse"), "White and blue are not jade-blue" might well be a genuine paradox of the dialecticians. But this section has all the stylistic marks of the last essays (parallelism, frequent use of 其 and the final particles, 以 "and", 則, 若, 不可, prepositional 乎), and if any ancient fragments have been worked into it, it is unlikely that they can be recovered.³

Although the date of the compilation cannot be fixed with any confidence, what evidence there is suggests that it is as late as the 6th century. We have seen that the author of *Understanding Change* misunderstood the cliché "yellow horse and jade-blue chicken", which, as far as is known, was first used by Liou Jiunn (462-521),⁴ and that the *Gongsuen Long tzyy* was

not represented in the *Tzyy chau* 子鈔 compiled by Yeu Jonqrong (476-549). In the 6th century there was still enough interest in the dialecticians to make forgery worth while; for example the first Liang 梁 Emperor Wuudih 武帝 (502-549) "argued about how connected rings can be separated, and was skilful in discussing hardness and whiteness".¹

The *Gongsuen Long tzyy* is the main surviving document of the "school of names", and it is with regret that one is driven to the conclusion that three of its five essays are spurious. Of course, to put their date as late as the 6th century does not in itself affect their value; indeed, it is a gain that something has been added to the little that we know about the circles which discussed logical paradoxes during the Six Dynasties. But unfortunately, in exploring the evidence of late date, we have incidentally shown that there is little serious thought in the spurious essays, and that the problems they raise are generally a matter for textual criticism rather than philosophy. One is especially sorry to lose the *Hard and White*, of which Forke wrote that "Kung-sun Lung's wonderful critique of our perceptive faculties recalls to us the modern Idealists Kant, Fichte and Schopenhauer".² Although there is nothing in the development of the argument which justifies this eulogy, the shift of attention back from the object to the senses by which it is perceived is one of the decisive steps in the evolution of a philosophical tradition, and if the *Hard and White* belonged to the period of the Warring Kingdoms, the mere fact that it takes this point of view would make it a document of revolutionary importance. But if it was written as late as the Six Dynasties, when the influence of Buddhism had made this change of viewpoint familiar, it loses most of its significance.

¹ Z. D. Sung, *Text of the Yi King*, Shanghai, 1935. 281/4.

² 若左右 GSL, B, 4A/6, 5A/5, 6.

³ A. Forke also suggested that while the Left and Right section is genuine, the rest of the chapter is spurious: "The reasoning is so inept that the whole appears to me a very clumsy forgery." *The Chinese Sophists*, Journal of the China Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, vol. 34 (1901-2), No. 1, p. 74n47.

⁴ See Part II, B, ii above.

¹ 辨解聯環，論精聖白 *Jinloutzyy* 金樓子, by the Liang Emperor Shiiawuyan 學元 (552-4), *Tzyyshu baajia* 子書百家, 1/10A/9, 10.

² Forke, *op. cit.* p. 37.