

TWO DIALOGUES IN THE
KUNG-SUN LUNG TZŪ: "WHITE HORSE"
AND "LEFT AND RIGHT"

by A. C. GRAHAM

Part 1. The "White Horse" dialogue.

- 1/1 The order of the writing strips.
1/2 Evidence in the introductory chapter for the order of the strips.
1/3 The number of characters on each strip.
1/4 The argument of the White Horse dialogue.
1/5 Reconstructed text, translation and notes.

Part 2. The "Left and Right" dialogue.

Abbreviations

O, S: objector, sophist.

Q, A: questions of objector, answers of sophist (irrespective of whether sentences are grammatically interrogative or affirmative).

The order of questions and answers in the standard text is indicated by numbers (§1, 2, 3 . . .), the order in the reconstructed text by letters (§A, B, C, . . .).

(X)*Y: read Y for X.

<X>: insert X.

[X]: delete X.

References to classical texts are (unless otherwise stated) to the editions of the *Ssu-pu ts'ung-k'an* 四部叢刊 and are to *chüan* 卷, page and line.

The text of the *Kung-sun Lung tzü* is that of the Taoist Canon 道藏, Vol. 840, printed 1445, photographic reprint of the Peking Pai-yün-kuan 白雲觀 copy, Commercial Press, 1923-1926. Other editions mentioned for variants are that of the *Tzü hui* 子彙 printed 1577, photographic reprint Commercial Press 1937, and the text of the White Horse dialogue in the *Nan hua chen ching chang chü yü shih* 南華真經章句餘事 of Ch'en Ching-yüan 陳景元 (preface 1084), Taoist Canon, Vol. 497.

The most important modern edition, that of Ch'en Chu, follows the Taoist Canon text, but has three added or omitted characters, all easily overlooked, in the "White Horse" and "Left and Right" dialogues, on pp. 61, 75 (both at the top of the last line of text), and 123.

Finding List

- BODDE, Derk: translation of Fung Yu-lan, *A History of Chinese Philosophy*, Princeton, 1952.
CHANG Hsin-ch'eng 張心澂: *Wei shu t'ung k'ao* 偽書通考, Shanghai, 1957.
CH'EN Chu 陳柱: *Kung-sun Lung tzü chi chieh* 集解, Commercial Press, 1937.
CH'EN Mu 錢穆: *Hui Shih Kung-sun Lung* 惠施公孫龍, *Kuo-hsüeh hsiao ts'ung-shu* 國學小叢書
CHMIELEWSKI, Janusz: *Notes on Early Chinese Logic*, Part I, Rocznik Orientalistyczny 26/1 (1962), 7-22.
DOWNER, G. B.: *Derivation by Tone-change in Classical Chinese*, BSOAS, 22/2 (1959), 258-290.
FENG Yu-lan 馮友蘭: (1) *Chung-kuo che-hsüeh shih* 中國哲學史, Commercial Pr., 1947.
(2) *Chung-kuo che-hsüeh shih hsin pien* 新編, Peking, 1963.
GRAHAM, A. C.: (G1) *Kung-sun Lung's Essay on Meanings and Things*, Journal of Oriental Studies, Hong-kong, 2/2 (1955), 282-301.
(G2) *The Composition of the Gongsuen Long tzyy*, A.M. (NS) 5/2 (1957), 147-83.
(G3) *The Logic of the Mohist Hsiao-ch'ü*, T.P., 51/1 (1964), 1-54.
(G4) *The Relation between the Final Particles YU 與 and YEE 也*, BSOAS, 19/1 (1957), 105-23.
HALOUN, G.: *Legalist Fragments*, Part I, A.M. (NS) 2 (1951/1952), 85-120.
HU Tao-ching 胡道靜: *Kung-sun Lung tzü k'ao* 考, Commercial Pr., 1934.
KOU Pao-koh: *Deux sophistes chinois: Houei Che et K'ong-souen Long*, Paris, 1953.
KRAMERS, R. P.: *K'ung Tzü Chia Yü*, Leiden, 1950.
KU Kung-yi 顧公毅: *Lun-li-hsüeh chiao-k'o shu* 論理學教科書, Chung-hua Pr., 1913.
LUAN T'iao-fu 樂調甫: *Lo-chi* 邏輯 (publisher unidentified), 1930.
MEI, Y. P.: *The Kung-sun Lung-tzū*, Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 16 (1953), 404-37.
MIYAZAKI, Ichisada 宮崎市定: *Reconstruction of the Text of the Kung-sun Lung-tze*, Tōhō Gakuhō 東方學報 36 (Oct. 1964).
NEEDHAM, Joseph: *Science and Civilization in China*, Vol. 3, Cambridge, 1959.
POKORA Timoteus: *Once more the dates of Huan T'an*, Archiv Orientalní, 29 (1961), 652-7.
SUN Yi-jang 孫詒讓: *Mo tzü chien ku* 墨子閒詁, Peking, 1954.
T'AN Chieh-fu 譚戒甫: (1) *Hsing ming fa wei* 形名發微, Peking, 1957.
(2) *Mo pien fa wei* 墨辯發微, Peking, 1958.
TSIEN Tsuen-hsui: *Written on Bamboo and Silk*, Chicago, 1962.
TU Kuo-hsiang 杜國庠: *Tu Kuo-hsiang wen chi* 文集, Peking, 1962.
WANG Ch'i-hsiang 王啓湘: *Kung-sun Lung tzü chiao ch'üan* 校詮, Taipei, 1958.

- WANG Tien-chi 汪奠基: *Chung-kuo lo-chi ssü-hsiang shih-k'o fen-hsi*
中國邏輯思想史科分析, Vol. 1, Peking, 1961.
Yü Yüeh 俞樾: *Chu tzü p'ing yi pu lu* 諸子平議補錄, Peking, 1956.
Wu Yü-chiang 吳毓江: *Mo tzü chiao chu* 墨子校注, Tu-li ch'u-pan
she 獨立出版社, 1944.

Part I. The "White Horse" dialogue

1/1. The order of the writing strips

The "White Horse" dialogue ascribed to the sophist Kung-sun Lung (c. 300 B.C.) is a notoriously difficult text.¹ Its questions and answers seldom fall into coherent sequences, and sometimes it is far from clear that a question and answer belong together. The easiest explanation for such confusion is that sections have been transposed, after the rotting of the strings tying the wooden or bamboo strips on which most Chinese books were written before the discovery of paper.

The dialogue in its traditional form consists of seven questions of the objector and seven answers by the sophist. Their content leaves no doubt that most are rightly assigned to objector or sophist, although there are two questions which it is possible to interpret as answers, §9 (if we omit the last two characters) and §13.² However, we cannot convert either question into an answer without postulating the loss of two more questions, a device to which we can hardly resort except in extreme emergency. There is also no reason to suspect that sections have been divided and redistributed, although this possibility cannot be altogether excluded. Let us consider whether we can find a satisfactory rearrangement on the most economical hypothesis, that no sections have been either lost or divided.

There are three sequences which are certainly integral, §1-4 QAQA and §7, 8 QA, both of which are self-contained, and §10-12 AQA. There remain three questions and two answers, which may be variously paired with each other and with the first answer of §10-12. These permit the following pairings of question and answer:

(§5, 6	9, 10-12	13, 14)
5, 6	9, 14	13, 10-12.
5, 10-12	9, 6	13, 14.
5, 10-12	9, 14	13, 6.
5, 14	9, 6	13, 10-12
5, 14	9, 10-12	13, 6.

¹ This study assumes the conclusions of an earlier inquiry into the composition of the *Kung-sun Lung tzü* (G 2), that the book was compiled between A.D. 300 and 600, that the *White Horse* and *Meanings and Things* chapters are pre-Han documents, and that the compiler wrote the last three chapters himself (with the probable exception of the "Left and Right" dialogue) with the help of misunderstood extracts from the Mohist Canons. The translation and analysis of the parts which I believe to be pre-Han, commenced in an earlier study (G 1), is completed in the present article.

² Cf. Ch'en 67, 74. Kou 33, 34. Tu 123.

The most puzzling feature of the traditional arrangement is the treatment of the questioner's objection that "Having a white horse cannot be called 'not having a horse'" (§5). The next section is not inappropriate as the sophist's answer, although we are not yet committed to keeping it in this position. The discussion then shifts to a new objection, that since colourless horses do not exist the sophist is implicitly denying the existence of horses (§7, 8). The questioner proceeds to a further objection, very obscure in its present context, that the sophist is using the names of uncombined elements ("white", "horse") in the combination "white horse" (§9). Instead of replying, the sophist abruptly returns to the earlier objection: "Granted that having a white horse is deemed having a horse, may one say that having a horse is to be deemed having a yellow horse?" (§10), and the debate continues on this topic through §10-12, 13.

It seems clear that §7-9 and perhaps also §6 have intruded into the sequence, and that the answer in §10 is detached from its proper question. If so, our table of possible pairings allows the four rearrangements which separate §9 and 10 (we shall leave §1-4 and §7, 8 out of account, as self-contained sequences).

"Having a white horse" sequence	Remainder
§5, 6 QA 13 Q 10-12 AQA	9 Q 14 A
5 Q 10-12 AQA 13 Q 14 A	9 Q 6 A
5 Q 10-12 AQA 13 Q 6 A	9 Q 14 A
5 Q 14 A 13 Q 10-12 AQA	9 Q 6 A

It would be troublesome to run through these possibilities in turn; the reader may test for himself my conviction that only the first makes a satisfactory arrangement. The questioner raises his objection and is answered (§5,6). He then clarifies his position: "In 'having a white horse' cannot be called 'not having a horse', the point is that one leaves out the white" (§13), initiating a new exchange (§10-12).

As a corollary of this arrangement we are committed to pairing §9, 14; if they do in fact have a common theme and can be read consecutively, we shall have strong confirmation that the inquiry is along the right lines:

§9 Q. "If it is horse not yet combined with white which is deemed horse, and white not yet combined with horse which is deemed white, to compound the name 'white horse' for horse and white joined together is to give them when combined their names when uncombined, which is inadmissible. Therefore I say: it is inadmissible that a white horse is not a horse."

§14 A. "White does not fix anything as white; that may be left out of account. 'White horse' refers to white fixing something as white; what fixes something as white is not 'white'. 'Horse' selects or excludes none of the colours, and therefore one may answer it with either a yellow or a black; 'white horse' selects some colour and excludes others, and the yellow and

black are both excluded on grounds of colour; therefore one may answer it only with a white horse. What excludes none is not what excludes some; therefore I say: a white horse is not a horse."

The question and answer make a satisfactory pair. In §9 the objector points out the contradiction in calling a combination of colour and shape "white horse", yet maintaining that the shape is horse and the colour white only when they are uncombined. §14 replies that the shape and colour in combination are still horse and white, but not the same as horse and white in isolation.

The possibilities of arrangement for the whole dialogue are now six (for the "Having a white horse" sequence we shall use the abbreviation HWH):

§1-4	7, 8	9, 14	HWH
"	7, 8	HWH	9, 14
"	9, 14	7, 8	HWH
"	9, 14	HWH	7, 8
"	HWH	7, 8	9, 14
"	HWH	9, 14	7, 8

1/2 Evidence in the introductory chapter for the order of the strips

There is early testimony to the arrangement of the *White Horse* dialogue in a summary of the argument in the first chapter of the *Kung-sun Lung tzü*. The editor of the book, between A.D. 300 and 600, assembled this chapter from passages in older sources, some of which are identifiable.³ The encyclopaedia *T'ai-p'ing yü-lan* 太平御覽 (completed in 983) quotes an abridged form of the introductory passage on Kung-sun Lung and his White Horse argument, naming as its source the lost *Hsin lun* 新論 of Huan T'an 桓譚 (c.43 B.C.-A.D. 28).⁴ It is likely that Huan T'an wrote the complete passage reproduced in the *Kung-sun Lung tzü*, or borrowed it from a still older source, and that the editors of the encyclopaedia are responsible for its abridgement.

謂白馬爲非馬也。白馬爲非馬者，言白所以名色，言馬所以名形也。色非形，形非色也。

"He claimed that a white horse is to be deemed not a horse. That a white horse is to be deemed not a horse is because the word 'white' is used to name the colour and the word 'horse' is used to name the shape; the colour is not the shape, the shape is not the colour." (Cf. §4) 夫言色則形不當與，言形則色不宜從。今合以爲物，非也。"Mentioning the colour, the shape ought not to be taken into consideration; mentioning the shape, the colour should not accompany it. Now we join them together as one thing, which is wrong."

³ Cf. G(2) 180 f.

⁴ *T'ai p'ing yü lan*, 464, 5A/11-13. For the date of Huan T'an cf. Pokora, *op. cit.*

如求白馬於廄中無有，而有驪色之馬，然不可以應有白馬也。不可以應有白馬，則所求之馬亡矣。亡則白馬竟非馬。"If someone seeks a white horse in the stable, and though there is none, there is a horse coloured black, one cannot however answer that there is a white horse; and if one cannot answer that there is a white horse, the horse which he seeks is absent. If it is absent, a white horse is after all not a horse." (Cf. §6.)

The first and third sections summarize the arguments of the introductory and "Having a white horse" sequences; they are paraphrases with some close verbal parallels with §4 and 6 and slight divergences of detail. The dialogue as we have it does not mention that the horse is sought *in a stable*, and contrasts white with yellow as well as black horses, using the word *hei* 黑 of the latter; but these are the sort of differences one may expect when a writer puts the substance of a passage into his own words. The only section which suggests that the summarizer is using another text is the second, which implies an arrangement in which another argument intervenes between §1-4 and §5, 6. But which argument? There are no verbal parallels as in the other two sections. After the introductory sequence the sophist mentions the independence of shape from colour only at the end of §8; this independence is mentioned again in §9, but there the objector is denying it. Of the key words in the second section, *wu* 物 "thing" is never used in the dialogue, *ho* 合 "join" only by the objector (§9). But we find both these words, and a similar phrasing, in an account of the White Horse sophistry by Hsü Shen 許慎 (fl. A.D. 100), whose use of the word *li* 離 (§13), absent in the summary, suggests that he is an independent witness:

Huai-nan tzü 淮南子, 11, 12A/9, commentary:
以白馬不得合爲一物，離而爲二也。

"Because white and horse cannot be joined together as one thing, he separated them as two."

Although we find neither word in the text of §8, it is remarkable that we do find both in the commentary, which is probably as early as the 7th century.⁵

Text

故白者非馬也。白馬者馬與白也。馬與白馬也。故曰，白馬非馬也。

"Therefore the white are not horses. White horse is horse and white combined, ? . . . ?. Therefore I say: a white horse is not a horse."

Commentary

白既非馬則白與馬二物矣。合二物以共體則不可偏謂之馬。故以馬而喻白則白馬爲非馬也。

⁵ For the date of the commentary, cf. G(2) 171-4.

"Since white is not horse, white and horse are two things. If we join the two things in a common body, we cannot one-sidedly call them 'horse'. Therefore when we use 'horse' to indicate something white, the white horse is to be deemed not a horse."

The text is mutilated, and editors have proposed more than one emendation of the untranslated phrase.⁶ It seems likely that it has a lacuna in the middle ("Horse and white . . . horse") and that it is all that remains of a passage paraphrased by the commentator: "*White and horse* are two things. If we join the two things in a common body, we cannot one-sidedly call them 'horse'." If so, we can definitely identify the passage underlying the second section of the summary as §8.

Applying the evidence of the summary to our earlier conclusions, we arrive at this order:

§1-4

§7, 8

§5, 6, 13, 10-12

Only §9, 14 are still an unlocated pair. Like §1-4, 7, 8 they concern the division of white horse into white and horse; they are perhaps most conveniently placed after §8.

1/3 The number of characters on each strip

There is a useful test of a hypothesis of large-scale transposition in a pre-Han or Han book. If strips were misplaced we should expect regularity in the number of characters in the exchanged parts, although the regularity might be disguised to some extent by damage to the strips or by later corruption. Strips were of three standard lengths, eight Chinese inches, one foot two inches and two foot four inches, the last used by Han Confucians for the classics; but the number of characters to a strip of one of the standard lengths seems to have varied.⁷ According to the preliminary reports of the Han copies of the *Yi li* 儀禮 found at Wuwei 武威 in Kansu,⁸ the complete copy is written on strips of 55.5—56 cm., a length corresponding to the Han measure of two foot four inches, and has about sixty characters to a strip. One of the two additional copies of single *p'ien* 篇 is on strips of the same length, but the number of characters is not reported; the strips of the other are slightly shorter but much more crowded, of about 50.5 cm. with about 100-110 characters to each.⁹

The strips were tied together in sheets which could be rolled up as scrolls; chapter headings are written on the back, a fact which suggests that in counting the characters of transposed blocks in the White Horse

dialogue we may ignore the title; a division of the text begins on a new strip, the commencement marked by a circle, and the preceding strip unfilled. The strips are numbered at the bottom, a device which would prevent such a radical disarrangement as we are postulating for the White Horse dialogue; this raises the interesting possibility that in other texts we may be able to locate the proper position of a misplaced fragment at the same distance from the beginning of another chapter.

The copy of the *Mu t'ien-tzü chuan* 穆天子傳 found in A.D. 281 in a tomb of the 3rd century B.C. consisted, according to the preface by Hsün Hsü 荀勗 (died 289), of strips two foot four inches long with forty characters to each. This is still our only direct evidence for a pre-Han copy of a book. We find an approximation to the same figure in the philosophical text with the most confidently identified major transpositions, *Mo-tzü*. The figures for exchanged passages in *Mo-tzü* ch. 1-39 as edited by Wu Yü-chiang are as follows:

<i>Mo-tzü</i> , ch. 5 (Wu, ch. 1, 14B/4)	40 characters
10 (ch. 2, 15B/5)	37 (with preceding lacuna), 41
12 (ch. 3, 7A/3)	37, 43, 39
15 (ch. 4, 3B/9)	40, 38
36 (ch. 9, 8A/2)	40, 40

Since the misplacements claimed on the present hypothesis are of complete questions and answers one might guess that the scribe began each section on a new strip, leaving the unfilled part of the previous strip blank. If so, there is no hope of confirming a proposed rearrangement by counting characters. However, it might be convenient for an author to adjust his composition to the length of his strips, and the newspaper columnist's art of developing an idea within a set number of words would be easily cultivated in a language which encourages the pairing of words, phrases, clauses, sentences, groups of sentences. Haloun in reconstructing *Kuan-tzü* 管子, ch. 55, found that the stanzas alternated in length, thirty-two and forty-two to forty-four characters; he inferred that they were written to fit alternately long and short strips, and that the different order of parallel passages in the *Liu t'ao* 六韜 was the result of disarrangement of the strips.¹⁰

Counting the characters in the transposed blocks (one of which we decided has been mutilated), we find these figures:

<i>Located</i>	
§1-4	39 characters
§7, 8 (mutilated)	71
§5, 6	121
§13	61
§10-12	81

¹⁰ Haloun, 97 f. For strips alternating in length, cf. Tsien, 106.

⁶ Cf. below.

⁷ Tsien, 105, 107.

⁸ *Kao gu* 考古 (1960), 5/10-12, 8/29-33. *Peking Review*, 31 March 1961.

⁹ *Kao gu* (1960), 8/29-33.

Unlocated (after §8 ?)

§9 40

§14 80

In all but two of the seven blocks the figure is almost exactly forty, eighty or a hundred and twenty. It seems virtually certain that the dialogue, like *Mo-tzu* and the *Mu t'ien tzü chuan*, was written with about forty characters to a strip. Of the two exceptions, one is in the section mutilated after the 7th century (§7, 8); we may now assume the loss of about nine characters.

Identification of the strips confirms the crucial choice between the four theoretically possible arrangements of the "Having a white horse" sequence;¹¹ the rejected possibilities all separate §5 (thirty-one characters) from §6 (ninety characters), which we now see must have been written consecutively on three strips. It also confirms, for the fully identified strips, the bolder of the two postulates with which this inquiry started, that no question or answer has been divided or scattered. We can now locate, with a margin of error of only one character, the points where a strip began and ended, and confirm that they are in the middle of intact sentences.

Let us now consider the sixty-one characters of §13. We must assume the loss of about nineteen characters, since the content is too tightly packed to allow the excision of interpolations amounting to twenty-one characters. The text was probably mutilated long after being transferred from bamboo strips to paper, for as in §7, 8 there are signs both of damage to the text and of the T'ang commentator's acquaintance with the intact text. In §13 the objector argues that when we speak of having a white horse we are entitled to detach the "white" and call it "having a horse". His argument is fully intelligible except at the end, where the phrase 故其爲有馬也 "Therefore its being deemed having a horse . . ." is rounded off by a phrase which makes no sense in its present context: 不可以謂馬馬也. "one cannot call it 'horse horse' ". The commentator's note begins: 實曰, 爲白是離有馬, 不離實爲非馬。

"The objector says: To deem white is to leave out the 'having a horse'; unless one leaves out, it really is deemed not a horse."

This is the reading of the Taoist Canon edition, which is consistently superior to others. For the first clause the *Tzū hui* edition reads 離白是爲有馬 "To leave out the 'white' is to deem it having a horse", with which Ch'en Ch'ing-yüan's edition agrees except in reading *tsu* 足 for *shih* 是: "To leave out the 'white' is enough to deem it having a horse". These variants make better apparent sense, but look like deliberate emendations; we are bound to accept the Taoist Canon reading as the 'lectio difficilior'. But if we accept it we must suppose that the text originally

stated that when we have a white horse we may either ignore its whiteness and say "We have a horse" or ignore the existence of the horse and say "It is white"; the latter alternative has dropped out of the text, the former out of the commentary. This suggests a lacuna continuous except for one fragment covering the last characters of the text ("One cannot call it 'horse horse' ") and the first two of the commentary ("The objector says"). Let us now attempt a reconstruction of the last thirty-two characters of the second strip of §13, on the quite arbitrary assumption that the commentator's first clause is not paraphrase but direct quotation; we shall underline characters taken from the commentary, and indicate positions not yet filled by characters with an X:

故其爲有馬, <是離白也。其爲白, 是離有馬也> × × × ×
× × × 也, 不可以謂馬馬也。

"Therefore to deem it having a horse is to leave out the white, to deem it white is to leave out the having a horse . . . one cannot call it 'horse horse'."

This leaves room for another missing clause, which we can hardly hope to recover; since we have no guarantee that the commentator quoted word for word, we cannot of course be confident that it amounted to seven characters. But since on this hypothesis the T'ang commentator knew the complete text, we may look with new respect at his exposition of the clause "One cannot call it 'horse horse' ", not very convincing if we accept the text as it stands:

但以馬形馬色堅相連屬, 便是二馬共體。不可謂之馬馬, 故連稱白馬也。

"But to join the horse's shape and the horse's colour firmly together amounts to two horses sharing a common body; one cannot call them 'horse horse', therefore one puts the two terms one after the other, 'white horse'."

This is a satisfactory explanation in the light of the reconstructed text. The objector maintains against the sophist that we may describe having a white horse as "having a horse", omitting the "white". He points out that we may similarly omit the "having a horse" and refer to the same horse as "the white one". If then the sophist insists that to omit one word of a phrase is to refer to a different thing, he must suppose that "having a horse" and "white one" refer to different horses and "having a white horse" to their combination; but one cannot call a white horse a "horse horse".

Whether this reconstruction is found convincing or not, the divergence of text and commentary suggests that the mutilation happened between the 7th century and the 11th (when the present text is attested by Ch'en Ching-yüan's edition), in which case there is no reason to suppose that any of the strips were broken. The scribe to whom we owe the present arrangement copied from thirteen disconnected but intact strips. He was able to recover the right order wherever a sentence ran on from one strip

¹¹ Cf. above.

to the next, but not where a strip began with a new question or answer. This explains why the transpositions are all of integral sections.

May we assume that the number of characters to a strip was *exactly* forty? The numbers on the *Yi li* strips show variations; and although it is likely enough that some scribes would keep to an exact figure as a safeguard against missing or repeating characters, it would be surprising if any pre-Han text were so perfectly preserved that one could locate every character with confidence. However, it happens that there are very few graphic errors in the dialogue, no doubt because of the simplicity of the vocabulary; and in the five un mutilated blocks the total never diverges by more than one from forty or a multiple of forty. It is at least worth mention that all five totals may be rendered exact by accepting a plausible variant or a current emendation.¹²

1/4 *The argument of the White Horse dialogue*

The Mohist *Hsiao ch'ü* 小取 begins a series of examples of inference from "X is Y" to "Doing to X is doing to Y" with the inference: "A white horse is a horse, to ride a white horse is to ride a horse".¹³ This suggests that "A white horse is a horse" was a standard illustration of an indisputable proposition, and that Kung-sun Lung chose to assail it precisely because its denial was the most startling of paradoxes.

Early Chinese dialectic centres on the relation between names (*ming* 名) and objects (*shih* 實). This is true of both the sophists (*ming chia* 名家, "school of names") and the authors of the Mohist Canons. A shift of attention from names to sentences (*tz'ü* 辭) appears only in the last phase of pre-Han dialectic, in the *Hsiao ch'ü* and *Ta ch'ü* 大取 and to some extent in the *Cheng ming* 正名 chapter of Hsün-tzū 荀子,¹⁴ and even Hsün-tzū conceives the sentence as merely an aggregate of names.¹⁵ The White Horse argument is conducted throughout in terms of names, simple such as "horse" "white" and compound (*fu ming* 復名 §G) such as "white horse" "having a horse" 有馬, and the particular objects with which one "answers" (*ying* 應) the names. It is assumed that if there are objects answering to "X" but not to "Y" then one may not "deem" an X a Y (*yi* 以 X *wei* 爲 Y), an X does not "constitute, amount to" (*wei*) a Y. (For the sake of consistency the latter *wei* is represented in the present translation by passive forms of "deem".) Kung-sun Lung does not deny that white horses answer to "horse", indeed twice affirms that yellow and black horses do answer to "horse", but this is irrelevant to his case; what matters is that yellow and black horses answer to "horse" but not to

¹² Cf. below.

¹³ *Mo-tzū* 墨子, 11, 8B/8. Cf. G(3) 5 f., 28-33.

¹⁴ For the advance from the isolated name to the sentence, cf. G(3), 22 f., 25 f.

¹⁵ *Hsün-tzū*, 16, 9B/4-10A/1. Cf. G(3) 23.

"white horse", so that having a white horse is not the same thing as having a horse. The effect of this procedure is to hide the distinction between identity and class inclusion; arguments which prove that the compound name "white horse" is not synonymous with the name "horse" are presented as though they proved that a white horse is not a horse.

This type of argument became obsolete when the later Mohists and Hsün-tzū pointed out that names vary in generality.¹⁶ Hsün-tzū mentions the thesis that "a horse is not a horse" among the fallacies which "use names to confuse objects" (用名以亂實).¹⁷ The objection that "horse" is more general than "white horse" is made explicitly in the story of a debate on the white horse between Kung-sun Lung and K'ung Ch'uan 孔穿 (a descendant of Confucius), which, although preserved only in late sources, probably goes back to this period.¹⁸ In this Kung-sun Lung appeals to a

¹⁶ *Mo-tzū*, 10, 2B/1, 10B/3-5 (T'an(2), A 86), translated Bodde 1/254 and G(3) 25. *Hsün-tzū*, 16, 5B/5-6B/5, translated Bodde 1/305f and G(1) 284.

¹⁷ *Hsün-tzū*, 16, 8B/1.

¹⁸ Two accounts of the meeting of Kung-sun Lung and K'ung Ch'uan stand side by side in the first chapter of *Kung-sun Lung tzü* (Ch'en 39, 40-44). K'ung Ch'uan's reply appears only in a conflation of the two versions in *K'ung ts'ung tzü* (Vol. 1, 72A-76A), a Confucian compilation first mentioned by Wang Su 王肅 (195-256), who is suspected of having forged it (Chang 749-751, Kramers 98). The conflated story seems originally to have contained an exposition of the White Horse argument, including a passage close in wording to §4 of the dialogue which is quoted from *K'ung ts'ung tzü* by Liu Chün 劉峻 (462-521) commenting on *Shih shuo hsün yü* 世說新語 (上之下 16B/9). The beginning of K'ung Ch'uan's answer must be an editorial addition; it shows no understanding of the argument and appeals irrelevantly to the *Spring and Autumn Annals* (*K'ung ts'ung tzü*, Vol. 1, 74B/7-75A/3) in a manner which suggests a Confucian of the Han or later (Hu, 23 f). Even when it follows its sources verbally the *K'ung ts'ung tzü* (Vol. 1, 72A/4, 72B/2, 4, 6) systematically corrects Kung-sun Lung's thesis to "A white horse is not a white horse". This misunderstanding, which was common during the later Han and Six Dynasties (cf. Hu, 17, 18, 24), is very fortunate from our point of view. The editorial addition assumes that the sophist denied the right to speak of "white horses", and makes such points as "The *Ode* has 'white silk', it does not say 'silk white'" (*K'ung ts'ung tzü*, Vol. 1, 75A/4 詩有素絲, 不曰絲素); clearly the editor did not also write the crucial part of K'ung Ch'uan's reply, in which the sophist's case is well understood. We must conclude that the reply belongs to the original narrative, and that the *Kung-sun Lung tzü* omitted it in order to leave the sophist victorious in the debate.

The two *Kung-sun Lung tzü* versions are close to each other both in content and in phrasing. The main difference is that the sophist appeals in the first to the story of the King of Ch'ü's bow (found also in *Shuo yüan* 說苑, 24, 4A) and in the second to a story about Yin Wen 尹文 (found also in *Lü shih ch'un-ch'iu* 呂化春秋, 16, 19B/4-20B/3). A few sentences from the second (Ch'en, 40/1) are quoted in the commentary (preface dated 658) on the *Wen-hsüan* 文選, 39, 7B/4 as from the *Hsin hsü* 新序 of Liu Hsiang 劉向 (80-9BC), in which they are no longer to be found. Both versions use *ch'ing* 請 (=情) adverbially in the sense of *ch'eng* 誠 "truly" (Ch'en, 38/2, 40/2: *ch'eng* is substituted in *K'ung ts'ung tzü*, Vol. 1, 72B/2); this is a pre-Han usage common in *Mo-tzū* (Sun, 57/6, 119/10).

Since throughout the Han dynasty there was little interest in either defending or refuting sophistries, it is likely that the nucleus of K'ung Ch'uan's reply has survived from a pre-Han form of the story.

Several editors avoid the repetition of *erh* 爾 in the last sentence by omitting one or the other.³⁹ The omission of one *erh* reduces the number of characters in §I, J to exactly one hundred and twenty.

.....

§K-N/13, 10-12

O. "In 'Having a white horse cannot be called "not having a horse"', the point is that one leaves out the 'white'. If one did not leave it out, having a white horse could not be called 'having a horse'. Therefore the reason why one deems this having a horse is the horse alone; it is not having a white horse which is deemed having a horse. Therefore to deem this having a horse <depends on leaving out the 'white', to deem this the white depends on leaving out 'having a horse'> . . . one may not call it a 'horse horse'."

S. "If having a white horse is to be deemed having a horse, is it admissible to say that having a horse is to be deemed having a yellow horse?"

O. "It is inadmissible."

S. "To deem having a horse different from having a yellow horse is to differentiate a yellow horse from a horse. To differentiate a yellow horse from a horse is to deem a yellow horse not a horse. To deem a yellow horse not a horse, yet in the case of the white horse deem it having a horse, is 'Flying things go underwater, and inner and outer coffin are in different places'; it is the worst sort of fallacy and inconsistency."

.....

The objector answers that when we call having a white horse "having a horse" it is simply that we do not mention its whiteness. The loss of about nineteen characters makes it uncertain how his argument continued; judging by the T'ang commentary (here used to fill part of the lacuna) he proceeded to point out that we may similarly fail to mention the presence of the horse and refer to it simply as "the white one". One may make a guess, assisted by the commentary, at how this led on to the final fragment; if the sophist insists that to omit one word is to refer to a different thing, he must suppose that "having a horse" and "white one" refer to different horses and "having a white horse" to their combination; but one cannot call a white horse a "horse horse".⁴⁰

On the sophist's assumption that "X may be called Y" implies identity, the objector's claim is tenable only if one may *always* restore "white" in "having a horse". But in that case one can never say "having a horse" of having a yellow horse; and the sophist easily shows that one is driven to admitting that yellow horses, and so by analogy white horses, are not horses.

³⁹ Cf. Ch'en, 59/5, 6, Tu, 120, n. 1.

⁴⁰ Cf. above, p. 138 n. 13.

§L. 謂有[白]馬爲有黃馬. The continuation of the argument makes it clear that T'an Chieh-fu is right in proposing this deletion, which incidentally reduces the characters in §K-N to the exact eighty of two strips.

Part 2. The "Left and Right" dialogue

The "Left and Right" dialogue stands at the head of the fourth chapter of the *Kung-sun Lung tsü*. There is reason to regard it as a pre-Han fragment, although the chapter is one of those written between A. D. 300 and 600.⁴¹

Like the "White Horse" dialogue the "Left and Right" dialogue shows signs of dislocation, but of a much less radical kind. The total number of questions and answers is twenty. In §1-6 the objector inquires and the sophist answers. In §7-19 their roles are reversed; the odd numbers belong to the sophist and the even to the objector. This suggests that an objection has dropped out between §6 and 7. After the final answer there is an isolated and unanswered question by the objector. Ch'en Chu⁴² has proposed placing it after §12, with a lacuna following; but it seems clear that it belongs in the gap between §6 and 7, which it fills perfectly. This is a case of parablepsis, the scribe's eye passing from one *yüeh* 曰 "he said" to the next and missing the intermediate characters. After completing the dialogue the scribe noticed the omission and wrote in the passage, no doubt with indications of its position which a later scribe overlooked.

The dialogue falls into two halves; in the first the objector takes the initiative, in the second the sophist. We find a similar organization, with the objection first developed in detail and then answered, in at least one of the Mohist Canons⁴³ and possibly in the *Essay on Meanings and Things*.⁴⁴

The theme of the dialogue is the relation between one and two. The words "left" and "right" refer to single vertical counting-rods on left and right representing ones, which may be combined to form the figure two. The simplest method of reproducing the argument in English is to base the translation on a diagram, using Roman numerals and indicating the ones on left and right by the letters L and R.

§A-F/1-6 曰，二有一乎。曰，二無一。

曰，二有右乎。曰，二無右。

曰，二有左乎。曰，二無左。

§G/20 曰，二苟無左，又無右，二者左與右奈何。

⁴¹ G(2), 181 f.

⁴² Ch'en 126.

⁴³ *Mo-tzü*, 10, 20B/8-21A/5 (T'an(2), B, 73), translated Bodde 1/272, and G(3), 12.

⁴⁴ The two parts (sentences 1-11, 12-21) as translated in G(1), 296-299, may well be taken as the defence of a sophistry followed by a criticism of it.

§H-T/7-19 曰，右可謂二乎。曰，不可。
 曰，左可謂二乎。曰，不可。
 曰，左與右可謂二乎。曰，可。
 曰，謂變非不變，可乎。曰，可。
 曰，右有與，可謂變乎。曰，可。
 曰，變隻。曰，右。
 曰，右苟變，安可謂右。苟不變，安可謂變。

DIAGRAM

Ones: I	I
(L)	(R)
Two:	II

Objection

§A-F/1-6

O. "Is there I in II?"

S. No.

O. Is there R in II?"

S. No.

O. Is there L in II?"

S. No.

G/20

O. If there is neither L nor R in II, how is it that II is L and R combined?

Reply

§H-T/7-19

S. May R be called II?"

O. No.

S. May L be called II?"

O. No.

S. May L and R combined be called II?"

O. Yes.

S. May one say that the changed is not the unchanged?"

O. Yes.

S. When R is combined with something, may it be called changed?"

O. Yes.

- S. Changed from what?⁴⁵
 O. From being R.
 S. If it has changed from being R, how can it be called R?
 If it has not changed from being R, how can it be called changed?"

Place two counting-rods vertically on left and right.⁴⁶ As long as they are wide apart they are ones; move them nearer together and they suddenly turn into the figure two. The objector insists that since the two is a combination of the left and right hand ones the ones are still present in the two. The sophist replies that combining is change, and if they have changed they are no longer the left and right hand ones. It is possible that he is making the point that as soon as the rods become one figure they are no longer seen as left and right but as both of them left of a figure on the right and right of a figure on the left; if so, the corruption of § 17 has obscured his argument. Unlike the White Horse dialogue this debate concerns a problem which Western philosophers have also taken seriously (whether a whole is more than the sum of its parts, whether $1 + 1 = 2$ is a tautology), and the sophist's position is not sophistical.

⁴⁵ 曰, 變(變)*奚 (Yü, 31). T'an Chieh-fu supports the emendation with evidence that the proposed character had a graphic variant 眞 (T'an(1) 23). I follow this emendation for want of a better, but suspect that this question is a fragment. *Hsi* 奚 in the final position (with or without *yeh* 也) is very uncommon, although there is at least one text which uses final *hsi yeh* regularly, the *Shuo yüan* (for example, 2, 10A/12, 5, 6B/11, 18, 12B/11).

⁴⁶ For the counting-rods used for calculation before the introduction of the abacus, cf. Needham, 5-9, 70-72. From the early centuries A.D. ones were placed vertically and tens horizontally (the arrangement assumed in this dialogue); horizontal ones and vertical tens were common but not universal in earlier periods. I am indebted to Mr. D. C. Lau for pointing out the relevance of counting-rods to this passage.