

## **PREFECTURES AND POPULATION IN SOUTH CHINA IN THE FIRST THREE CENTURIES A. D.**

by

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The spread of the Chinese people to the south has been one of the most impressive movements in the history of human migration. From its first beginnings in the loess-land of the northwest and the great plain of the Yellow River, Chinese civilisation, over the centuries, extended into the valley of the Yangtse and onwards to the shores of the Pacific. In modern times, the frontiers of the Chinese world are to be found in south-east Asia and on the eastern coast of Taiwan, but it is the purpose of this paper to study an earlier period of this great migration, and to examine the process by which the government and culture of the Chinese people were established in the lands of the Yangtse.

Chinese civilisation depended on settled agriculture; and for a people to live in Chinese style it is essential that they should be able to farm the land and have permanent settlements. The tribes of the northern steppes had to base their economy on the grazing of animals, and the animals' needs for pasture in a land where grass grows seldom tall enough for harvest compelled the herders to travel from place to place in the search for food. It was impossible for people in these lands to adopt more than a few materialistic aspects of the Chinese way of life. In South China, however, a different geographical situation existed, and in the course of time the barbarian people could be settled and educated and brought within the government of the empire.

The Chinese colonists who passed from the valley of the Yellow River to the basin of the Yangtse were moving from a dry climate to a damp and trop-

ical one. In the north, the staple grain is wheat, and the first techniques of water control had been developed to maintain the Yellow River in a settled course and to allow for the irrigation of farmlands with limited rain. In the south, the main crop is rice, but the same methods of dams and canals could be readily adapted to the draining of low-lying marsh-land and to the seasonal control of paddy-fields. As a result, Chinese were able to settle the valleys of the rivers and till the land, and many barbarians were sinicised through the example of their new neighbours or through intermarriage. The non-Chinese people who were unwilling to accept Chinese customs also lacked the organisation to make effective resistance to the invaders, and they were steadily driven into the hills.

The first centuries A. D. are an important phase in the history of this expansion, for as late as the Han dynasty, in the last two centuries before the Christian era, the Yangtse valley was still considered a frontier of the empire. Since the great Chou 周 dynasty state of Ch'u 楚, this southern land was well within the boundaries of the Chinese world, and the outposts of the Former Han 漢 empire extended as far south as present-day Vietnam, but the balance of power was settled on the Yellow River, and the interests of the court lay rather in the north and west than in the south. It was not until the end of Later Han, in the second century A.D., that colonisation of the south began its full development. Early in the third century, the unified government of Han was succeeded by three warring states, Wei 魏 in the north, Shu 蜀 in the west and Wu 吳 in the south. Despite its economic weakness and its scant resources of population, the state of Wu managed to maintain its independence for more than three-quarters of a century, and in doing this it laid the basis for the refugee Chinese dynasties of the south in the Period of Division that succeeded Western Chin 晉.

A general outline of the development in the south has already been given by Professor Hans Bielenstein in his article on 'The Census of China during the period 2-742 A.D.' In this work, dot maps were used to show the distribution of population recorded in five geographical treatises of the dynastic histories from Han to T'ang 唐, and the sites of prefectural cities (縣城 *hsien-ch'eng*) were the basis of the placement of the dots. By adjusting the number of dots to the population of each administrative division, Bielenstein was able to give a detailed and accurate picture of the spread of Chinese settlement in the empires of Former Han, Later Han, Sui 隋 and T'ang. Unfortunately, however, there are no satisfactory

census records for the four hundred years between Later Han and Sui. The population figures in the histories of the Period of Division were collected for taxation purposes and not for census, and they cannot be used as guides either for the number of people in the succeeding Chinese empires nor for their distribution of settlement.

The maps presented here are designed to fill the gap in the demographic history of South China between Later Han and Chin. In order to do this, a different method has been used, based on the establishment and abolition of the prefectures. The existence of prefectures is evidence of Chinese settlement, and although prefectures give a less accurate picture of the spread of population, this indirect technique is the only one which can indicate the progress of Chinese colonisation. Moreover, as will appear below, the plans of the central government were an important factor in the advance of the Chinese people, and maps of prefectures can be used to show the varying frontier policies of succeeding rulers of China.

*The design of the maps:*

Map I shows the sites of the capital cities of the prefectures of south and west China at the time of the Former Han census of 2 A.D., recorded in the *ti-li chih* 地理志 of *Han Shu* 28A and 28B, together with those listed by the Later Han census of 140 A.D., in the *chün-kuo chih* 郡國志 of *Hou Han shu* treatises 19 to 23B. The points on the map show under which dynasty each prefecture was established. Map II compares the prefectural cities of 140 A.D. with those listed by the Chin dynasty census of 280 A.D., recorded in the *ti-li chih* of *Chin shu* 14 and 15.<sup>3</sup>

Both maps illustrate prefectures in the same area, the territory of the Later Han provinces (州 *chou*) Yang 揚, Ching 荆 and Yi 益, together with parts of Chiao 交, Hsü 徐, Yü 豫, Ssu-li 司隸 and Liang 涼. The commanderies (郡 *chün*) and kingdoms (國 *kuo*) at the time of the census of 140 A.D. are listed below, and their capitals are shown, for reference purposes, on Map III<sup>4</sup>.

|                |             |    |
|----------------|-------------|----|
| Yang province: | Chiu-chiang | 九江 |
|                | Tan-yang    | 丹陽 |
|                | Lu-chiang   | 廬江 |
|                | K'uai-chi   | 會稽 |
|                | Wu          | 吳  |
|                | Yü-chang    | 豫章 |

Prefectures and Population in South China in the First Three Centuries A.D.

Ching province: Nan-yang 南陽

Nan 南

Chiang-hsia 江夏

Ling-ling 零陵

Kuei-yang 桂陽

Wu-ling 武陵

Ch'ang-sha 長沙

Yi province: Han-chung 漢中

Pa 巴

Kuang-han 廣漢

Shu 蜀

Chien-wei 犍爲

Tsang-ko 牂牁

Yüeh-hsi 越嶲

Yi-chou 益州

Yung-ch'ang 永昌

and the dependant states (屬國 *shu-kuo*) of Kuang-han, Shu, and Chien-wei

Chiao province: Nan-hai 南海

Ts'ang-wu 蒼梧

Yü-lin 鬱林

Ho-p'u 合浦

Hsü province: Kuang-ling 廣陵

Hsia-p'i 下邳

Yü province: Ju-nan 汝南

P'ei 沛

Ssu-li: Ching-chao 京兆

Yu-fu-feng 右扶風

Hung-nung 宏農

Liang province: Wu-tu 武都

Lung-hsi 隴西

Han-yang 漢陽

*The sources for the maps:*

The study of practical government was one of the chief reasons for the compilation of the standard histories, and the historians had a great quantity of material available to them, including the imperial archives. Each dynasty recorded



the placenames of its administrative divisions, and errors in one list can be corrected against contemporary texts or lists of earlier and later periods. The late Ch'ing scholar, Wang Hsien-ch'ien, summed up much of the geographical criticism in his *Han shu pu-chu* and *Hou Han shu chi-chieh*. Wang's commentaries, and the compilations of other scholars, make it possible to trace the history of each prefecture through the periods of Han, the Three Kingdoms and Chin.

In identifying the ancient sites of the prefectural capitals I have followed the commentaries to the standard histories, the historical atlas *Li-tai yü-ti yen-ko hsien yao t'u* of Yang Shou-ching, and *Chung-kuo ku-chin ti-ming ta-tz'u-tien* (*Encyclopaedia of Chinese Place-names*). The latter work, like other modern Chinese encyclopaedias of geography, is based on the *Ta-Ch'ing yi-t'ung-chih* 大清一統志 which was compiled by Hsü Ch'ien-hsüeh 徐乾學 (1631-1694) and others and was first printed in 1744. The great gazetteer is based largely on the commentaries to the standard histories, and its identifications of places in China are almost always accurate.

Despite these aids, however, in all three dynasties there are some prefectures whose sites are now uncertain. In each case, I have shown a tentative position. For such small-scale maps as these, there is little likelihood of serious error, since individual prefectures can be safely grouped with others whose sites are known and who were governed by the same commandery.

Beyond the borders of modern China the historical tradition is less reliable, and the records of ancient settlements in the territory of present-day Vietnam are unfortunately not sufficient to allow accurate identification of many of the prefectural sites of Han and Chin. For this reason, I have not extended the maps south of the border beyond modern Kwangtung and Kwangsi provinces, and so the three southernmost commanderies of the Later Han Chiao Province are omitted. These commanderies were Chiao-chih 交趾, Chiu-chen 九真 and Jih-nan 日南, and their territories ran in that order south along the coast of North and South Vietnam.

#### *Estimates of Population in Han and Chin:*

Before we can discuss the changes in the patterns of Chinese settlement from one dynasty to another, we must appreciate the quality of the statistics in the histories. Bielenstein has shown that the population of the empire, with slight fluctuations, remained at about fifty million individuals for the seven hundred years between Han and T'ang, a stability which is not unexpected for a

primitive economy where the bulk of the population was at the subsistence level.<sup>5</sup>

From this assumption, it appears that traditional records of great variations in numbers of people are based on misinterpretation of the material in the histories and are often caused through confusing census figures with taxation lists. *San-kuo chih* 8, p. 22b, says that at the end of Later Han only one-tenth of the former population remained, and the geographical treatise of *Chin shu* calculates that about 280 A.D. the total population of the empire was two and a half million households and some sixteen million individuals, a decline of three-quarters of the households and two-thirds of the individuals in the century and a half since the census of 140 A.D. About 363, Huan Wen 桓溫 of Eastern Chin claimed in a memorial that the population of the empire was no more than that of a commandery of Han.<sup>6</sup> However, the figures given by *San-kuo chih* and officials like Huan Wen were designed simply to impress their readers. It is impossible that any period of civil war should cause such devastation, and it is impossible that these figures are a true representation of the population of China. General statements were often intended to give an impression of disaster and difficulty, but it is far more likely that the Chinese of that time did not know themselves how many they were. In fact, although the *Chin shu* treatise gives a figure for the individuals in the whole empire, it records only the number of households in each commandery, and it is clear that the data come not from a census but from a taxation list.

As any modern government can understand, an accurate census requires a high degree of organisation and an effective control of the people who are to be counted. It is not surprising that the settled dynasties of Former and Later Han should have been able to accomplish such a task, and that the Chin dynasty, soon after the end of a long-drawn civil war, should have found the full work beyond its powers. Nevertheless, even as a taxation list, the figures in the *Chin shu* treatise reflect a weakness in the central government. Unlike the records of the two Han dynasties, which tried to give a precise figure for households and individuals, the Chin list describes the households of each commandery in round numbers. Where Later Han, for example, has the population of Yü-chang commandery as 406,496 households and 1,608,906 individuals, Chin has 35,000 households; where Later Han has 71,477 households and 250,282 individuals in Nan-hai, Chin has 9,500 households. Not only did the number of households decline, but the government was evidently prepared to base its assessments on

an approximate figure of taxable households, and it did not have sufficient energy for a full census.<sup>7</sup>

As we have seen, general estimates for the total population of the empire are quite unacceptable. It also happens, unfortunately, that even in the treatises the totals for major units such as provinces or for the whole country are very often wrong. In *Chin shu*, Liang province is said to have 76,300 households, but the total obtained by adding the figures for each commandery is 82,600; in *Hou Han shu* the total population of the empire is given as 9.7 million households and 49.2 million individuals, but the total of the census is 9.5 million households and 48 million individuals. Obviously, similar errors must have occurred when the prefectural returns were added together to give the figures for each commandery. Since the prefectural records are no longer preserved, we have no direct way to check the ancient addition, but the figures are comparatively small, and excessive errors can be checked by comparing each commandery with its neighbours and by considering the real probabilities of its population.<sup>8</sup>

The early Chinese administrators were far more reliable in their figures than any of their contemporaries in other civilisations, but they could still make mistakes in large-scale calculation. As a general rule, unsupported estimates of population are useless for statistical purposes, although they may be interesting evidence of official opinion at the time they were made. Other figures, presented with some basis of detail, can be accepted with care, although large numbers may be affected by mistakes in addition and should be checked against their subtotals. In all cases, the authority for the figures should be borne in mind, and it is clear that a detailed census carried out by a well-established and effective government will be more accurate than a collection of taxation returns from a weaker government in the early stages of a new administration. For the two Han dynasties, at least, the commandery populations appear realistic and reliable, but there is no list that gives details of prefectural totals, and these figures can only be estimated by taking an average of the commandery figures or by calculations from other administrative sources.

#### *Variations in the populations of prefectures:*

If every prefecture under every dynasty governed the same number of people, the maps of prefectures would also be accurate maps of population. Since the size of prefectures differed, both from place to place and from time to time, we must make some assessment of the effects of these variations before we can make

any use of prefectural maps for the purposes of demography.

The prefecture was the grass-roots level of the imperial administration. The chief officials of the prefectures were the lowest officials of the local government who received their appointment directly from the capital and who were commissioned officers of the emperor. Provincial and commandery units could be revised and adjusted for political or military reasons, but the internal security of the empire and the regular supply of taxation depended on the efficiency of the prefectural administrations, and these small units of local government were tied very closely to the people that they controlled.

Under Han, the rank and salary of the head of a prefectural administration was fixed by reference to the population under his command. A prefecture of more than 10,000 households was ruled by a Prefect (令 *ling*) with a salary rated at 1000 piculs (石 *shih*), prefectures with less than 10,000 households were ruled, by Chiefs (長 *chang*), with salaries of 400 or 300 piculs, depending on size. If a prefecture was the fief of a marquis (侯 *hou*), the Chancellor (相 *hsiang*) of the marquissate also had his salary determined by the same scale.<sup>9</sup> Under the Chin dynasty, prefectures were still headed by Prefects and Chiefs but the number of their subordinate officers (屬吏 *shu-li*) was also determined by the size of the prefecture. Where the population was less than 300 households, twenty-two officers could be appointed, and the number increased for populations up to 500, 1000, 1500 and 3000 households. For the largest prefectures, more than 3000 households, these junior officers numbered 114.<sup>10</sup> Both in the Han dynasties and in Chin, government appointments, and the expenses of official salaries, were directly related to the current census figures or taxation lists.

In these circumstances, no government was going to set up prefectures without good cause. Indeed, under Later Han, there is evidence that the local administration was lagging behind the movement of population. From 2 to 140 the populations of Ch'ang-sha, Ling-ling and Yü-chang commanderies increased five times: Ch'ang-sha rose from 235,825 individuals to 1,059,372, Ling-ling rose from 139,378 to 1,001,578, and Yü-chang rose from 351,965 to 1,608,906. Despite this immense increase, more than three million individuals, none of the commanderies were subdivided and few new prefectures were set up. As a result, in the three commanderies, the average population of each prefecture rose from 15,000 on 20,000 in Former Han to about 80,000 in Later Han. Although the administrative control over these developing territories must have become increas-

ingly slack, the central government saw no need for additional administrators.

This restrained and conservative policy towards the administrative divisions in the settled regions of the empire can also be traced in the records of the Wei and Chin dynasties. The area of Ju-nan and P'ei in Later Han contained 58 prefectures, 604,930 households and 3,352,181 individuals. In Former Han, the same area had contained 69 prefectures, about 800,000 households, and 4.3 million individuals; thus between 2 A.D. and 140 the population of the area had declined by about one quarter and about one sixth of the prefectures had been done away with. By 280 the area contained only 43 prefectures. It is not, in fact, very likely that the population had suffered any great decline: the imperial Ts'ao family of the state of Wei came from P'ei commandery, so the region would be favoured by imperial policy; and the economic records of the Chin dynasty mention considerable works of agriculture and irrigation which were carried out in the third century A.D.<sup>11</sup> Almost certainly, the decline in the number of prefectures represents the rationalisation of local government in a prosperous and settled area rather than a reflection of falling population.

From the histories, statistics and maps, it seems fair to assume that the prefectures of the three dynasties each bore the same relationship to the territories and the people that they administered. Population per prefecture varied greatly from time to time and from place to place, but the changing pattern of prefectures on the map gives a clue to the reality of population on the ground. In settled areas, the local organisation responded very little to increases in population, but in the frontier society of South China, where the Chinese people and their government advanced into the lands of the barbarians, the geography of administration illustrates the conquest.

#### *Government policy and Chinese migration:*

At this point of the discussion it is appropriate to clarify the two terms 'prefectures' and 'population' in the context of early South China. In the established ground north of the Yangtse, all territory was under the control of the imperial government, every person was a Chinese citizen, and the prefectural administrations, from their headquarters in leading cities, controlled all the people and all the land.

The situation in the south was different. Throughout the Later Han dynasty, under the pressure of Hsiung-nu 匈奴 and Ch'iang 羌 barbarians on the north and west, many Chinese had emigrated to the lands of the Yangtse valley,

bringing their cultural traditions with them, settling the level ground along the rivers and between the hills to farm the land as peasants, and still remaining subject to the imperial government. By the second century A.D., the Chinese population of the south had increased immensely, and the census of 140 recorded the change. However, the imperial censors only counted those who were registered as Chinese subjects. Many barbarians within the nominal borders of the Chinese empire in the south avoided the calculations of census and the rigours of taxation by escape into the hills and by defensive warfare against the local forces of the colonising Chinese. Blank spaces on a population map of the Chinese empire do not necessarily indicate an absence of people, but only their reluctance to be counted.

The existence of a prefecture was a question of administration and policy. When sufficient people had collected in one district to make it appropriate that they should be administered on the spot, prefectural offices were established (置 *chih*) with headquarters in one of the chief settlements. In some cases, the government found that administration could be carried on even though there was only one prefect to 80,000 people, in other circumstances, many prefectures contained fewer than 3,000 people. Obviously, when a prefecture was abolished (省 *sheng*), its territory was incorporated under a neighbouring administration, but the local inhabitants were little affected and generally stayed exactly where they were.

With these points in mind, it is clear that the frontier of the Chinese empire in the south during this early period was extremely fluid, and that individual prefectures in many cases were islands of settlement surrounded by non-Chinese peoples. Under the Han dynasties, from 2 to 140 A.D., the government in the north was not particularly interested in a forward policy south of the Yangtse. Several commanderies, such as Ch'ang-sha, Kuei-yang, and particularly Wu-ling, have a history of 'barbarian rebellion' at this time, which is surely the natural defensive reaction of the non-Chinese people to the pressure of colonisation. The government, however, though it organised armies to restore order, made little attempt to extend its sway over the difficult country of the highlands. Without official support for expansion, the Chinese immigrants from the north moved into the areas already lightly settled, and they consolidated, rather than advanced, the frontiers of the Chinese world. Those few who went further out, establishing themselves in the wilderness beyond the control of the prefectures, ceased to be Chinese subjects.



*From Han to Chin:*

In the half-century after the Later Han census of 140, the government of the empire declined steadily into chaos. By 190, the dynasty was in the final stages of collapse, and rival warlords competed for the succession to power. By 220, when the last Emperor made his formal abdication, three great states had divided China between them. In the north, the Wei dynasty of the Ts'ao 曹 family controlled the heartlands of the empire about the Yellow River valley until 266, when a coup-d'état of the Ssu-ma 司馬 family established the Chin dynasty. In the west, the adventurer Liu Pei 劉備 took over the government of the Later Han Yi Province in 214, and he and his descendants ruled the territory of modern Szechwan, Kweichow and Yünnan until the conquest by Wei in 263. In the south and east, the Sun 孫 family of Wu had gained control of the middle and lower Yangtse by 200, and the state was not conquered by Chin until 280. At its greatest extent, Wu could claim all the territory south and east of the Kweichow hills, across the Nan Ling into modern Kwangtung and Kwangsi, and south along the coast of Vietnam.

This century of division brought disorder to much of settled China, although it is not likely that the warfare of the times caused a large-scale or long-lasting fall in population. When armies marched, they could leave a swathe of devastation behind them, but the effect was essentially transitory. Despite the accounts of contemporaries, there is evidence from Map II that the requirements of war in many districts actually stimulated the development of colonisation. On the borders of the state of Shu, where mountain ranges gave opportunities for close defence, settlements were encouraged close to the frontier on both sides, largely for military purposes.

On the eastern section of the frontier between Wei and Wu, in the marshy ground near the junction of the Han with the Yangtse, a similar situation prevailed. Both states set their prefectures extremely close, several prefectures were contested, and Chiang-hsia commandery was divided between them. Further east, however, on the flat open ground between the Hwai and the Yangtse, in the territory of the Later Han commanderies of Lu-chiang, Chiu-chiang and Kuangling, the country was too exposed to be habitable in time of war. Both sides could raid, and neither side could successfully protect peaceful pursuits in forward areas. As a result, many of the prefectures were abandoned,<sup>12</sup> and although Wei maintained the development of the Hwai valley by agricultural colonies and

large-scale irrigation, the colonisation of the lands in this border area received a set-back from which it had only begun to recover under Chin.

*The state of Wu and the development of the south:*

Map I, from Former Han to Later Han, shows a static policy. Map II, from Later Han to Chin, is a picture of expansion. In south and east China, the territory of the state of Wu, the number of prefectures more than doubled between Later Han and Chin. In 140 A.D., the area of Wu south of the Yangtse had contained 174 prefectures; in 280, 13 of these had been abolished, but 197 new ones had been set up.<sup>13</sup> Not only had local government increased intensity at this time, but new districts had been opened where no settlement was recorded in the past.

In the west, the conservative policy of Shu is a striking contrast. In 140 A.D. the area of the state contained 122 prefectures; but by 280, 14 had disappeared and only 34 new ones had been established.

The difference between the two states obviously reflects different government policies. Both Wu and Shu were anxious to gain the support of non-Chinese people for their warfare against the northern state of Wei. The position was serious, for it can be calculated that the area of Wei had contained seven-tenths of the Chinese population at the time of Later Han, that Wu had one-fifth, and Shu only a tenth. In Shu, however, according to the histories, the great minister Chu-ko Liang 諸葛亮 was content to defeat and pacify the barbarian tribes and then leave them to the government of their own chieftains so long as they paid practical allegiance to the court.<sup>14</sup>

In Wu, the government was far more active. In the very earliest years of the state, the general Ho Ch'i 賀齊 had been given command of the region south of Hangchow Bay, with orders to subdue the barbarians and 'rebels' and to extend the boundaries of K'uai-chi commandery.<sup>15</sup> About the same time, the great minister Lu Hsün 陸遜 gave his advice to Sun Ch'üan 孫權, the ruler of Wu:

'At this time, all the brave men are fighting for power, and they look over the empire like wolves upon their prey. Without great numbers of men, it is impossible to defeat enemies or to settle disorders. Moreover, the rebels of the hills have long been a trouble to us, and they rely on the natural difficulties of their lands. Until this heart of our country is at peace, it will be difficult to make any plans for action at a distance. The best thing to do is to raise strong armies and seize their best soldiers.'<sup>16</sup>



Sun Ch'üan supported this policy, and even while his state was fighting for survival against attack from the north and west, expeditions were sent regularly into the difficult land of the hills. East of the Po-yang Lake, and south and west of Hangchow Bay, the people known variously as 'barbarians of the hills' (山越 *Shan-yüeh*), 'hills bandits' (山賊 *shan-tse*) or simply as 'hills people' (山民 *shan-min*), were steadily brought under the control of the Sun government. Some were certainly non-Chinese, others were refugees who had fled from the disorders of civil war, but all the able men were immediately pressed into the armies of Wu to serve on the frontier against Wei, and the rest of the captives were settled on flat ground and administered by prefectures.<sup>17</sup> In 237, in Tan-yang, Chu-ko K'o 諸葛恪 starved the *Shan-yüeh* from the hills by a policy of strategic hamlets and by an 'Open Arms' programme, and from the literary evidence it appears that the government of Wu had pressed its power at that time far into the territory which was formerly uncontrolled.<sup>18</sup> By the middle of the third century, the Yangtse valley and the hills around it were firmly in the hands of a Chinese government, and the people who lived in those remote regions were brought to swell the armies of Wu and to help maintain the defences of the state in civil war.

By its exertions on these frontiers of the Chinese world, the government of Wu survived against odds and maintained its power. Even after the fall of Shu, another seventeen years were gone before Wu succumbed to the overwhelming forces of the new empire of Chin. The taxation list of 280 preserves a picture of the structure of local administration in the fallen empire, and one generation later, by the irony of fate, the ruling house of Chin was itself compelled to take refuge in the lands of the southeast. The third century defences of Wu along the Yangtse became the battle-lines of Eastern Chin and the succeeding Chinese dynasties of the south as they struggled to survive against the barbarian tribal states that had conquered and ruled North China, and in this period of division the southern dynasties maintained their economic and military power on the foundations laid by the state of Wu. In later centuries, the balance of power and civilisation swung to the south, from the Yellow River to the Yangtse, but the beginnings of that movement came in the first centuries A.D., and its impetus developed from the policies and achievements of Wu.

## NOTES

- 1 'The Census of China...', pp. 127-131 and 145 and Plate IV.
- 2 In his article on 'The Chinese Colonisation of Fukien until the end of T'ang', Bielenstein has used the placement of prefectures for a study of demography. The present work deals, in much the same way, with a wider area but a more limited time.
- 3 The date of the Former Han census, and hence evidently of the list of prefectures, is given as the second year of the Yüan-shih 元始 period in *Han shu* 28A, p. 11a. The Later Han date appears similarly in *Hou Han shu* treatise 19, p. 5b, as the fifth year of Yung-ho 永和.  
*Chin shu* 14, p. 7a, gives a total census figure for the whole empire, by households (戶 *hu*) and individuals (口 *k'ou*), as in the first year of T'ai-k'ang 太康 reign-period (also written 泰康), which is generally equated to 280 A.D. Since the last ruler of the state of Wu surrendered in the third month of that year, no census of any form could have been compiled for the whole empire of Chin before that time. On the other hand, *Chin shu* 15, p. 4a, refers to Shun-yang 順陽 and Yi-yang 義陽 commanderies being established 'during T'ai-k'ang' (太康中), which seems to imply a slightly later date than the very first year of that reign-period.  
The list of commanderies and prefectures in *Chin shu* cannot have been compiled later than the third year of T'ai-k'ang, for *Chin shu* 14, pp. 15b and 18b, while listing the two provinces of Ch'in 秦 and Ning 寧, notes that they were abolished as separate entities in that year. It seems clear, then, that the list of provinces, commanderies and prefectures in the *Chin shu* treatise was compiled soon after the fall of Wu in 280 A.D. and certainly no later than 282.  
It may be noted that a 'geographical record' (*Ti chi*) and a list of names of provinces, commanderies and prefectures (*Chou chün hsien ming*), both compiled in the third year of T'ai-k'ang, are recorded by the bibliographical treatise of the two T'ang histories (e.g. *Chiu T'ang shu* 46, p. 29a, in the Po-na edition). Fragments of the former work have been collected by the Ch'ing scholar Pi Yüan and by others, and the partial reconstruction of the *Chin T'ai-k'ang san-nien ti chi* differs on some few points with the *Chin shu* treatise.
- 4 In Later Han, there was no practical administrative distinction between a commandery and a kingdom. A commandery was governed by a Grand Administrator (太守 *t'ai-shou*), who was appointed by the court. A Kingdom was a commandery which has been granted to one of the cadets of the imperial house as a fief, but it was administered by a Chancellor (相 *hsiang*), who was appointed on the same terms as a Grand Administrator of a commandery, and the King (王 *wang*) had no power but merely received a pension from the revenues of his state. Both commanderies and Kingdoms were grouped into provinces and were subject to supervision from Inspectors (刺史 *ts'u-shih*). Inspectors were lower in rank than Grand Administrators and Chancellors and they had no executive authority over them, but they were empowered to report direct to the capital on the conduct of the local government in their districts.
- 5 'The Census of China ...', p. 157.
- 6 *Chin shu* 98, p. 14a. Ju-nan was the most populous commandery of Han, with 461,587 households and 2,596,148 individuals.
- 7 It must be pointed out that Yü-chang and Nan-hai commanderies of Later Han were very much larger than the territories of the same names under Chin. At the end of Later Han and during the Three Kingdoms, old commanderies were often subdivided. *Hou Han shu* lists 99 commandery units in the whole empire, but *Chin shu*, for essentially the same area, has 173. As a result of this sort of change, direct comparison between the larger units of one dynasty and another is generally meaningless.
- 8 For example, in 'The Census of China...', Bielenstein has made appropriate corrections of the population of P'ei under Later Han from 251,939 to 1,251,939 individuals, and Ch'en from 1,547,572 to 547,572 individuals (p. 159).
- 9 *Han shu* 19A, p. 14b, *Hou Han shu* treatise 28, p. 7a, and *Li-tai chih-kuan piao* 54. A Marquis could be enfeoffed with a prefecture in the same way that a King was enfeoffed with a commandery: a Chancellor was appointed instead of a Prefect or Chief, but the recipient of the title

- gained no power, but only a pension, from his nominal fief.
- 10 *Chin shu* 24, p. 14b.
  - 11 Yang Lien-sheng, 'Notes on the Economic History of the Chin Dynasty', pp. 164-170.
  - 12 e.g. *San-kuo chih* 14, p. 18b.
  - 13 These are the totals for all prefectures in the state of Wu south of the Yangtse, including those belonging to the commanderies in modern Vietnam, not shown on the maps.
  - 14 e.g. *San-kuo chih* 35, pp. 8a and 8b, commentary quoting the *Han-Chin ch'un-ch'iu* 漢晉春秋 by Hsi Tso-ch'ih 習鑿齒 of the fourth century.
  - 15 *San-kuo chih* 60, pp. 1b ff.
  - 16 *San-kuo chih* 58, p. 1b.
  - 17 e.g. *San-kuo chih* 66, pp. 3b f and 17b.
  - 18 *San-kuo chih* 64, pp. 3a-4a. For similar policy further west in Wu-ling, see *San-kuo chih* 61, p. 2a.

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